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Abstract
Health care decision-makers face several uncertainties regarding pharmaceutical
products. For new and expensive drugs, the performance outside of clinical trials could
be uncertain. For old and low-profit pharmaceutical products, the supply could be
uncertain, causing drug shortages. In three essays, I study mitigating strategies to deal
with different types of uncertainties associated with pharmaceutical products.
In the first essay, I compare two types of pharmaceutical reimbursement contracts
to mitigate the uncertainties associated with new and expensive drugs. I construct a
game-theoretic model to analyze the interactions between a pharmaceutical manufacturer
and a payer. The payer’s reimbursement of a drug is either related to the costeffectiveness or the sales volume of the drug in the two contracts, respectively. I find key
factors that determine the two parties’ preferences for the two contracts. I also find
conditions under which each type is preferred by both parties and can achieve a Pareto
improvement.
In the second essay, I study mitigating strategies for drug shortage, which has
become a serious problem in many countries in recent years. I construct a multi-period
supply chain model to analyze the interactions between a representative hospital and an
unreliable pharmaceutical manufacturer. The hospital owns an in-house manufacturer and
can procure the drug from the two manufacturing facilities. I also assume that the hospital
can make emergency production. I study the two parties’ procurement and production
decisions and examine the impacts of the hospital’s optimal decisions on the external
manufacturer’s profit.
In the third essay, I study mitigating strategies for drug shortages from the
governments’ perspective. I construct a game-theoretic model consisting of a
pharmaceutical manufacturer, a wholesaler, and a government. I compare two types of
mitigating strategies that the government can implement: providing subsidies to the
wholesaler, or using a government-owned manufacturer. I identify key factors for the
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government’s preference over the two strategies and examine the impact on the private
sector.
The three essays have theoretical contributions to game theory and supply chain
risk management literature and have policy implications for policymakers to manage
drug supply and patient access to drugs.
Keywords
Healthcare Policies, Pharmaceutical, Uncertainties, Game Theory, Supply Chain
Management, Pharmaceutical Reimbursement Contracts, Risk-Sharing Agreements, Drug
Shortages, Dual-Sourcing, Contingent Sourcing, Subsidy
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Summary for Lay Audience
Health care decision-makers face several uncertainties regarding pharmaceutical products
when making decisions. For new and expensive drugs, their performance in the realworld could be uncertain. For old and low-price drugs, there could be manufacturing
problems, which may cause drug shortages. In this thesis, I study strategies to deal with
different types of uncertainties associated with pharmaceutical products.
In the first essay, I compare two types of drug reimbursement contracts. I assume
a drug company is selling a new and expensive drug to treat patients with a disease. A
payer (e.g., government drug benefit programs or insurance companies) is considering
covering the drug so that patients do not need to pay from their own pockets. However,
the payer may have two concerns: 1) the health benefit that the drug can provide to the
general patients may be lower than that in the clinical trials; and 2) more drugs may be
sold than originally estimated, causing a higher expenditure to the payer. Therefore, the
payer is considering two reimbursement contracts in which the payment to the
manufacturer is linked to either the health benefit or the sales volume of the drug. We
identify circumstances in which both the manufacturer and the payer prefer the same type
of contract, which can achieve a win-win situation.
In the second essay, I study mitigating strategies for drug shortages, which has
become a serious problem in many countries in recent years. Due to the prevalence of
drug shortages of many common drugs, several US hospitals allied and established a
manufacturer to produce certain generic drugs to make the drugs more available for
patients. Motivated by this initiative, I analyze when the hospitals would benefit from
owning a drug manufacturer, and what are the impacts on the external manufacturers.
In the third essay, I study government interventions on mitigating drug shortages.
I compare two types of government interventions: providing subsidies or using a public
manufacturer. I find that the government should provide subsidies to inexpensive but
critical generic drugs without alternatives, and it should use a public manufacturing
facility to produce expensive lifesaving drugs.
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Chapter 1
1

Introduction

Health care decision-makers face several uncertainties regarding pharmaceutical
products. For new and expensive drugs, the performance outside of clinical trials could
be uncertain. For example, in real clinical practice, the effectiveness of new drugs could
be lower than the efficacy observed in clinical trials. This is because clinical tries usually
have targeted patients with higher adherence levels (Adamski et al., 2010). Sales volume
could be larger than originally anticipated due to factors such as poor forecasts, off-label
usage, expansion of indication, and marketing effort by the manufacturers (Zhang et al.,
2011). Many payers use a formulary (a list of drugs that will be reimbursed by the payer)
to manage and control pharmaceutical spending. However, the uncertainties add
significant risks to the payers when making formulary decisions.
To better control pharmaceutical expenditure and manage patient access to drugs
in the presence of various uncertainties, there emerged “risk-sharing agreements”
between payers and pharmaceutical companies in recent years (Adamski et al., 2010).
Under a risk-sharing agreement, the reimbursement price of a drug is related to its
performance in the real world. For example, Price-Volume Agreements (PVAs) are
widely used in many European counties to deal with sales uncertainties and control
financial expenditure. Under a PVA, the manufacturer receives partial or no payment for
sales that exceed a pre-agreed volume threshold (Zhang and Zaric, 2015; Zhang et al.,
2011). To deal with uncertainty in the effectiveness of new drugs, outcome-based
schemes are adopted by payers and health systems. For example, in 2002, the National
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in UK established an outcome-based
contract with pharmaceutical manufacturers for beta interferon to treat multiple sclerosis.
According to the agreement, drug manufacturers have to pay refunds to NICE if the costeffectiveness of the drugs exceeds a threshold value of £35,000/ quality-adjusted life year
(QALY) gained (Adamski et al., 2010).
In addition, many old and low-profit drugs, such as generic drugs, are vulnerable
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to to supply uncertainties caused by manufacturing problems (e.g., quality problems,
production technology malfunction, and production delays) due to low profit margins,
complex production processes, and high market concentration (Jia and Zhao, 2017;
Malacos, 2019; Woodcock and Wosinska, 2013). For example, saline, the most widely
used fluid in medical facilities and hospitals, has experienced several shortages in the US
since 2014. Due to the low profit margin, manufacturers’ pursuit of economies of scale,
and market consolidation, there are only three major saline manufacturers in the US.
Most shortages are caused by manufacturing problems such as recalls due to quality
issues, and manufacturing delays due to natural disasters at the overseas facilities (MazerAmirshahi and Fox 2018). Shortages not only have clinical consequences such as inferior
outcomes, increased morbidity and mortality, but also add significant costs to health care
systems due to replacement cost and staff time (Alevizakos et al., 2016; Fox et al., 2014;
Hedman, 2016). In order to reduce shortages, government agencies, such as the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) in the US, are taking actions to collaborate with the
pharmaceutical industry by sharing information, searching for alternative manufacturers,
or importing critical drugs in shortage directly from other overseas manufacturers (Food
and Drug Administration, 2018). However, drug shortages are still prevalent. For
example, in June 2018, the US experienced shortages for 182 drugs and pharmaceutical
supplies, affecting all common drug classes (Hoffman, 2018).
To mitigate supply uncertainties, several US hospitals allied and established a notfor-profit pharmaceutical company named “Civica Rx” in 2018 to produce certain drugs
(Kodjak, 2018; Tirrell, 2018). By July 2020, more than 50 health systems are members of
Civica RX, representing more than 1,200 US hospitals and over 30 percent of all licensed
US hospital beds (Civica Rx, 2020). Governments are also important stakeholders in
managing drug supply and patient access to drugs. Policymakers proposed various
government interventions to mitigate drug shortages such as maintaining public lists of
essential drugs with limited supply or expected supply shortages, providing subsidies to
those drugs, and producing those drugs at public manufacturers. (MacLeod, 2020;
McGinley, 2019; Milne et al., 2017).
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In this thesis, I study the optimal policies on managing drug supply and patient
access to drugs in the presence of various uncertainties. Using a game-theoretic approach,
I study the dynamics of key stakeholders’ optimal decisions, and the impacts of the
interactions on their welfare. I analyze the efficiency of different drug reimbursement
schemes between payers and pharmaceutical companies when the performance of the
drug in the real-world is uncertain. I study the efficiency of strategies to mitigate drug
shortages from hospitals and governments’ perspective, respectively, when the
manufacturing process is subject to supply uncertainties. In three essays, I analyze
policymakers’ optimal policy decisions under different circumstances and the impact of
each policy on the benefit of other parties such as the pharmaceutical manufacturers and
wholesalers.
Overview of Three Essays
In the first essay, I compare two types of risk-sharing agreement to mitigate uncertainties
in new and expensive drugs. Previous studies have investigated the performance of
financial-based risk-sharing agreements (Zaric and O'Brien, 2005; Zhang and Zaric,
2015; Zhang et al., 2011) and outcome-based risk-sharing agreements (Antonanzas et al.,
2011; Barros, 2011; Mahjoub et al., 2014). There are limited studies that compared
different types of risk-sharing agreements. For example, Zaric and Xie (2009) compared
two outcome-based agreements, and Levaggi (2014) compared the welfare of a listing
process through uncertain bargaining and a value-based pricing agreement with risksharing. However, none of these studies compared a financial-based risk-sharing
agreement with an outcome-based risk-sharing agreement.
To fill this gap, I construct a game-theoretic model consisting of a payer and a
pharmaceutical company to compare a volume-based risk-sharing agreement (PVA) with
a value-based risk-sharing agreement (based on the cost-effectiveness of the drug). There
are two sequential decisions in the model. First, the payer selects from the two risksharing agreements to determine how a new drug will be reimbursed. Next, the
pharmaceutical company decides its level of marketing effort that can affect both sales
volume and cost-effectiveness of the drug. This study captures two types of uncertainties
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that may affect the performance of a new drug: 1) uncertainties in patients’ health
benefits from the drug, which reflects patients’ heterogeneity in response to the same
drug; and 2) heterogeneity in physicians’ prescribing behavior that can be caused by
differences in interpreting clinical guidelines for patient treatment eligibility.
I find that each risk-sharing agreement may or may not be able to align the
incentives of the two parties, depending on different circumstances. Under some
circumstances, none of the two agreements can be mutually preferred by payers and
manufacturers, which may explain the resistance from one party during the
implementation, as observed in reality. For example, if the drug price is either low or
high, then neither of the risk-sharing agreements could be mutually preferred by the two
parties. Under some other circumstances, a properly selected risk-sharing agreement can
be mutually preferred by the two parties, which creates a “win-win situation and leads to
a smooth implementation. For example, if the drug price is intermediate, then the two
parties may prefer the same agreement depending on patient treatment eligibility for the
drug (specified in clinical guidelines). Specifically, if a relatively large proportion of
patients are eligible for the drug, then both parties may prefer a volume-based policy. If a
relatively small portion of patients are eligible for the drug, then a volume-based policy
may be mutually preferred by the two parties. Therefore, neither risk-sharing agreement
is a universal solution that can be applied in all situations, and payers should not always
stick to one type of agreement. For example, some payers prefer to use a volume-based
agreement for ease of negotiation and implementation, and this study indicates that
payers may be better off by applying a value-based risk-sharing agreement in some cases.
In the second essay, I study the hospital’s sourcing strategy and inventory
management policies to mitigate drug shortage. Several previous studies investigated
sourcing strategies to mitigate supply uncertainties from a single firm’s perspective
(Tomlin, 2006; Xanthopoulos et al., 2012), and some studies analyzed the interactions
between buyer(s) and supplier(s) under supply uncertainty with a single-period setting
(He and Zhang, 2008; Keren, 2009; Li et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2010). In this study, I
construct a multi-period supply chain model to analyze the interactions between a
representative hospital and an unreliable pharmaceutical manufacturer (the external
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manufacturer). The hospital owns an in-house manufacturer and can procure the drug
from the two manufacturing facilities. I assume the hospital also has a second chance to
make emergency production at the in-house producer. I assume the manufacturing
process has a random yield rate to capture the main cause of drug shortages, which is
manufacturing problems. I analyze the hospital’s ordering and production decisions, and
the external manufacturer’s production decision. First, I analytically characterize the
optimal solutions in a single-period setting and generate insights into the structures of the
long-term procurement decisions for each party. Next, I propose two long-term inventory
management policies and evaluate the performance of the two policies in the multi-period
setting with a heuristic.
There are several findings. I find that the expected shortage amount can be
reduced if the hospital operates an in-house producer as its regular source or contingent
source, indicating the importance of the establishment of additional drug suppliers such
as Civica Rx. The hospital would benefit from using the in-house manufacturer to make
regular production if the in-house production cost is low, the external manufacturer’s
yield rate is low, or the external manufacturer’s yield is highly uncertain. The hospital
should make use of emergency production at the in-house producer if the emergency
production cost is relatively low compared with the revenue of the drug and the shortage
cost.
The analysis also shows that the two long-term inventory management policies
have comparable and relatively high performance for the hospital, indicating that the
hospital can use either policy for its long-term inventory management practice. However,
the manufacturer’s yield rate has a large impact on its performance if one of these
inventory management policies is used, indicating that it is beneficial for the
manufacturer to make investments on improving its reliability.
In the third essay, I study mitigating strategies for drug shortages from the
governments’ perspective. I construct a game-theoretic model consisting of a private
manufacturer, a wholesaler, and a government. The wholesaler procures the drug from
the manufacturing facilities and sells it to the downstream demand, such as hospitals and
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pharmacies. I consider two types of government interventions to mitigate drug shortages:
establishing a public manufacturer, or providing subsidies to the wholesaler. I construct
three models corresponding to three strategies that can be implemented by the
government: 1) a basic model (the status quo), in which the government does not
intervene; 2) a dual sourcing model, in which the government operates public
manufacturer, and the wholesaler can procure the drug from the two manufacturing
facilities; and 3) a subsidy model, in which the government provides subsidies based on
the wholesaler’s unit procurement cost or its unit selling price. I analytically characterize
the optimal decision for the three parties and compare their welfare under different
strategies.
I show the advantages and disadvantages of each strategy. An advantage of both
mitigating strategies is that the shortage amount can be reduced by either strategy
compared with the status quo, indicating the positive effect of the two strategies on
mitigating shortages. An advantage of a subsidy strategy is that it can align the incentives
of all three parties and achieve an “all-win” situation. However, a disadvantage is that the
supply chain remains a sole sourcing situation under a subsidy strategy, and is thus more
vulnerable to supply uncertainties compared to supply chains with multiple suppliers. In
contrast, an advantage of a dual sourcing strategy is that it adds a supplier of the drug,
which eases the market concentration and makes the supply chain more reliable and
resilient to supply uncertainties. A disadvantage is that a dual sourcing strategy cannot be
mutually preferred by all three parties, because the private manufacturer is no better off
compared with the status quo. In some circumstances, the wholesaler may prefer to
procure everything from the public manufacturer, and the private manufacturer is not
making any profit. In this situation, the private manufacturer may exit the market, leaving
the public manufacturer the sole supplier of the drug. Therefore, the government and/or
the wholesaler may need to provide incentives to the private manufacturer to keep it in
the market and maintain the dual-sourcing situation in the long term. I also provide
analysis regarding governments' optimal policies to mitigate drug shortages under
different circumstances, which has implications for policymakers.
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Chapter 2
2

Essay 1: Value or Volume? A Comparison of Two Risk
Sharing Approaches
Introduction

The large proportion of pharmaceutical spending in both health expenditures and gross
domestic product is a big concern in many countries. For example, 20% of health
expenditures were spent on pharmaceuticals in Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries in 2013 (Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 2015). Many payers use a formulary (a list of drugs that will be
reimbursed by the payer) to manage and contain pharmaceutical spending (Zaric and Xie,
2009).
However, when making formulary listing and reimbursement decisions, there are
several uncertainties such as the sales volume or the effectiveness of new drugs. Sales
volumes could be larger than originally anticipated due to factors such as poor forecasts,
off-label usage, expansion of indication, and marketing effort by the manufacturers
(Zhang et al., 2011). The effectiveness of new drugs in real clinical practice could be
lower than the efficacy in clinical trials, which usually have targeted patients with higher
adherence levels (Antonanzas et al., 2011). To deal with these uncertainties, many payers
have adopted risk-sharing agreements under which the reimbursement for a
pharmaceutical product is related to its performance in real-world settings (Adamski et
al., 2010).
Although the uncertainties in both sales volume and health outcome co-exist in
many situations, we are not aware of any direct theoretical comparisons between sales
volume-based and health outcome-based contracts. Our study intends to fill an important
gap by comparing the performance of a sales volume-based agreement and a costeffectiveness-based agreement to provide theoretical foundations for selection and
decision making in the future. We focus on the comparison between a sales volume-based
agreement and a value-based cost-effectiveness rebate.
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To control financial expenditure, a price-volume agreement (PVA) uses a sales
threshold, and manufacturers must pay a partial or full rebate to payers for excessive
sales over the threshold. These contracts are widely used in Australia and many European
countries (Adamski et al., 2010). To manage the uncertainties in health outcomes, a
value-based cost-effectiveness rebate (CER) specifies a cost-effectiveness threshold and
manufacturers pay rebates to payers if the drug fails to meet the benchmark (Adamski et
al., 2010). A well-known example of this type of plan was in the listing for Multiple
Sclerosis drugs in the UK (Palace et al., 2015). These risk-sharing agreements are
expected to help payers control pharmaceutical spendings, increase “value for money”,
and also facilitate earlier patient access to breakthrough drugs and treatments.
Several studies have investigated the performance of a PVA (Zaric and O'Brien,
2005; Zhang and Zaric, 2011, 2015; Zhang et al., 2011) and some examined the
efficiency of a CER (Antonanzas et al., 2011; Barros, 2011). Limited studies compared
different types of risk-sharing agreements. For example, Zaric and Xie (2009) compared
two cost-effectiveness-based agreements and showed that the optimal agreements for the
two parties depend on several factors and neither of them is always preferred by either
party. (Levaggi, 2014) compared the welfare of a listing through an uncertain bargaining
process and a value-based pricing agreement with risk sharing, and showed that the total
welfare is always better under a value-based pricing scheme but the distribution of the
benefits between consumers and the manufacturer depends on the rebate rate.
We are not aware of any direct comparisons between a sales volume-based and a
health outcome-based agreement. In this study, we construct a game-theoretical model
consisting of a manufacturer and third-party payer to compare the desirability of a PVA
and a CER by the two parties. It should be noted that the two contracts under comparison
are not always applicable in reality. For example, a CER is not an option when outcome
is not measurable. However, our study intends to provide insights into situations where
both contracts are available options and need to be compared. We model the
manufacturer’s marketing efforts explicitly as it can significantly affect both the cost-
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effectiveness and the sales volume of a new drug. To our knowledge, our study is the first
modelling paper on the theoretical comparison of the two risk-sharing approaches.

Literature Review
We first survey theoretical studies on health-outcome based risk-sharing agreements. Zaric
and Xie (2009) compared two risk-sharing agreements (a delisting scheme and a rebate
scheme) based on the effectiveness of a new drug by modelling a manufacturer’s optimal
decisions on the drug price and marketing effort. The authors reported that the performance
of the two schemes depends on several factors and none of them is always preferred by the
manufacturer or the payer. Two studies (Antonanzas et al., 2011; Barros, 2011) analyzed
the performance of health-outcome based risk-sharing agreements based on patient level
effectiveness. Barros (2011) modeled the interaction between a manufacturer and a payer
with and without a risk-sharing agreement. the manufacturer decides the drug price
whereas the payer decides patient eligiblity for a new drug through a cutoff threshold on
the effectiveness of the drug. The author found that too many patients may be treated under
a risk-sharing agreement, and social welfare may decrease if the manufacturer anticipates
a future risk-sharing agreement while deciding the drug price. Antonanzas et al. (2011)
constructed a Nash-bargaining game with risk-sharing agreement in which the price of a
new drug is negociated between a manufacturer and a payer depending on their bargaining
power. The authors found that fewer patients are treated under a risk-sharing agreement,
which is in contrast to the results in Barros (2011). The authors also concluded that the
optimal contract depends on factors such as monitoring costs, the marginal production cost,
etc. However, none of the above studies on health-outcome based risk-sharing agreements
considered comparison with financial-based risk-sharing agreements, leaving an important
theoretical gap.
Next, we investigate non-modeling literature on success factors, challenges,
barriers, and other aspects of risk-sharing agreements. Several studies constructed
taxonomy to categorize existing risk-sharing agreements (Adamski et al., 2010; Carlson et
al., 2010; Garrison et al., 2013; Towse and Garrison, 2010). Some studies summarized
challenges of risk-sharing agreements such as high administration cost, low transparency,
lack of data collecting infrastructure, the additional burden to the existing health care
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systems, and conflict of interests (Adamski et al., 2010; McCabe et al., 2010; Stafinski et
al., 2010; Towse and Garrison, 2010).
Our study extends the literature by comparing the performance of two different
types of risk-sharing agreements while taking into account the manufacturer’s decision on
marketing effort after a reimbursement scheme is signed. To our knowledge, our study is
the first theoretical comparison between a financial-based risk-sharing agreement with a
health-outcome based risk-sharing agreement, which fills an important gap in the existing
literature.

Model
We construct a game-theoretic model to analyze the interactions between a payer and a
pharmaceutical manufacturer (referred to as the manufacturer). We assume that the
manufacturer received regulatory approval to sell a new drug, and the payer is
considering listing the drug on its formulary. To manage the uncertainties in the sales
volume and cost-effectiveness of the new drug, the payer is considering choosing from
two risk-sharing agreements: a price-volume agreement (referred to as PVA, and a valuebased cost-effectiveness rebate (referred to as CER). Let 𝑖 be the index for the two risksharing agreements, 𝑖 ∈ {𝑃𝑉𝐴, 𝐶𝐸𝑅}. All model notation is summarized in Table 2.1.
We normalize the size of the patient population to one. Let 𝛽 ≥ 0 be the
incremental health benefit for a patient using the new drug compared with the current
standard of treatment. The units of 𝛽 could be quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), life
years (LYs) or any other units that the payer cares about. We assume that 𝛽 is a random
variable distributed on the interval [𝛽, 𝛽], according to a probability density function
(PDF) 𝑓(∙) and a cumulative distribution function (CDF) 𝐹(∙). The randomness of 𝛽
captures patients’ heterogeneity in the incremental health benefit that may be attributed to
patient characteristics (e.g., age, gender, health condition) or other factors. Let 𝜆 be the
payer’s willingness to pay for each unit of the incremental health benefit.
We assume that the payer applies a threshold policy to determine the treatment
eligibility (i.e., the prescribing criteria) for the new drug: there is a threshold of the
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Table 2.1: Summary of notation
Decisions
The manufacturer’s marketing effort
𝑚
𝑖
The payer’s choice of the risk-sharing agreement, 𝑖 ∈ {𝑃𝑉𝐴, 𝐶𝐸𝑅}
Random Variable
Incremental health benefit per patient under the new drug compared with the
𝛽
current standard treatment
Heterogeneity in doctors’ prescribing behavior
𝜖
Parameters
Lower bound and upper bound of 𝛽
𝛽, 𝛽
𝑓(∙), 𝐹(∙) PDF and CDF of 𝛽
Payer’s willingness to pay threshold
𝜆
Treatment eligibility threshold of the new drug, i.e., the lower bound of
𝑦
incremental health benefit for patients who are eligible for the new drug
𝜖, 𝜖
Lower bound and upper bound of 𝜖
𝑔(∙), 𝐺(∙) PDF and CDF of 𝜖
Parameter of the efficiency of the marketing effort in the cost function
𝑘
List price of the new drug
𝑝
Manufacturer’s marginal production cost per unit of drug
𝑐𝑀
Payer’s non-drug related cost per unit of drug
𝑐𝑃
Payer’ implementation cost of contract 𝑖 per unit of drug
𝑎𝑃𝑖
Volume threshold for rebate in a PVA
𝑥
Calculated Quantities
Expected total sales of the new drug.
𝑄
Expected total health benefit of the new drug
𝐵
𝑖
Expected total rebate in contract 𝑖
𝑆
𝑖
Manufacturer’s expected profit
𝜋𝑀
Payer’s expected payoff
𝜋𝑃𝑖
Other notation
Superscript for optimal value
∗

incremental health benefit (referred to as the treatment eligibility threshold), 𝑦, such that
all patients with 𝛽 ≥ 𝑦 will be treated with the new drug, and patients with 𝛽 < 𝑦 will be
treated with the current standard of treatment. We assume that the treatment eligibility
threshold is specified in a clinical guideline that has been determined by a third-party
organization, which is exogenous to our model and does not depend on other parameters.
For example, in the risk-sharing agreement for four Multiple Sclerosis (MS) drugs in the
UK established in 2002, the government agreed to fund the drugs to treat MS patients
according to the guideline set by the Association of British Neurologists (ABN) in 2001
(Adamski et al., 2010). According to the ABN guideline, up to 30% of the MS patients
could be eligible for the drugs (Sudlow and Counsell, 2003), i.e., not all patients with a
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positive incremental health benefit are eligible for the new drugs. According to the
appraisal by National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), the drugs are not
cost-effective based on the ABN guideline, i.e., the ABN guideline is focused on clinical
benefits instead of the cost-effectiveness or the price of the drugs.
We assume that physicians can observe the incremental health benefit for each
patient (i.e., the realization of 𝛽) prior to the prescribing decision through diagnostic tests
or observations. However, two factors may affect the actual patient eligibility, i.e.,
whether a patient will be treated with the new drug or not. The first factor is
heterogeneity in physicians’ prescribing decisions, which can be caused by differences in
physicians’ interpretations of clinical guidelines, situations that are not adequately
captured by clinical guidelines, and physicians’ attitudes to risks and benefits
(Lugtenberg et al., 2009; Multiple Sclerosis Trust, 2019; Riggs and Ubel, 2015).
Therefore, some physicians may prescribe the new drug to patients who are not eligible
according to the clinical guideline, whereas others may prescribe the new drug more
strictly. Let a random variable 𝜖 capture the heterogeneity in physicians’ prescribing
behavior, which is distributed on the interval [𝜖, 𝜖], 𝜖 ≥ 0, according to a PDF 𝑔(∙) and a
CDF 𝐺(∙).
The second factor that may affect the actual patient eligibility is the
manufacturer’s marketing effort, 𝑚 > 0. Typical marketing effort includes physician
detailing, direct-to-consumer advertising, and professional meetings (Hébert and
Stanbrook, 2007; Mizik and Jacobson, 2004). The marketing effort incurs a cost 𝑘𝑚2 ,
where 𝑘 is the efficiency parameter of the marketing effort. Similar to some other studies
(Tirole, 1990; Zhang and Zaric, 2015), the cost function in our study has the following
properties: 1) the marketing effort can only increase sales; 2) there are diminishing
marginal returns in the marketing effort; and 3) no cost will occur without any marketing
effort.
Without any marketing effort, patient treatment eligibility, 𝑦 + 𝜖, is a random
variable subject to heterogeneity in physicians’ prescribing behavior. The manufacturer’s
marketing effort shifts the patient treatment eligibility from 𝑦 + 𝜖 down to 𝑦 − 𝑚 + 𝜖,
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causing physicians to prescribe the new drug to some patients who are not eligible
according to the original clinical guideline. In other words, the marketing effort only
affects the mean of the physicians’ prescribing behavior, but it does not change the
variance of the physicians’ prescribing behavior. Let 𝜃 = min {max {𝑦 − 𝑚 + 𝜖, 𝛽} , 𝛽 }.
Let 𝑞 and 𝑏 be the total sales and total health benefit of the drug subject to the random 𝜖,
𝛽

𝛽

respectively, where 𝑞 = ∫𝜃 𝑓(𝛽)𝑑𝛽 and 𝑏 = ∫𝜃 𝛽𝑓(𝛽)𝑑𝛽. Let 𝐸𝜖 denote the expected
value over 𝜖. The expected total sales volume 𝑄 = 𝐸𝜖 [𝑞] and the expected total health
benefit of the drug is 𝐵 = 𝐸𝜖 [𝑏]. We assume that each patient consumes one unit of the
new drug if prescribed.
Let 𝑝 and 𝑐𝑀 , 𝑝 > 𝑐𝑀 > 0, be the price and the manufacturer’s marginal
production cost per unit of the drug, respectively. Let 𝑐𝑃 be the payer’s non-drug-related
incremental cost per unit of the drug, which could be positive or negative. A negative
𝑐𝑃 indicates that the new drug causes a reduction in non-drug healthcare expenditures.
For example, the drug may prevent or delay expensive surgeries or prevent infections that
are expensive to treat. A positive 𝑐𝑃 indicates that the new drug causes an increase in
non-drug healthcare expenditures. For example, it may be necessary to administer the
drug in a hospital or spend time in a hospital to treat a drug reaction. Let 𝑎𝑃𝑖 be the
administration cost for implementing contract 𝑖, which is assumed to be fully borne by
the payer. The payer’s monetary benefit is 𝑀𝐵 = 𝜆𝑏 − (𝑝 + 𝑐𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃𝑖 )𝑞. The first term 𝜆𝑏
denotes the monetary value that the payer attached to the total incremental health benefit
of the new drug. The second term (𝑝 + 𝑐𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃𝑖 )𝑞 is the total costs incurred to the payer.
Let 𝑠 𝑖 be the rebate from the manufacturer to the payer under contract 𝑖. In a
PVA, a sales volume threshold 𝑥 is predetermined in the contract, and we assume that the
manufacturer must pay a full rebate to the payer for the excess of sales, i.e. 𝑆 𝑃𝑉𝐴 =
max{0, 𝑝(𝑞 − 𝑥)}. In a CER, there is no rebate when 𝑀𝐵 ≥ 0, and the manufacturer
must fully compensate the payer’s loss if 𝑀𝐵 < 0, i.e. 𝑠 𝐶𝐸𝑅 = max{0, (𝑝 + 𝑐𝑃 +
𝑎𝑃𝐶𝐸𝑅 )𝑞 − 𝜆𝑏}. Let 𝑆 𝑖 be the expected value of 𝑠 𝑖 over 𝜖, i.e., 𝑆 𝑖 = 𝐸𝜖 [𝑠𝑖 ].
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𝑖
Let 𝜋𝑃𝑖 and 𝜋𝑀
be the payer’s and the manufacturer’s expected payoff under

contract 𝑖, which are calculated as follows.
𝜋𝑃𝑖 = 𝜆𝐵 − (𝑝 + 𝑐𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃𝑖 )𝑄 + 𝑆 𝑖

(2.1)

𝑖
𝜋𝑀
= (𝑝 − 𝑐𝑀 )𝑄 − 𝑘𝑚2 − 𝑆 𝑖

(2.2)

We assume that the payer first chooses the risk-sharing agreement 𝑖 to maximize
her expected payoff, and then the manufacturer chooses the marketing effort, 𝑚, to
maximize his expected payoff. The payer will choose a PVA if her expected payoff in a
PVA is greater than the payoff in a CER, i.e. 𝑖𝑃∗ = 𝑃𝑉𝐴 if 𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ ≥ 𝜋𝑃𝐶𝐸𝑅∗ , and vice versa.
Similarly, the manufacturer prefers a PVA if the expected payoff in a PVA is greater than
𝑃𝑉𝐴∗
𝐶𝐸𝑅∗
∗
the payoff in a CER, i.e. 𝑖𝑀
= 𝑃𝑉𝐴 if 𝜋𝑀
> 𝜋𝑀
, and vice versa. We do not

consider any participation constraint for the payer as her payoff is always non-negative in
a CER according to the setup of the rebate, and therefore 𝜋𝑃𝐶𝐸𝑅 could be considered as the
reservation payoff for the payer.

Analysis
In this section, we analytically characterize the optimal decision and payoff for each
party. We assume that 𝛽 is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1] and ϵ is uniformly
distributed on the interval [−𝜖, 𝜖], 𝜖 > 0. We also verify that the main results hold with
other distributions such as normal distributions and beta distributions. We assume that the
rebate threshold in a PVA is exogenously set equal to the expected sales (i.e. 𝑥 = 𝑄)
because many PVAs in reality set the volume limit based on anticipated expenditure
(sales) (Adamski et al., 2010).
We first derive the closed-form solutions of the manufacturer’s optimal marketing
effort and the optimal payoff for the two parties under each risk-sharing agreement. Next,
we examine the optimal risk-sharing agreement with respect to some key parameters. We
also show the manufacturer’s preference for the risk-sharing agreement, which may
impact the implementation of the scheme in reality. Due to the complex expression of the
optimal payoffs, we show the preferred risk-sharing agreement for the two parties using
numerical examples.
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Figure 2.1: Policy graph of the risk-sharing agreement preferred by the payer and the
manufacturer. In each region, the first row is the payer’s preferred risk-sharing
agreement, and the second row is the manufacturer’s preferred risk-sharing
agreement. 𝑦𝐿 and 𝑦𝐻 represent a board treatment eligibility and a targeted treatment
eligibility, respectively, which are used in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3.

Let superscript ∗ denote the optimal solutions. The closed-form solutions for the
manufacturer’s optimal marketing effort (𝑚∗ ) and the optimal payoff for the two parties
𝑖∗
under agreement 𝑖 ∈ {𝑃𝑉𝐴, 𝐶𝐸𝑅} (i.e., 𝜋𝑃𝑖∗ and 𝜋𝑀
) are summarized in Table A.1 and

Table A.2 in the appendix.
Next, we show the preferred risk-sharing agreement for the two parties
numerically using parameter values 𝜆 = 50000, 𝜖 = 0.1, 𝑐𝑀 = 5000, 𝑐𝑃 = 500, 𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑉𝐴 =
200, 𝑎𝑃𝐶𝐸𝑅 = 1000 and 𝑘 = 10000. We also perform robustness checks using different
values of the administration costs, which are one of the major concerns of implementing
a risk-sharing agreement (Adamski et al., 2010), and our results are qualitatively robust
over a wide range of values.
Preliminary analysis demonstrates that the optimal solutions are sensitive to the
drug price (𝑝) and the treatment eligibility threshold (𝑦). Therefore, we shows a two-way
policy graph of the risk-sharing agreement preferred by the two parties with respect to 𝑝
and 𝑦 in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.1 indicates that with a sufficiently low drug price, the payer
prefers a PVA, but the manufacturer prefers a CER (Region A). When drug price is

19

sufficiently high, the payer prefers a CER, but the manufacturer prefers a PVA (Region
D). When drug price is intermediate, the two parties may prefer the same risk-sharing
agreement. For example, both parties prefer a PVA when treatment eligibility is broad
(i.e., 𝑦 is low; Region C); and both parties prefer a CER when treatment eligibility is
targeted (i.e., 𝑦 is high; Region B).
To explain the logic behind Figure 2.1, we present additional details in Figure 2.2
and Figure 2.3 with different values of 𝑦 (i.e., 𝑦𝐿 and 𝑦𝐻 in Figure 2.1). Figure 2.2 shows
the optimal values for the manufacturer’s marketing effort (𝑚∗ ) and several calculated
quantities (𝑄 𝑖∗ , 𝐵 𝑖∗ and 𝑆 𝑖∗ , 𝑖 ∈ {𝑃𝑉𝐴, 𝐶𝐸𝑅}) with respect to the drug price (𝑝). Figure
2.2.a and b show that with both broad (𝑦 is small) and targeted (𝑦 is large) treatment
eligibilities, the optimal marketing effort in a PVA is greater than that in a CER
(𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ > 𝑚𝐶𝐸𝑅∗ ), the optimal marketing effort in a PVA is increasing in the drug price,
and the optimal marketing effort in a CER is non-monotonic (increasing then decreasing)
in the drug price. Figure 2.2.c to f show that the optimal total sales (𝑄 𝑖∗ ) and health
benefit (𝐵 𝑖∗ ) of the new drug have the same trend as the optimal marketing effort.
Figure 2.2.g and h show that the optimal rebate in a PVA is always positive
(𝑆 𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ > 0). This is because the manufacturer pays a rebate to the payer when there are
excessive sales, but it does not receive any reward from the payer if the total sales is
below the volume threshold. The optimal rebate in a CER is zero (𝑆 𝐶𝐸𝑅∗ = 0) when drug
price is sufficiently low, and it is positive (𝑆 𝐶𝐸𝑅∗ > 0) and increasing rapidly in drug
price when drug price is sufficiently high. This is because when drug price is low, there is
a higher chance that the monetary value of the total health benefit exceeds the payer’s
costs (𝜆𝑏 > (𝑝 − 𝑐𝑃 − 𝑎𝑃𝐶𝐸𝑅 )𝑞) so that the manufacturer does not pay a rebate. In other
words, the optimal rebate in a PVA is less than that in a CER (𝑆 𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ < 𝑆 𝐶𝐸𝑅∗ ) when drug
price is low, and the optimal rebate in a PVA is greater than that in a CER (𝑆 𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ >
𝑆 𝐶𝐸𝑅∗ ) when drug price is high. Because the rebate can be considered as the payer’s
revenue and the manufacturer’s cost, the payer prefers a PVA and the manufacturer
prefers a CER when drug price is low, and the payer prefers a CER and the manufacturer
prefers a PVA when drug price is high (this can be seen from Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.3).
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𝒚 is Small

𝒚 is Large

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

𝒎𝒊∗

𝑸𝒊∗

𝑩𝒊∗

𝑺𝒊∗

Figure 2.2: Optimal values with respect to the drug price (𝑝). (a), (c), (e) and (g): the
treatment eligibility (𝑦) is small, i.e., 𝑦 = 𝑦𝐿 in Figure 2.1; (b), (d), (f) and (h): 𝑦 is
large, i.e., 𝑦 = 𝑦𝐻 in Figure 2.1.
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𝒚 is Small

𝒚 is Large

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

𝝅𝒊∗
𝑷

𝝅𝒊∗
𝑴

𝑖∗
Figure 2.3: The optimal profits for the two parties (𝜋𝑃𝑖∗ and 𝜋𝑀
, 𝑖 ∈ {𝑃𝑉𝐴, 𝐶𝐸𝑅}) with
respect to the drug price 𝑝. (a) and (c): the treatment eligibility (𝑦) is small, i.e., 𝑦 = 𝑦𝐿
in Figure 2.1; (b) and (d): 𝑦 is large, i.e., 𝑦 = 𝑦𝐻 in Figure 2.1.

𝑖∗
Figure 2.3 shows the optimal payoff for the two parties (𝜋𝑃𝑖∗ and 𝜋𝑀
) with respect

to the drug price. Let 𝑝̃𝑃 be the payer’s switching price where the payer’s preferred
contract switches from a PVA to a CER. Let 𝑝̃𝑀 be the manufacturer’s switching price
where the manufacturer’s preferred contract switches from a CER to a PVA. Define
switching patients as patients who are not eligible for the new drug according to the
clinical guideline but are treated with the new drug due to marketing effort, i.e., patients
with an incremental health benefit 𝛽 ∈ [𝑦 − 𝑚, 𝑦). With a broad treatment eligibility, the
total incremental health benefit from the switching patients is small, which reduces the
manufacturer’s switching price and creates a range for a PVA to be preferred by the two
parties. With a targeted treatment eligibility, the total incremental health benefit from the
switching patients is large. This allows a health outcome-based contract to be preferred
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by the manufacturer up to a higher switching price, which creates a range for a CER to be
preferred by the two parties.
We perform robustness checks on the assumptions made for model tractability.
When relaxing the assumption on a bounded uniform distribution and assuming a normal
distribution for 𝛽 and 𝜖, the general insights are the same as presented here. If the
administration cost is sufficiently high, then there is no region where both parties prefer a
PVA, and the general insights for the other three regions remain the same.

Discussion
In this article, we compare the performance of a sales volume-based agreement and a
cost-effectiveness-based contract between a payer and a manufacturer as uncertainties in
sales volume and cost-effectiveness co-exist in many situations. We find the conditions
under which the two parties agree or disagree on the preferred contract. Our study
suggests that neither of the two risk-sharing agreements is always preferred by both
parties. In general, the payer prefers a PVA but the manufacturer prefers a CER when
price is much lower than the payer’s willingness to pay. With a sufficiently high drug
price, the payer prefers a CER but the manufacturer prefers a PVA. When price is
intermediate, the two parties may prefer the same contract depending on the
combinations of parameters. For example, both parties may prefer a CER with a broad
treatment eligibility and prefer a PVA with a targeted treatment eligibility.
As observed, the two parties may prefer the same contract under certain
circumstances. When choosing properly under these circumstances, a risk-sharing
agreement can re-distribute risks between the two parties and create an all-win situation:
for the payer, both the total health benefit and the cost to the health care system are taken
into consideration and maximized; for the manufacturer, market access is accelerated,
profit and the resulting incentives for future investment in new drug development are
protected; for the patients, as some payer may only list a drug on the formulary with a
risk-sharing agreement (Morgan, Thomson, Daw, & Friesen, 2013) due to unforeseeable
risks and health budget constraints, such a contract also accelerates patients’ access to
new drugs and improve patients’ welfare.
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An important policy implication is that neither risk-sharing agreement is a
universal solution that can be applied in all situations, and payers should not always stick
to one type of agreement. For example, some payers prefer to use a volume-based
agreement for ease of negotiation and implementation, and this study indicates that
payers may be better off by applying a value-based risk-sharing agreement in some cases.
There are some limitations to this study. We compare a value-based risk-sharing
agreement (a CER) and a volume-based risk-sharing agreement (a PVA). Future studies
may consider other types of risk-sharing agreements to increase options for the two
parties. We assume the price is set exogenously, but it could be negotiated between the
two parties or a decision variable of either party depending on their power. We assume all
parameters are publicly known and did not consider any information asymmetry.
However, some key parameters of the health benefit could be one party’s private
information. For example, the manufacturer may have a better knowledge of the type of
distribution of health benefit through clinical trials, or the payer may have a better
knowledge of the information through investigation or research. We assume the sales
limit in a PVA is set equal to the expected sales. Future studies may consider other forms
or treat it as either party’s decision. We assume that the treatment eligibility is set in
clinical guidelines by a third-party organization and it is an exogenous parameter that
does not depend on other parameters. One possible extension is to assume that the
treatment eligibility threshold depends on the drug price or to endogenize the treatment
eligibility threshold as the payer’s decision.
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Chapter 3
3

Essay 2: Mitigating Drug Shortages: Should Hospitals
Use Their Own Drug Manufacturer?
Introduction

Drug shortages are a significant problem in many countries in recent years (Hall et al.,
2013). In 2018, the FDA in the US stated that there is an increase in drug shortage
occurrences as well as a spike in the intensity and duration of each shortage (Brennan,
2018), and the American Medical Association (AMA) declared that drug shortages pose
an urgent public health crisis (American Medical Association, 2018). According to the
American Society of Health-System Pharmacists, the US experienced shortages for 182
drugs and pharmaceutical supplies in June 2018, including IV bags, injectable
painkillers, anesthetics, and cancer drugs. Drug shortages not only have clinical
consequences such as inferior outcomes, increased morbidity and mortality, but can also
add significant costs to health care systems due to replacement cost and staff time
(Alevizakos et al., 2016; Fox et al., 2014; Hedman, 2016).
Shortages are caused by a variety of factors, such as manufacturing problems
(e.g., quality problems, production delays), natural disasters, difficulties in acquiring raw
materials, sudden increases in demand, and discontinuation by a manufacturer (De
Weerdt et al., 2015; Fox et al., 2014; Malacos, 2019). According to the University of
Utah Drug Information Service, among all the drug shortages in the United States in
2018, 51% of the causes are unknown, 30% of shortages are caused by manufacturing
reasons, and other direct causes account for smaller proportions ranging from 1% to 10%
(Malacos, 2019). Shortages may also be caused by underlying factors such as low-price
and low-profit margin (e.g., generic drugs), production difficulties, regulatory issues, and
high market concentration (Blank, 2018; Chabner, 2011; Jia and Zhao, 2017; Woodcock
and Wosinska, 2013).
To mitigate drug shortages, government agencies, such as the FDA in the US, are
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taking actions to collaborate with the pharmaceutical industry by sharing information,
searching for alternative manufacturers, or importing critical drugs in shortage directly
from other overseas manufacturers (Food and Drug Administration, 2018). However,
drug shortages are still prevalent, even for some commonplace generic drugs and
lifesaving drugs. Several US health organizations have formed an alliance and
established a not-for-profit generic drug company named “Civica Rx”
(https://civicarx.org/) in 2018, to manufacture certain generic medicines (Kodjak, 2018;
Tirrell, 2018). In December 2019, 18 Civica Rx medications are in production, and more
than 45 health systems are members of Civica Rx, representing more than 1,200 US
hospitals and over 30 percent of all licensed US hospital beds (Civica Rx, 2019, 2020).
This might be a potential way to ease the market concentration on the generic drug
market and serve as an additional source or redundancy for drug supply.
Motivated by this initiative, our research investigates circumstances under which
hospitals would benefit from owning an in-house pharmaceutical manufacturer, and the
impacts on the external manufacturers. We formulate the problem using a supply chain
management framework. We assume that drug shortages are a result of supply
uncertainty at manufacturing facilities, since manufacturing problems are a major cause
of drug shortages. We focus on hospital’ sourcing strategies to mitigate drug shortages.
There has been substantial research on mitigating supply disruptions with
different sourcing strategies in both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical supply
chains. However, the majority of studies have focused on buyers’ decisions, and ignore
the interactions between suppliers and buyers. In the setting of the establishment of
Civica Rx, due to the large number of hospitals in the alliance and their potential
influential power in the supply chain, we decide to construct a model to analyze the
interactions between the hospitals and the external pharmaceutical manufacturers. In our
model, we assume that a hospital, representing the alliance of all hospitals who
established Civica Rx, could procure a drug through two sources (dual-sourcing): an
external pharmaceutical manufacturer, and a hospital-owned manufacturer (referred to as
the in-house producer). We also assume that the hospital has a second chance to make
emergency production (contingent sourcing) if needed. Our assumption on a single
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external pharmaceutical manufacturer is due to the high market concentration on the
generic drug market, and often there are very few or even a single manufacturer
producing a particular generic drug in the US market (Blank, 2018).
We analyze the hospital’s ordering and production decisions and the external
manufacturer’s production decision with the presence of supply uncertainty. We first
solve a single-period model analytically. We then propose two long-term inventory
management policies (a Target Inventory Policy and a Scale Factor Policy), and we
evaluate the performance of the two policies in the multi-period setting with a heuristic.
Our study reveals several findings. First, the hospital would benefit from using an
in-house manufacturer to make regular production if the in-house production cost is low,
the external manufacturer’s yield rate is low, or the external manufacturer’s yield is
highly uncertain. Second, the hospital should make use of emergency production at the
in-house producer, if the emergency production cost is relatively low compared with the
revenue of the drug and the shortage cost. Third, we show that the expected shortage
quantity can be reduced if the hospital operates an in-house producer as her regular
source and/or contingent source.
In addition, the analysis shows that the two inventory management policies (the
Target Inventory Policy and the Scale Factor Policy) have a comparable performance for
the hospital. Both policies perform well under different parameters of the yield rate,
indicating that the hospital can use either policy as the long-term inventory management
policy. In contrast, the manufacturer’s yield uncertainty has a larger impact on its own
profit than that on the hospital’s profit in the long term. If the yield rate decreases (i.e.,
the mean of yield rate decreases) or the yield uncertainty increases (the variance of yield
rate increases), then the manufacturer’s long-term profit under each inventory
management policy decreases more rapidly than the hospital’s profit does. This means
that it is beneficial for the manufacturer to make investments in improving his yield rate
and reliability.
Our study has important implications for hospitals’ drug procurement practices.
Our analysis indicates that hospitals should trade-off between the procurement cost and
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other factors (e.g., shortage cost of the drug, and reliability of different suppliers), instead
of focusing only on procurement costs to choose the cheapest supplier, as observed in
drug procurement practices in reality. Considering the long-term impact on the external
manufacturers and the drug supply chain, hospitals should also procure drugs from both
the internal and external manufacturers to avoid driving out the external manufacturers
from the market.

Literature Review
Many early studies (e.g., Gerchak et al. (1988) and Henig and Gerchak (1990)) showed
that the optimal periodic review policy in the presence of yield uncertainty is non-orderup-to type, which requires different analysis from the models in which only demand is
uncertain. Therefore, we investigate studies explicitly dealt with supply uncertainties. We
survey three streams of literature: (1) mitigating supply uncertainty with lot sizing and
sourcing strategies; (2) supply uncertainty with multiple decision-makers; (3) drug
shortages from a pharmaceutical supply chain perspective. Literature that falls in two or
more categories will be included in the most relevant category.

3.2.1. Mitigating supply uncertainty with lot sizing and sourcing
strategies
Yano and Lee (1995) provided a comprehensive review of lot-sizing problems with yield
uncertainty, including different types for yield randomness (binomial, stochastically
proportional, and interrupted geometric, etc.) and different time horizons (single-period,
multi-periods). Khouja (1999) summarized extensions for single period newsvendor
problem (random demand) in 11 categories, including extensions to random yields.
Agrawal and Nahmias (1997) studied the optimal order size and the optimal number of
suppliers under deterministic demand and yield uncertainty. Their model addressed a key
trade-off: small order from many suppliers can reduce yield uncertainty, but fixed costs
associated with each supplier provides a penalty for having a large number of suppliers.
Inderfurth (2004) studied a single-period inventory problem with random yield
and random demand, and the author derived analytical solutions with uniform
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distributions. The study found that depending on the parameter combinations, the optimal
policy can be a non-linear type. Rekik et al. (2007) extended Inderfurth (2004) by
considering two types of errors: additive errors and multiplicative errors. The authors
stated that results in earlier literature are only valid for a certain range of parameters, and
they derived closed-form solutions for all values of parameters with the uniform
distribution. Tomlin (2006) studied a firm’s optimal sourcing strategy for mitigating
supply disruption, which is similar to our study and will be elaborated in section 3.2.4.
Li et al. (2010) studied a single period supply chain with a single retailer and two
suppliers with supply disruption. This study is also similar to our study and will be
elaborated on in section 3.2.4. Xanthopoulos et al. (2012) studied a single-period
newsvendor-type (stochastic demand) model with dual-sourcing supply chain with or
without service level constraints. The authors studied a retailer’s optimal sourcing
strategy from two suppliers both of whom are susceptible to supply disruption risk and
examined both risk neutral and risk-averse decision-makers. Hou et al. (2017) studied a
single period model consists of a buyer, a main supplier and a backup supplier. The main
supplier is prone to supply disruption, and the buyer could sign a capacity reservation
contract with the backup supplier to mitigate supply risk. This study also has the feature
of multiple decision-makers.

3.2.2. Supply uncertainty with multiple decision-makers
Many studies on supply uncertainty focus on the optimal decision(s) by a single decisionmaker. Since we study the interaction between a hospital and an external manufacturer in
our model, we also survey supply uncertainty with multiple decision-makers. He and
Zhang (2008) studied supply chain with one supplier and one retailer under random yield
and random demand. The authors proposed several risk-sharing contracts and found that
under certain conditions, random yield may enhance the supply chain performance and
decrease the double marginalization effect. Keren (2009) studied a two-tier supply chain
with one retailer and one supplier with supply uncertainty, which will be discussed and
compared with our study in section 3.2.4.
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Güler and Keskin (2013) analyzed supply chain coordination under random yield
and random demand. They found that the randomness in the yield does not change the
coordination ability of the contracts, including wholesale price, buy-back, revenue share,
quantity discount, and quantity flexibility, but affects the values of the contract
parameters. Chen and Yang (2014) studied a supply chain in which a buyer procures
from a supplier with a random yield and has an opportunity to source from an emergency
backup supplier. The authors developed two Stackelberg games: a buyer-Stackelberg
model (the buyer moves first) and a supplier-Stackelberg model (the supplier moves
first).
Cai et al. (2017) studied contracts to coordinate a vendor-managed inventory
(VMI) supply chain with one retailer and one unreliable supplier. The authors compared
two contracts: an option contract, and a subsidy contract. Cai et al. (2019) studied supply
chain coordination with yield uncertainty and downside risk aversion. The authors
examined a supplier led supply chain, and a buyer led supply chain and shown that a
revenue-sharing contract can coordinate both supply chains.

3.2.3 Drug shortages from a supply chain perspective
Chick et al. (2008) studied an influenza vaccination supply chain with a government and
a manufacturer under random yield. The authors constructed a joint epidemic and supply
chain model and proposed a variant of the cost-sharing contract, which could coordinate
the supply chain and hence improve the supply of vaccines. Two studies investigated
inventory management strategies for an integrated pharmaceutical supply chain
consisting of a hospital and a pharmaceutical company, both assuming that the
pharmaceutical company and the hospital cooperate and jointly derive a coordinated
supply chain decision system (Priyan and Uthayakumar, 2014; Uthayakumar and Priyan,
2013).
Taylor and Xiao (2014) investigated a donor’s optimal subsidy decision to
improve the availability and affordability of recommended malaria drugs provided by the
private-sector in some developing countries. The authors found that the donor should
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only subsidize the purchases of retailers for malaria drugs and should not subsidize their
sales. Saedi et al. (2016) presented a stochastic optimization model (a continuous time
Markov chain model) to find a hospital’s optimal stock levels and order quantity levels
that minimize the impact of drug shortages in the presence of supply disruptions and
stochastic demand. The authors analyzed the balance point among substitutable drugs,
considering important factors (e.g., the space occupied by an item, disruption rates, and
recovery rate), and shown that the proposed scheme outperforms the current policies in
many key aspects.
Jia and Zhao (2017) developed a model to capture the objectives of key supply
chain parties, and investigated Pareto-improving contracts through price increases paired
with strengthened failure-to-supply clauses. The authors verified the model results using
real data of several drugs undergoing shortages. Tucker et al. (2019) constructed a multistage stochastic program model to study a pharmaceutical company’s optimal decision
on vulnerable or resilient supply chains under supply disruption and studied the impacts
of proposed drug shortage mitigating policies on the supply chain decisions. The authors
found that it may be optimal for pharmaceutical companies to keep vulnerable supply
chains for certain types of low profit margin drugs, and redundancy regulations would be
at least as efficient as market-based solutions.

3.2.4. The Contribution of this Research
Our research is most similar to three previous studies, but with important differences.
Table 3.1 categorizes the three similar studies and our study along two important
dimensions: the number of decision-makers and the number of sources. Tomlin (2006)
studied a firm’s optimal sourcing strategy for mitigating supply disruption. The author
considered an infinite-horizon, periodic-review inventory system with stochastic demand,
Table 3.1: Comparison of our study with similar literature discussed in section 3.2.4
Single sourcing
Single decision-maker
Multiple decision-makers

Multiple sourcing
Tomlin (2006)

Keren (2009)

Li et al. (2010); Our study
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and studied a dual-sourcing strategy in which a firm could source from two suppliers: an
unreliable but cheaper supplier, and a reliable but more expensive supplier. Their study
and our study are similar in terms of the number of suppliers. However, the firm is the
only decision-maker in Tomlin (2006), whereas we construct a game-theoretic model
consisting of two interactive decision-makers.
Keren (2009) studied a two-tier supply chain with one supplier and one retailer,
using a single-period model with deterministic demand and random supply. Keren (2009)
and our study are similar in terms of the multi-decision-maker setting (game-theoretic
model). However, the main difference is that Keren (2009) considered a single source of
supply, whereas our study considers a dual sourcing strategy. Another difference is that
Keren (2009) only considered a single-period model, whereas our study analyzes both a
single-period setting and a multi-period setting.
Li et al. (2010) constructed a supply chain consisting of one retailer, two
suppliers unreliable supply, and one spot market for emergency replenishment. The multi
decision-maker setting in their study is similar to our model. However, a major
difference is that Li et al. (2010) focused on the pricing strategies of suppliers, whereas
our study focuses on the production decisions of the suppliers (manufacturing facilities)
and we assume that all prices are exogenous. Another difference is that Li et al. (2010)
constructed a single-period model, whereas our study analyzes both a single-period
setting and a multi-period setting.
In summary, our study differs from existing literature by analyzing a hospital’s
dual sourcing strategy and contingent sourcing strategy on mitigating drug shortages,
while taking into consideration the interactions between the hospital and the
manufacturer and capturing the multi-period feature of many drug supply chains.

Model
We develop a multi-period model to analyze the interaction between a hospital (H, she)
and an external pharmaceutical manufacturer (M, he). Let 𝑖 be the index for the two
decision-makers, 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝑀. We adopt the convention that the notation 𝐴+ = max{0, 𝐴},
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Table 3.2: Summary of notation
Symbol
Decisions
𝑞𝑀𝑡
𝑞𝑅𝑡

Description

The hospital’s order quantity from the manufacturer M in period 𝑡
The hospital’s in-house production quantity in the regular procurement
phase in period 𝑡
The hospital’s in-house production quantity in the emergency
𝑞𝐸𝑡
procurement phase-in period 𝑡
𝑥𝑀𝑡
The manufacturer’s planned production quantity in period 𝑡
Random Variable
𝑢𝑡
The manufacturer’s random yield rate in period 𝑡
Parameters
𝑖
Index for the players and systems: 𝑖 = 𝑀 for the manufacturer; 𝑖 = 𝐻
for the hospital; 𝑖 = 𝐶 for the centralized system; 𝑖 = 𝑇 for the total
system in a decentralized setting
𝑡
Index for the time periods, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇
Total number of time periods
𝑇
𝑎, 𝑏
The lower and upper bounds of 𝑢𝑡
𝑓(∙), 𝐹(∙)
PDF and CDF of 𝑢𝑡
𝜇
The mean of 𝑢𝑡
The variance of 𝑢𝑡
𝜎2
The hospital’s deterministic and static demand for the drug
𝐷
𝑧𝑖𝑡
The initial inventory level of player 𝑖 at the beginning of period 𝑡
The hospital’s unit revenue
𝑟
The hospital’s unit regular in-house production cost
𝑐𝑅
The hospital’s unit emergency in-house production cost
𝑐𝐸
The manufacturer’s unit production cost
𝑐𝑀
The manufacturer’s unit wholesale price
𝑤
ℎ𝑖
The unit holding cost of player 𝑖
𝑠𝑖
The unit shortage cost of player 𝑖
Calculated Quantities
𝑦𝑡
Quantity delivered from M to H in period 𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡 = min{𝑞𝑀𝑡 , 𝑧𝑀𝑡 +
𝑢𝑡 𝑥𝑀𝑡 }
𝛱𝑖𝑡
The expected profit of player 𝑖 in period 𝑡
𝛤𝑖𝑡
The optimal expected total profit of player 𝑖 from period 𝑡 onward
and 𝐸[∙] denotes the expected value. The terms “increasing” and “decreasing” are used in
a weak sense, i.e., “increasing” indicates “non-decreasing” and “decreasing” indicates
“non-increasing”. All model notation is summarized in Table 3.2.
Let 𝑇 be the total number of periods, and 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 be the index for each
period. We assume the hospital has a deterministic and static demand in each period (i.e.,
the same constant demand in each period), 𝐷. This is because for many pharmaceutical
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products, the demand generally remains stable over time, and changes in demand have
not been identified as a major contributing factor for drug shortages (Fox et al., 2014).
We assume the hospital uses a dual-sourcing strategy, making use of an in-house
producer who is reliable, and the external manufacturer (the manufacturer hereafter) who
is subject to a random yield.
We assume the manufacturer faces stochastically proportional yield in each
period with rates 𝑢1 , … , 𝑢𝑇 , which are continuous random variables independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) between 𝑎 and 𝑏, 0 ≤ 𝑎 < 𝑏 ≤ 1, with a probability density
function (PDF) 𝑓(∙) and a cumulative distribution function (CDF) 𝐹(∙). This assumption
is commonly used in studies involving manufacturing yields such as Inderfurth (2004)
and Keren (2009).
Since one important reason why the hospital owns an in-house producer is to
produce the drug in a more reliable way, we assume the in-house producer has a perfect
yield rate in the basic model. For example, some manufacturers produce drugs using
equipment that is more than 50 years old, which are vulnerable to manufacturing
problems (Woodcock and Wosinska, 2013), and the hospital’s newly established inhouse producer may have a better yield rate than the manufacturer because of the
advanced technology, better maintenance, or newer equipment. We also solve two
extensions in which the in-house producer has a constant yield loss and a random yield
rate, respectively. We assume the wholesale price of the drug is exogenous and fixed.
Although drug prices may increase after a drug shortage (Alevizakos et al., 2016), our
model applies to the situation where drug price is regulated and is not likely to be a
decision or change in the short run, which is the case in many countries (Hou et al.,
2017).
Let 𝑧𝑖𝑡 be the initial inventory of player 𝑖 at the beginning of period 𝑡, which
equals the leftover stock at the end of the previous period, with 𝑧𝑖1 = 0, 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝑀. In
each period, the hospital has two procurement phases: a regular procurement phase
followed by an emergency procurement phase. We define three decision making stages
from stage 1 to stage 3 in each period. At the beginning of stage 1 in period 𝑡, the
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hospital makes two decisions: the in-house production quantity, 𝑞𝑅𝑡 , and the order
quantity from the manufacturer, 𝑞𝑀𝑡 . At the beginning of stage 2, for a given 𝑞𝑀𝑡 , the
manufacturer chooses his planned production quantity 𝑥𝑀𝑡 . The two manufacturing
facilities then produce, and the manufacturer’s yield rate is realized. Let 𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝑀 be the
unit production cost for the planned production quantity in the regular procurement phase
for the hospital and the manufacturer, respectively. At the end of stage 2, the hospital
receives regular replenishment from the two manufacturing facilities: the in-house
producer delivers 𝑞𝑅𝑡 units; the manufacturer delivers 𝑦𝑡 units,𝑦𝑡 = min{𝑞𝑀𝑡 , 𝑧𝑀𝑡 +
𝑢𝑡 𝑥𝑀𝑡 }, and charges a fixed wholesale price 𝑤 > 𝑐𝑀 . For any unfulfilled order quantity
(𝑞𝑀𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡 − 𝑢𝑡 𝑥𝑀𝑡 )+ , the manufacturer incurs a unit shortage cost, 𝑠𝑀 ≥ 0. The
shortage cost may include penalty costs, loss of reputation, or loss of future sales to the
hospital (Keren, 2009). For any leftover quantity (𝑧𝑀𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 𝑥𝑀𝑡 − 𝑞𝑀𝑡 )+ , the
manufacturer incurs a unit holding cost, ℎ𝑀 > 0 (ℎ𝑀 < 0 may present a unit salvage
value, if there exists a secondary market). To avoid infinite profit, we assume that 𝑐𝑀 >
−ℎ𝑀 (the salvage value is less than the production cost).
At the end of the regular procurement phase, the hospital may still be in short
supply of the drug. We assume that the in-house producer can make emergency
production for the hospital if needed because the hospital’s main motivation to own the
in-house producer is to mitigate drug shortages and the in-house producer may be more
willing to allocate emergency capacity for the hospital. At the beginning of the
emergency production phase, the hospital chooses the emergency production quantity 𝑞𝐸𝑡
(stage 3). Emergency production occurs at a unit production cost 𝑐𝐸 , and the hospital
receives emergency replenishment from the in-house producer. Finally, demand occurs,
which will be satisfied with the hospital available inventory, and all revenue and costs
are realized.
We assume 𝑐𝐸 > 𝑐𝑅 since emergency production may require overtime working
hours and/or expedited delivery of raw materials. Note that we do not impose any
assumptions on the relationship between 𝑤 and the hospital’s in-house production costs
(𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝐸 ) since the hospital may or may not have advantages in the production cost
depending on the specific drug. For drugs with a low price and low profit margin for the
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manufacturer, the hospital’s in-house production cost may be higher than the
manufacturer’s wholesale price. For drugs with a high price and high profit margin for
the manufacturer, the hospital may have an advantage in the in-house production cost.
At the end of the emergency procurement phase, the hospital incurs a unit
shortage cost 𝑠𝐻 ≥ 0 for unfulfilled demand. The shortage cost 𝑠𝐻 should include all
costs caused by the unavailability of the drug that the hospital cares about. For example,
if an alternative drug is available, then the difference in drug price and related service
fees between the alternative drug and the original drug should be included in 𝑠𝐻 . If there
is no alternative drug and a shortage of the drug leads to canceled surgeries, then 𝑠𝐻
should include the fees for the surgery and subsequent hospital stay. 𝑠𝐻 should also
include staff time on searching for alternative drugs, communicating with patients, and
other activities for managing shortages. Therefore, 𝑠𝐻 can be very high, even
significantly higher than the hospital’s unit revenue for the drug, 𝑟. The unit revenue is
the amount that patients are billed for receiving the drug in the hospital. The hospital
incurs a unit holding cost ℎ𝐻 > 0 for leftover stocks (ℎ𝐻 < 0 may present a unit salvage
value if there is a secondary market). To avoid infinite profit, we assume 𝑤 and 𝑐𝑅 are
each greater than −ℎ𝐻 . To avoid a trivial solution, we assume that at least one of 𝑤 and
𝑐𝑅 are less than 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 , otherwise, the hospital would never procure or produce the drug.
We assume that all parameters are known by all parties. The sequence of events is
illustrated in Figure 3.1. Let 𝛱𝑖𝑡 be the expected profit of player 𝑖 in period 𝑡, which is
calculated as follows.
𝛱𝐻𝑡 (𝑞𝑀𝑡 , 𝑞𝑅𝑡 , 𝑞𝐸𝑡 )
= 𝐸[𝑟 min{𝐷, 𝑧𝐻𝑡 + 𝑞𝑅𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑞𝐸𝑡 } − 𝑤𝑦𝑡 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅𝑡 − 𝑐𝐸 𝑞𝐸𝑡
− ℎ𝐻 (𝑧𝐻𝑡 + 𝑞𝑅𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑞𝐸𝑡 − 𝐷)+

(3.1)

− 𝑠𝐻 (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑞𝑅𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑞𝐸𝑡 )+ ]

𝛱𝑀𝑡 (𝑥𝑀𝑡 ) = 𝐸[𝑤𝑦𝑡 − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀𝑡 − ℎ𝑀 (𝑧𝑀𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 𝑥𝑀𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 )

(3.2)

− 𝑠𝑀 (𝑞𝑀𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 )]
The hospital’s expected profit (Equation 3.1) includes the revenue from the drug,
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Figure 3.1: The sequence of events in period 𝑡
the procurement cost paid to the manufacturer, the in-house regular production cost, the
emergency production costs, the shortage cost, and the holding cost. The manufacturer’s
profit function (Equation 3.2) includes the revenue, the production cost, the holding cost,
and the shortage cost.
Let 𝛤𝑖𝑡 (𝑧𝑖𝑡 ) be the optimal total expected profit of player 𝑖 from period 𝑡 onward
(i.e., the value function) for any initial inventory 𝑧𝑖𝑡 , which is formulated as follows.
𝛤𝐻𝑡 (𝑧𝐻𝑡 ) =

max

𝛱𝐻𝑡 (𝑧𝐻𝑡 , 𝑞𝑅𝑡 , 𝑞𝑀𝑡 , 𝑞𝐸𝑡 ) + 𝛿𝐸(𝛤𝐻𝑡+1 (𝑧𝐻𝑡+1 ))

𝑞𝑅𝑡 ,𝑞𝑀𝑡 ,𝑞𝐸𝑡 ≥0

𝛤𝑀𝑡 (𝑧𝑀𝑡 ) = max 𝛱𝑀𝑡 (𝑧𝑀𝑡 , 𝑥𝑀𝑡 ) + 𝛿𝐸(𝛤𝑀𝑡+1 (𝑧𝑀𝑡+1 ))
𝑥𝑀𝑡 ≥0

(3.3)
(3.4)

Where 𝛿 is a discount factor for the value of time. The initial inventory of player 𝑖
in period 𝑡 + 1 is the leftover inventory in period 𝑡, i.e., 𝑧𝐻𝑡+1 = (𝑞𝑅𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑞𝐸𝑡 − 𝐷)+ ,
and 𝑧𝑀𝑡+1 = (𝑧𝑀𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 𝑥𝑀𝑡 − 𝑞𝑀𝑡 )+ .
Our model is a multi-stage stochastic programming, with the two parties’
sequential and iterative decision-making process in each period. Although this model
setting captures the important features of a pharmaceutical supply chain, we are not able
to solve it analytically in the original multi-period setting. Therefore, we first solve a
single-period model and obtain closed-form solutions to generate insights into the
structure of the two player’s optimal production plans. We then propose two long-term
inventory management policies and evaluate the performance of the two policies using a
heuristic in the multi-period setting.
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Figure 3.2: A schematic illustration of the centralized system

Single-Period Analysis
We first solve a single-period model. We drop the subscript for the time period, 𝑡, in this
section. Similar to other studies (Keren, 2009; Li et al., 2012), we assume that the
manufacturer’s yield rate 𝑢 is uniformly distributed between 𝑎 and 𝑏. This assumption
allows us to derive close-form solutions and examine some main properties of the
hospital’s optimal procurement plan. We also verified that the main results hold under
other distributions, such as beta distributions and truncated normal distributions.
Therefore, our main results are robust and not distribution specific. We first solve a
centralized system with dual sourcing as the benchmark for the best case. Next, we solve
a decentralized system with dual sourcing.

3.4.1

Centralized System with Dual Sourcing

In a centralized system with dual sourcing (Model C, the centralized system), we
envision a single integrated system (Figure 3.2) consisting of the hospital and the two
manufacturing facilities. We continue to refer to the two manufacturing facilities as the
manufacturer and the in-house producer in this section, even though they are part of an
integrated system. A central planner makes decisions to maximize the total profit in this
system.
The centralized system differs from the decentralized system in several aspects.
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The first difference is the decision variables in each system. The decision variables in the
centralized system are 𝑞𝑅 , 𝑥𝑀 and 𝑞𝐸 . 𝑞𝑀 is no longer a decision because it is used to
determine the transfer payment between players within the system. The second difference
is the sequence of decisions. Under a centralized system, the order of decision sequence
does not matter because the decisions are made by the same decision-maker. Therefore,
the central planner chooses 𝑞𝑅 and 𝑥𝑀 simultaneously in the regular procurement phase,
and he chooses the emergency production quantity 𝑞𝐸 in the emergency procurement
phase.
Several parameters are also different in the two systems. Let 𝑧𝐶 = 𝑧𝐻 + 𝑧𝑀 be the
total initial inventory in the centralized system, which can be accessed by the central
planner at the beginning of the period. Let 𝑠𝐶 = 𝑠𝐻 be the unit shortage cost for the
centralized system for unfulfilled demand. This is because 𝑠𝑀 can be interpreted as the
manufacturer’s loss of reputation and future sales to the hospital, which is within the
integrated system. Let ℎ𝐶 = min{ℎ𝐻 , ℎ𝑀 } be the holding cost in the centralized system,
i.e., the leftover stocks will be stored in the less expensive facility. All other parameters
and sequence of events are the same as the decentralized system.
Let 𝛱𝐶 be the expected profit for the centralized system. Unlike the centralized
system in much of the supply chain literature, the profit in our integrated system is not
simply the sum of the two parties’ profit functions. This is because the central planner’s
production quantities at the two manufacturing facilities are embedded in the min and
max functions in 𝛱𝐶 , which cannot be obtained by summing up the hospital and the
manufacturer’s profit functions together. 𝛱𝐶 is given by:
𝛱𝐶 (𝑞𝑅 , 𝑥𝑀 , 𝑞𝐸 ) = 𝐸[𝑟 min{𝐷, 𝑧𝐶 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑢 𝑥𝑀 + 𝑞𝐸 } − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑐𝐸 𝑞𝐸
− ℎ𝐶 (𝑧𝐶 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑢 𝑥𝑀 + 𝑞𝐸 − 𝐷)+
− 𝑠𝐻 (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶 − 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑢 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑞𝐸 )+ ]

(3.5)

The expected profit in the centralized system includes the revenue, the regular
production costs at the two manufacturing facilities, the emergency production cost, the
holding cost, and the shortage cost. The central planner’s problem can be formulated as
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follows.
max 𝛱𝐶

𝑞𝑅 ,𝑥𝑀

s.t.

(3.6)

𝑞𝐸 = arg max 𝛱𝐶 |𝑞𝑅 , 𝑥𝑀

(3.7)

𝑞𝑅 , 𝑥𝑀 , 𝑞𝐸 ≥ 0

(3.8)

Let 𝐿𝐶 = 𝑧𝐶 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑢𝑥𝑀 be the central planner’s inventory level at the beginning
of the emergency procurement phase. Let 𝑞̃𝐸𝐶 be the best response function for Equation
(5), which is summarized in Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1: In Model C, the best response function for the emergency production
quantity for any given 𝑞𝑅 and 𝑥𝑀 is as follows.
𝑞̃𝐸𝐶 = {

0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻
(𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶 )+ , 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻

Lemma 3.1 indicates that if 𝑐𝐸 is sufficiently high (𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 ), then the central
planner will not make any emergency production, even if there is a shortage. If 𝑐𝐸 is
sufficiently low (𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 ), then the central planner will set the emergency
production quantity equal to the shortage quantity at the beginning of the emergency
replenishment phase. In Lemma 3.1, the threshold for 𝑐𝐸 is 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 , indicating that the
hospital should consider both the revenue and the shortage cost of the drug when
determining whether to make emergency production or not.
Let superscript 𝐶 denote the optimal solutions in the centralized system. Let 𝑄𝐸𝐶 =
𝐸[𝑞𝐸𝐶 ] be the optimal expected emergency production quantity. Proposition 3.1
𝐶
summarizes the central planner’s optimal decisions about 𝑞𝑅𝐶 and 𝑥𝑀
, as well as the

resulting expected emergency production quantity, 𝑄𝐸𝐶 .
Proposition 3.1: The optimal production plan in the centralized system is one of the
following:
𝐶
a. If 𝑧𝑇 ≥ 𝐷, then 𝑞𝑅𝐶 = 0, 𝑥𝑀
= 0 and 𝑄𝐸𝐶 = 0
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b. If 𝑧𝑇 < 𝐷:
𝐶

𝐶
I. 𝑞𝑅𝐶 = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶 > 0, 𝑥𝑀
= 0 and 𝑄𝐸𝐶 = 0 if and only if (iff) 𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑐𝑅
𝐶

𝐶
II. 𝑞𝑅𝐶 = 0 and 𝑥𝑀
= 𝐴𝐶 (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶 ), iff 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑐𝑅

i. 𝑄𝐸𝐶 > 0 iff 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻
ii. 𝑄𝐸𝐶 = 0 iff 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻
𝐶

√ℎ𝐶 +𝜙√−2𝑎𝑐𝑀 +𝑏(2𝑐𝑀 +𝑏ℎ𝐶 )+𝑎2 𝜙−𝑏ℎ𝐶 −𝑎𝜙

where 𝑐𝑅 = (
and 𝐴𝐶 =

√ℎ𝐶 +𝜙(𝐷−𝑧𝐶 )
√−2𝑎𝑐𝑀 +𝑏(2𝑐𝑀 +𝑏ℎ𝐶 )+𝑎2 𝜙

𝑏−𝑎

+

) , 𝜙 = min{𝑐𝐸 , 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 },

.

Proposition 3.1 indicates that the central planner will not produce anything if the
demand can be satisfied by the initial inventory. Otherwise, the central planner’s optimal
production plan is depending on the production costs at the manufacturing facilities. If
𝐶

the hospital’s regular production cost is sufficiently low (𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑐𝑅 ), then the central
planner prefers to produce at the hospital’s in-house producer in the regular procurement
phase, and the production quantity is the difference between the demand and the initial
𝐶

inventory. If the hospital’s regular production cost is sufficiently high (𝑐𝑅 > 𝑐𝑅 ), then the
central planner will produce at the manufacturer during the regular procurement phase,
and the production quantity is the product of the adjustment factor 𝐴𝐶 and the quantity
still in short (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶 ). If the emergency production cost is sufficiently low, then the
central planner will make emergency production. Otherwise, he will not produce
anything during the emergency procurement phase, regardless of shortages. The optimal
solutions in the centralized system provide a benchmark for the best case, and we
compare it with the decentralized system in section 3.4.3.

3.4.2

Decentralized System with Dual Sourcing

In this section, we solve the decentralized system with dual sourcing (Model D, the
decentralized system). The problem is formally formulated as follows.
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max 𝛱𝐻

(3.9)

𝑞𝑅 ,𝑞𝑀

s.t.

𝑥𝑀 = arg max 𝛱𝑀 |𝑞𝑀

(3.10)

𝑞𝐸 = arg max 𝛱𝐻 |𝑞𝑅 , 𝑞𝑀 , 𝑥𝑀

(3.11)

𝑞𝑅 , 𝑞𝑀 , 𝑥𝑀 , 𝑞𝐸 ≥ 0

(3.12)

Equation 3.9 is the hospital’s problem of choosing 𝑞𝑅 , and 𝑞𝑀 in stage 1.
Equation 3.10 is the manufacturer’s optimal decision of 𝑥𝑀 in stage 2, for any given 𝑞𝑀 .
Equation 3.11 is the hospital’s optimal decision of 𝑞𝐸 in stage 3, for any given 𝑞𝑀 , 𝑞𝑅 ,
and 𝑥𝑀 . Inequality 3.12 is the non-negativity constraint for all decision variables.
Let superscript ∗ denote the optimal solutions in Model D. Define 𝐿 as the
hospital’s inventory level at the beginning of stage 3, where 𝐿 = 𝑧𝐻 + 𝑦 + 𝑞𝑅 . Let 𝑞̃𝐸 be
the hospital’s best response function for her emergency production quantity. Lemma 3.2
shows the expression of 𝑞̃𝐸 .
Lemma 3.2: In Model D, the hospital’s best response function for the emergency
production quantity for any given 𝑞𝑅 and 𝑥𝑀 is as follows.
𝑞̃𝐸 = {

0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻
(𝐷 − 𝐿)+ , 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻

𝑞̃𝐸 has a similar expression and intuition with 𝑞̃𝐸𝐶 in Model C. 𝑞̃𝐸 can be obtained
by replacing 𝐿𝐶 in 𝑞̃𝐸𝐶 with 𝐿.
Let 𝑥̃𝑀 be the manufacturer’s best response function for Equation 8. Before
discussing 𝑥̃𝑀 , we present a condition under which the manufacturer will not produce
anything, regardless of the value of 𝑞𝑀 .
𝑎+𝑏

Lemma 3.3: If 𝑐𝑀 > (

2

∗
) (𝑤 + 𝑠𝑀 ), then 𝑥𝑀
= 0 ∀ 𝑞𝑀 .

The manufacturer’s production decision is based on the trade-off between the cost
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and benefit of production. In Lemma 3.3, the left-hand side of the inequality is the
manufacturer’s production cost if he plans to produce one unit of drug. The right-hand
side is the manufacturer’s expected benefit if he plans to produce one unit of the drug,
which is the product of his expected yield rate (
drug.

𝑎+𝑏
2

𝑎+𝑏
2

), and the benefit of selling one unit of

is the mean of the uniformly distributed yield rate based on our assumption,

and we numerically verified that it can be replaced by the mean of the yield rate with
other distributions. The benefit of selling one unit of drug includes the unit revenue from
selling the drug and the unit shortage cost that he can avoid (𝑤 + 𝑠𝑀 ). If the production
cost outweighs the expected benefit, then the manufacturer will not produce anything,
regardless of the order quantity from the hospital. In other words, there is no interaction
between the two parties in this situation. To guarantee the manufacturer’s participation,
we assume the following assumption holds throughout the rest of the analysis.
𝑎+𝑏

Assumption 3.1: (

2

Define 𝐴𝑀 =

) (𝑤 + 𝑠𝑀 ) > 𝑐𝑀 .
√𝑤+ℎ𝑀 +𝑠𝑀

√2(𝑏−𝑎)𝑐𝑀 +( 𝑠𝑀 +𝑤)𝑎2 + ℎ𝑀 𝑏2

as an “adjustment factor” that

determines how the manufacturer’s production level varies with respect to the hospital’s
order quantity. Lemma 3.4 summarizes the manufacturer’s best response function 𝑥̃𝑀 ,
i.e., how the manufacturing uses the adjustment factor 𝐴𝑀 to determine his production
quantity. Lemma 3.5 states a property of 𝐴𝑀 .
Lemma 3.4: The manufacturer’s best response function is given by:
𝑥̃𝑀 = 𝐴𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀 )+ .
Lemma 3.5: 𝐴𝑀 ≥ 1.
The manufacturer will not produce anything if his initial inventory can fully
satisfy the hospital’s order quantity (i.e., 𝑞𝑀 < 𝑧𝑀 ). Otherwise, he will use the
adjustment factor 𝐴𝑀 to determine his planned production quantity for any quantity that
needs to be produced (𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀 ). The coefficient 𝐴𝑀 is similar to Equation (6) in Keren
(2009), but with a difference in the denominator.
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Lemma 3.5 states that if the manufacturer needs to make production, then he will
plan to produce no less than the quantity needed. This is intuitive due to the existence of
his yield uncertainty.
Proposition 3.2 summarizes the hospital’s optimal production plan.
Proposition 3.2: The optimal production plan for the hospital in the decentralized
system with dual sourcing is one of the following.
∗
a. If 𝐷 ≤ 𝑧𝐻 , then 𝑞𝑅∗ = 0, 𝑞𝑀
= 0 and 𝑄𝐸∗ = 0

b. If 𝑧𝐻 < 𝐷 ≤ 𝑧𝑀 + 𝑧𝐻 :
∗
I. 𝑞𝑅∗ = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 , 𝑞𝑀
= 0, and 𝑄𝐸∗ = 0 iff 𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑤
∗
II. 𝑞𝑅∗ = 0, 𝑞𝑀
= 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 , and 𝑄𝐸∗ = 0 iff 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑤

c. If 𝐷 > 𝑧𝑀 + 𝑧𝐻 :
I.
II.
III.

∗
𝑞𝑅∗ = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 , 𝑞𝑀
= 0, and 𝑄𝐸∗ = 0, iff 𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑐 𝑅
∗
𝑞𝑅∗ = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 − 𝑧𝑀 , 𝑞𝑀
= 𝑧𝑀 , and 𝑄𝐸∗ = 0, iff 𝑐 𝑅 < 𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑐𝑅
∗
𝑞𝑅∗ = 0 and 𝑞𝑀
= 𝑧𝑀 + 𝐴𝐻 (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 − 𝑧𝑀 ), iff 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑐𝑅

i. 𝑄𝐸∗ = 0 iff 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻
ii. 𝑄𝐸∗ = 𝑄̂𝐸 > 0 iff 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻
√(ℎ𝐻 +𝜙)((2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻 +𝑤)+𝑎2 𝐴2 (𝜙−𝑤)−𝐴(𝑏ℎ𝐻 +𝑎𝜙)

where 𝑐 𝑅 = 𝑤, 𝑐𝑅 = (
max {1,

√(𝜙+ℎ𝐻 )
2
2
√𝐴 𝑎 (𝜙−𝑤)+(2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻 +𝑤)

𝐴(𝑏−𝑎)

}, and 𝑄̂𝐸 =

+

) , 𝐴𝐻 =

∗
(𝑧𝐻 +𝑧𝑀 +𝑎𝐴(𝑞𝑀
−𝑧𝑀 )−𝐷)2
∗ −𝑧 )
2𝐴(𝑏−𝑎)(𝑞𝑀
𝑀

.

Proposition 3.2.a and b state that the hospital first tries to satisfy the demand
using the existing inventories. If the existing inventories at the two manufacturing
facilities are not sufficient, Proposition 3.2.c indicates that the hospital’s production plan
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depends on the costs of the in-house production and outsourcing. If 𝑐𝑅 is sufficiently low
(Proposition 3.2.c.I), i.e., the hospital’s in-house production is cheaper and more reliable,
then the hospital will produce all quantity needed at the in-house producer in the regular
production phase. If 𝑐𝑅 is intermediate (Proposition 3.2.c.II), then the hospital’s in-house
production cost is reasonably high which can be justified by the higher reliability than the
manufacturer. In this case, the hospital will purchase the manufacturer’s initial inventory,
which does not involve yield risk and is cheaper than the in-house production. The
hospital will produce the rest of the quantity needed at the in-house producer during the
regular procurement phase. If 𝑐𝑅 is sufficiently high (Proposition 3.2.c.III), then the
hospital will only order from the manufacturer in the regular procurement phase. This is
because 𝑐𝑅 is too high to be justified by the higher reliability. The order quantity includes
two parts. The first part is the manufacturer’s initial inventory, 𝑧𝑀 which is risk-free and
does not need any adjustment. The second part involves yield risks and the hospital uses
a coefficient 𝐴𝐻 to make adjustment. Due to the existence of yield uncertainty, 𝐴𝐻 is no
less than 1. The hospital’s expected emergency production plan is a direct result of the
best response function of 𝑞̃𝐸 . For the rest of the analysis, we focus on the non-trivial
cases in which the demand cannot be satisfied by the existing inventories (Proposition
3.2.c), and production has to take place.
𝑐̅𝑅 is an important threshold value that determines whether the hospital will use
the in-house producer in the regular phase or not. Therefore, we show some properties of
𝑐̅𝑅 in Proposition 3.3.
Proposition 3.3:
𝜕𝑐𝑅
𝜕𝑠𝐻

≥ 0;

𝜕𝑐𝑅
𝜕𝑟

≥ 0;

𝜕𝑐𝑅
𝜕𝑐𝐸

≥ 0.

If 𝑠𝐻 or 𝑟 increases, the hospital will be more willing to mitigate drug shortages
to either avoid a high shortage cost or pursue a high revenue. Therefore, she is more
likely to use a reliable source, i.e., 𝑐̅𝑅 is increasing in 𝑠𝐻 and 𝑟. If 𝑐𝐸 increases, the
hospital will be more reluctant to make emergency production. Therefore, she is more
likely to switch from a reliable source to an unreliable source at a higher threshold of 𝑐𝑅 ,
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i.e., 𝑐̅𝑅 is increasing in 𝑐𝐸 .
Let 𝛺 denote the expected shortage amount, i.e., 𝛺 = 𝐸[(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑞𝑅𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 −
𝑞𝐸𝑡 )+ ]. Lemma 3.6 summarizes the expression of the expected shortage amount under
the optimal production plan, 𝛺 ∗ .
Lemma 3.6: The expected shortage amount under the optimal production plan in Model
D is as follows:
∗
∗
(𝑞𝑅
+𝑧𝐻 +𝑧𝑀 −𝐷+𝑎𝐴(𝑞𝑀
−𝑧𝑀 ))2

a.

𝛺∗ =

b.

𝛺 ∗ = 0, otherwise.

∗ −𝑧 )
2𝐴(𝑏−𝑎)(𝑞𝑀
𝑀

, if 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝐸 > 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻

Lemma 3.6 states that the establishment of the hospital’s in-house producer can
mitigate drug shortages, unless both 𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝐸 are sufficiently high. If 𝑐𝑅 is low (𝑐𝑅 ≤
𝑐𝑅 ), then shortages can be mitigated in the regular procurement phase. If 𝑐𝐸 is low (𝑐𝐸 ≤
𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 ), then shortages can be mitigated in the emergency procurement phase. If both 𝑐𝑅
and 𝑐𝐸 are high, then the hospital will not produce anything at the in-house producer,
which is a sole-sourcing situation. Note that, if the emergency production is not possible
(e.g., for drugs that need a long lead time or emergency production capacity is not
available), then we can set 𝑐𝐸 = ∞, and 𝑐𝐸 > 𝑐𝑅 + 𝑠𝐻 is always satisfied so that the
hospital never make emergency production.

3.4.3

Numerical Analysis

In this section, we conduct numerical analysis to analyze and illustrate some results and
observations. We first analyze Model D. Next, we compare Model D with Model C.

Parameter
Value
Parameter
Value

Table 3.3. Parameter values for numerical analysis
𝑫
𝒂
𝒃
𝒛𝑴
𝒛𝑯
𝒘
10000
0
1
1000 1000
500
𝒔𝑴
𝒓
𝒉𝑯
𝒔𝑯
𝒄𝑹
Low 𝒄𝑬
100
1500
100
1800
750
1500

𝒄𝑴
𝒉𝑴
50
200
High 𝒄𝑬
3500
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Figure 3.3: Policy graph of the hospital’s optimal procurement strategy in Model D with
respect to the hospital’s unit regular production cost (𝑐𝑅 ) and unit emergency production
cost (𝑐𝐸 ). In the regular procurement phase, the hospital’s optimal strategy is one of the
following: pure in-house production (only make in-house production), a mixed strategy
(procure from both manufacturing facilities), and pure outsourcing (only procures from
the external manufacturer). Contingent sourcing: the hospital prefers to make emergency
production at the in-house producer.

Model D
Depending on the hospital’s optimal ordering decision in the regular procurement phase,
we refer to the procurement plans in Proposition 3.2.c.I, II, and III as a pure in-house
production strategy, a mixed procurement strategy, and a pure outsourcing strategy,
respectively. Depending on the hospital’s emergency production decisions, we refer to
the procurement plans in Proposition 3.2.c.I.ii as a contingent sourcing strategy in which
the hospital will make emergency production if needed.
Figure 3.3 provides a graphical illustration of the hospital’s optimal procurement
strategy as a function of 𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝐸 in the Model D when 𝑧𝐻 < 𝐷 − 𝑧𝑀 (i.e., Proposition
3.2.c). In Case 1, 𝑐𝑅 is low (𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑤), and the hospital prefers a pure in-house production
strategy. In Case 2, 𝑐𝑅 is intermediate (𝑤 < 𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑐𝑅 ), and the hospital prefers a mixed
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procurement strategy and she will procure the drug from both manufacturing facilities.
This is because the hospital will purchase the manufacturer’s initial inventory, which
does not involve yield uncertainties and is cheaper than the hospital’s in-house
production. The hospital will produce the rest amount that is needed in the in-house
producer. In Case 3, 𝑐𝑅 is high (𝑐𝑅 > 𝑐𝑅 ) and 𝑐𝐸 is low (𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 ), and the hospital
prefers a pure outsourcing strategy in the regular phase and a contingent sourcing
strategy in the emergency procurement phase. In Case 4, both 𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝐸 are high (𝑐𝑅 >
𝑐𝑅 , and 𝑐𝐸 > 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 ), and the hospital prefers a pure outsourcing strategy in the regular
phase, and will not use a contingent sourcing strategy. Note that, in Figure 3.3, the
hospital does not use a contingent sourcing strategy when 𝑐𝑅 < 𝑐𝑅 . This is because we
assume that the hospital’s in-house producer has a perfect yield rate. If the in-house
producer also has yield uncertainties, which is highly likely in the real world, then the
hospital will use a contingent sourcing strategy in Case 1 and Case 2 if 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 .
Next, we examine some properties of 𝑐𝑅 . Let ∆𝑐 be the difference between the
hospital’s in-house regular production cost and the outsourcing cost, ∆𝑐 = 𝑐𝑅 − 𝑤. ∆𝑐
can be interpreted as the hospital’s cost disadvantage if she produces at the in-house
producer instead of procuring from the manufacturer in the regular phase. Let 𝜇 and 𝜎 2
be the mean and variance of 𝑢, respectively. Figure 3.4 shows 𝑐̅𝑅 as a function of ∆𝑐 with
different means and variances of 𝑢. The graphs in Figure 3.4.a and b have a fixed mean
of 𝑢 with different variances (𝑎 and 𝑏 move symmetrically with respect to the mean).
The graphs in Figure 3.4.c and d have a fixed variance of 𝑢 with different means (𝑎 and
𝑏 move simultaneously to the same direction). In all four graphs, 𝑐̅𝑅 is decreasing in ∆𝑐,
indicating that the hospital is more willing to procure from the manufacturer if 𝑐𝑅 is
higher than 𝑤.
We then analyze the impact of the parameters of the yield rate on 𝑐𝑅 . Figure 3.4 a
and b show that 𝑐̅𝑅 is sensitive to the variance of the yield rate (𝜎 2 ), regardless of the
value of 𝑐𝐸 . The impact of 𝜇 on 𝑐𝑅 depends on whether the hospital uses a contingent
sourcing strategy or not. If the hospital has a second chance to make emergency
production for any shortfall quantity (i.e., 𝑐𝐸 is low), then 𝑐𝑅 is not affected by 𝜇 very
much (Figure 3.4 c). If the hospital does not take advantage of a second chance to make
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Different 𝜇, Fixed 𝜎 2

(a)

(c)

(b)

(d)

High 𝑐𝐸 (𝑐𝐸 > 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 )

Low 𝑐𝐸 (𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 )

Different 𝜎 2 , Fixed 𝜇

Figure 3.4: 𝑐𝑅 as a function of ∆𝑐 = 𝑐𝑅 − 𝑤 with different μ and 𝜎 2 . (a) with different
𝜎 2 and fixed 𝜇, when 𝑐𝐸 is low; (b) with different 𝜎 2 and fixed 𝜇, when 𝑐𝐸 is high; (c)
with different 𝜇 and fixed 𝜎 2 , when 𝑐𝐸 is low; (d) with different 𝜇 and fixed 𝜎 2 , when
𝑐𝐸 is high.
emergency production (i.e., 𝑐𝐸 is high), then the hospital is very cautious when choosing
the optimal production plan in the regular procurement phase. In this case, even a small
change in 𝜇 will have a large impact on 𝑐̅𝑅 (Figure 3.4 d).
In summary, several factors have a large impact on the threshold value 𝑐𝑅 , such
as the hospital’s cost disadvantage (∆𝑐), the emergency production cost 𝑐𝐸 , and the
variance of the manufacturer’s yield rate (𝜎 2 ). 𝑐𝑅 is sensitive to the mean of the
manufacturer’s yield rate (𝜇) only if the hospital does not use a contingent sourcing
strategy.
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Model D vs. Model C
In this section, we compare the performance of Model D and Model C. Recall that we
assume 𝑠𝐶 = 𝑠𝐻 in Model C, therefore, we let 𝑠𝑀 = 0 for this section for a fair
comparison between the two systems. Let 𝛱𝑇∗ be the total optimal profit of the hospital
∗
and the manufacturer Model D, 𝛱𝑇∗ = 𝛱𝐻∗ + 𝛱𝑀
. Let 𝛱𝐶𝐶 be the optimal profit for the

integrated system in Model C.
Figure 3.5 shows the efficiency of Model D compared with Model C (𝛱𝑇∗ /𝛱𝐶𝐶 ) as
a function of 𝑐𝑅 when 𝑐𝐸 is low. This scenario corresponds to a horizontal line in Figure
3.3 across Case 1, 2 and 3. Figure 3.5 indicates that Model D has some inefficiencies
𝐶

when 𝑐𝑅 is low (𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑐 𝑅 ) and 𝑐𝑅 is high (𝑐𝑅 ≥ 𝑐𝑅 ). In Model C, the central planner will
always deplete the existing inventories at both manufacturing facilities (𝑧𝑇 ), before
producing anything. However, when 𝑐𝑅 is low (𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑐 𝑅 ), the hospital uses a pure inhouse production strategy in Model D, and she does not purchase anything from the
manufacturer. Therefore, when 𝑐𝑅 is low, the inefficiencies in Model D are mainly due to
𝐶

the waste of the manufacturer’s initial inventory and his holding cost. When 𝑐𝑅 ∈ [ 𝑐𝑅 ,
𝑐𝑅 ], the hospital uses a mixed procurement strategy, and the inefficiencies of Model D
are due to the decentralized decision-making process. When 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑐𝑅 , the hospital uses a

Figure 3.5: Relevant performance of Model D vs. Model C (𝛱𝑇∗ /𝛱𝐶𝐶 ) with respect to
the hospital’s unit regular production cost (𝑐𝑅 ) when 𝑐𝐸 is low (𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 ).
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pure outsourcing strategy, and the inefficiencies are mainly due to the holding cost. This
is because the central planner can store the leftover stocks in the cheaper warehouse,
whereas the two parties in Model D do not have this flexibility.
𝐶

When 𝑐𝑅 is between 𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝑅 , the optimal production plans in the two systems
are the same. The initial inventories at both manufacturer facilities will be used, and the
shortfall quantity will be produced at the hospital’s in-house producer. Therefore, when
the hospital’s in-house regular production cost is either low or high, a decentralized
system with dual sourcing has inefficiencies compared with a centralized system, and
other types of coordinating mechanisms could be designed to improve the total supply
chain performance.

3.4.4

Extensions

In this section, we relax the assumption that the hospital’s in-house producer has a
perfect yield rate. We consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, we assume that the inhouse producer has a constant yield loss. In the second scenario, we assume that the inhouse producer has a random yield rate.
Extension 1- The In-House Producer Has a Fixed Yield Loss
Let 𝑢𝐻 be the yield rate at the hospital’s in-house producer. In this extension, we assume
that 𝑢𝐻 is a constant and 𝑢𝐻 ∈ (0, 1), i.e., the in-house producer has a constant yield loss.
We analytically characterized the equilibrium solutions in this extension for the case 𝐷 >
𝑧𝑀 + 𝑧𝐻 , which are summarized in Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 3.4: If the hospital’s in-house producer has a constant yield rate ,𝑢𝐻 ∈
(0,1), then the optimal production plan for the hospital when 𝐷 > 𝑧𝑀 + 𝑧𝐻 is one of the
following.
I. 𝑞𝑅∗ =

𝐷−𝑧𝐻

II. 𝑞𝑅∗ =

𝐷−𝑧𝐻 −𝑧𝑀

𝑢𝐻

∗
, 𝑞𝑀
= 0, and 𝑄𝐸∗ = 0, iff 𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑢𝐻 𝑐 𝑅

𝑢𝐻

∗
, 𝑞𝑀
= 𝑧𝑀 , and 𝑄𝐸∗ = 0, iff 𝑢𝐻 𝑐 𝑅 < 𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑢𝐻 𝑐𝑅
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∗
III. 𝑞𝑅∗ = 0 and 𝑞𝑀
= 𝑧𝑀 + 𝐴𝐻 (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 − 𝑧𝑀 ), iff 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑢𝐻 𝑐𝑅

i. 𝑄𝐸∗ = 0 iff 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑢𝐻 ( 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 )
ii. 𝑄𝐸∗ > 0 iff 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑢𝐻 ( 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 )
where 𝑐 𝑅 , 𝑐𝑅 , and 𝐴𝐻 are the same as defined in Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.4 indicates that the equilibrium solutions in this extension have a
similar structure with the basic model as indicated in Proposition 3.2 – the threshold
values for 𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝐸 in this extension can be obtained by multiplying the threshold values
in the basic model by the in-house producer’s yield loss, 𝑢𝐻 , and the optimal in-house
production quantities can be obtained by dividing the corresponding quantities in the
basic model by 𝑢𝐻 . In other words, when the in-house producer is deterministically
reliable, the constant yield rate only has an scaling effect of boosting up the production
costs and the production quantities at the in-house producer, but the main structure and
qualitative properties of the policy graph in Figure 3.3 remain the same.
Extension 2 – The In-House Producer Has a Random Yield Rate
In this extension, we assume that the in-house producer’s yield rate (𝑢𝑅 ) is a random
variable with a PDF 𝑓𝐻 (∙) and CDF 𝐹𝐻 (∙). Due to the complexity of the profit functions,
we are not able to analytically characterize the optimal solutions. Therefore, we analyze
this extension numerically using the same numerical values in Table 3.3. We follow the
same assumption that the external manufacturer’s yield rate is uniformly distributed on
the interval [0,1]. We assume the emergency production has a perfect yield rate. We
consider the case that the in-house producer’s yield rate in the regular procurement phase
is stochastically dominated by the external manufacturer’s yield rate. Let 𝑢𝐻 be
uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 0.8].
Figure 3.6 presents a policy graph of the hospital’s optimal procurement plan
with respect to the unit regular in-house production cost (𝑐𝑅 ) and the unit emergency
production cost (𝑐𝐸 ) in this extension, which is a counterpart of Figure 3.3 in the basic
model. One major difference between Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.3 is that when 𝑐𝑅 is
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Figure 3.6: Policy graph of the hospital’s optimal procurement strategy with respect to
the hospital’s unit regular production cost (𝑐𝑅 ) and unit emergency production cost (𝑐𝐸 )
when the in-house producer has a random yield rate (𝑢𝐻 ). In the regular procurement
phase, the hospital’s optimal strategy is one of the following: pure in-house production
(only make in-house production), a mixed strategy (procure from both manufacturing
facilities), and pure outsourcing (only procures from the external manufacturer).
Contingent sourcing: the hospital prefers to make emergency production at the in-house
producer.
sufficiently low in this extension, the hospital prefers to procure from both
manufacturing facilities in the regular procurement phase. In Case 5 and Case 6 in Figure
3.6, the hospital’s order quantity from the manufacturer is greater than its initial
∗
inventory (𝑞𝑀
> 𝑧𝑀 ), i.e., the hospital will order from the manufacturer even if it does

not have any initial inventory. The hospital does not prefer a pure in-house production
strategy in this extension due to the low yield rate at the in-house producer. However, the
hospital still makes in-house production in the regular phase, which is mainly for riskpooling purposes. In other words, due to the existence of the random yield rates at both
manufacturing facilities, the hospital prefers to procure from both sources to mitigate
supply uncertainties if 𝑐𝑅 is sufficiently low.

Multi-Period Analysis
We are not able to derive closed-form solutions for the multi-period case. Thus, we solve
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and analyze the multi-period model using a heuristic. Inventory management policies
(e.g., order-up-to policy) are widely studied in supply chain management literature (Chao
and Zipkin, 2008; Chen et al., 2012; Henig and Gerchak, 1990), and they are easy to
implement by inventory managers. We consider three inventory management policies for
the hospital in the regular procurement phase: a Target Inventory Policy, a Scale Factor
Policy, and a Myopic Scale Factor Policy. The inventory management policies are
inspired by the structures of the single period solutions.
We make some assumptions in this section to focus our attention on the hospital’s
optimal procurement decision in the regular procurement phase. First, we assume that
𝑐𝑅 > 𝑤, i.e., the hospital’s regular in-house production is more expensive than procuring
from the manufacturer. Otherwise, the hospital will always make in-house production in
the regular phase, and there is no interaction between the hospital and the manufacturer
in the multi-period model. Second, we assume that the manufacturer uses the structure of
his best response function in the single-period setting (as specified in Lemma 3.4) as his
production policy in the multi-period setting: in each period, for any given order quantity
from the hospital, the manufacturer uses the scale factor 𝐴𝑀 to determine the production
quantity, 𝑥𝑀𝑡 = 𝐴𝑀 (𝑞𝑀𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡 )+ . In addition, we assume that the hospital’s emergency
production quantity in each period follows her best response function in the single-period
setting as specified in Lemma 3.2.
The sequence of events under each inventory management policy is as follows.
At the beginning of the time horizon, the hospital decides the policy parameters (will be
discussed in section 3.5.1), which will be fixed for the rest of the time horizon. In period
𝑡 ∈ {1, … , 𝑇}, the hospital and the manufacturer start period 𝑡 with an initial inventory
𝑧𝑅𝑡 and 𝑧𝑀𝑡 , respectively. Let 𝑧𝑀1 = 0 and 𝑧𝑅1 = 0. The sequence of events in each
period is the same as illustrated in Figure 3.1, where the decision variables are
determined according to the following rules: in stage 1, the hospital’s order quantities
from the two manufacturing facilities, 𝑞𝑅𝑡 and 𝑞𝑀𝑡 are determined by 𝑧𝐻𝑡 and the policy
parameters as described in section 3.5.1; in stage 2, the manufacturing’s order quantity
𝑥𝑀𝑡 is determined according to Lemma 3.2; and in stage 3, the hospital’s emergency
production quantity 𝑞𝐸𝑡 is determined according to Lemma 3.4. Figure 3.7 illustrates the
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Figure 3.7 Sequence of Events in the Multi-Period Setting under a TIP.
sequence of events in the multi-period setting under a TIP as an example. Under a SFP or
a MSFP, only the policy parameters need to be replaced accordingly at the beginning of
the time horizon.
We discuss the detail of the three inventory management policies in section
3.5.1. In section 3.5.2, we discuss the solution and evaluation algorithm using the Sample
Average Approximation (SAA) algorithm (Kleywegt et al., 2002). We then evaluate the
performance of the three inventory management policies in a multi-period setting in
section 3.5.3.

3.5.1

Three Inventory Management Policies

A Target Inventory Policy
Under a Target Inventory Policy (TIP), at the beginning of the entire time
horizon, the hospital chooses two parameters: a target inventory level 𝐼, and an allocation
factor 𝑘. The target inventory level 𝐼 incorporates the procurement from both the
manufacturer and the in-house producer, and the hospital uses 𝑘 to allocate the order
quantities to the two manufacturing facilities. At the beginning of period 𝑡, if the
hospital’s initial inventory is below 𝐼, then an initial shortfall quantity (𝐼 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 ) needs to
be procured in the regular procurement phase. The hospital’s most preferred source for
the initial shortfall amount is the manufacturer’s initial inventory because it is cheaper
than the hospital’s in-house production (recall that we assumed 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑤). If the
manufacturer’s initial inventory is not sufficient, i.e., 𝑧𝑀𝑡 < 𝐼 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 , then the shortfall
quantity (𝐼 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡 ) will be allocated to the two manufacturing facilities using the
allocation factor 𝑘, where 𝑘(𝐼 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡 ) will be ordered from the manufacturer, and
(1 − 𝑘)(𝐼 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡 ) will be allocated to the in-house producer. For any given pairs of
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(𝐼, 𝑘), the hospital’s order quantities from the two manufacturing facilities in period 𝑡 are
given by:
𝑞𝑀𝑡 = min{(𝐼 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 )+ , 𝑧𝑀𝑡 + 𝑘(𝐼 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡 )+ }

(3.13)

𝑞𝑅𝑡 = (1 − 𝑘)(𝐼 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡 )+

(3.14)

A Scale Factor Policy
Under a Scale Factor Policy (SFP), at the beginning of the entire time horizon,
the hospital chooses two scale factors, 𝑆𝑀 and 𝑆𝐻 , to determine the order quantities from
the manufacturer and the in-house producer, respectively. At the beginning of period 𝑡, if
the hospital’s initial inventory cannot fully satisfy the demand (𝑧𝐻𝑡 < 𝐷), then the
hospital needs to procure an initial shortfall quantity (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 ) from the two
manufacturing facilities. The hospital’s first preferred source for the initial shortfall
quantity is the manufacturer’s initial inventory, as discussed for a TIP. If the
manufacturer’s initial inventory is insufficient, then the quantity (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡 ) needs
to be produced by the two manufacturing facilities. The hospital will use 𝑆𝑀 and 𝑆𝐻 to
determine the allocation of this quantity: 𝑆𝑀 (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡 ) will be ordered from the
manufacturer, and 𝑆𝐻 (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡 ) will be ordered from the in-house producer. The
hospital’s order quantities from the two manufacturing facilities in period 𝑡 are given by:
𝑞𝑀𝑡 = min{ (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 )+ , 𝑧𝑀𝑡 + 𝑆𝑀 (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡 )+ }

(3.15)

𝑞𝑅𝑡 = 𝑆𝐻 (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡 )+

(3.16)

A Myopic Scale Factor Policy
The hospital can apply a myopic policy by using the optimal solution in the
single-period model. Denote this myopic policy a Myopic Scale Factor Policy (MSFP),
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃
because it has the same structure as a SFP with different scale factors. Let 𝑆𝑀
and

𝑆𝐻𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 be the scale factors used in a MSFP, and hospital’s order quantities from the
manufacturer and the in-house producer in period 𝑡 are given by:
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𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 (𝐷
𝑞𝑀𝑡 = min{ (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 )+ , 𝑧𝑀𝑡 + 𝑆𝑀
− 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡 )+ }

(3.17)

𝑞𝑅𝑡 = 𝑆𝐻𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡 )+

(3.18)

The hospital’s procurement decisions in the regular phase in period 𝑡, 𝑞𝑀𝑡 and
𝑞𝑅𝑡 , are determined using the same rule as a SFP. However, the optimal values for
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃
𝑆𝑀
and 𝑆𝐻𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 are not generated using the SAA algorithm as discussed in section

3.5.2, but a direct application of the single period result. According to Proposition 3.2,
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃
the parameters in the MSFP are given by 𝑆𝑀
= 0, and 𝑆𝐻𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 = 1, if 𝑐𝑅 is low,
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃
𝑆𝑀
= 𝐴𝐻 and 𝑆𝐻𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 = 0, if 𝑐𝑅 is high. The hospital can use a MSFP if she does not

have sophisticated analytical tools (such as the SAA algorithm) to obtain the optimal
policy parameters for a TIP or a SFP in a multi-period setting. Therefore, we consider the
hospital’s profit in this scenario as a lower bound for her expected profit in the multiperiod model.

3.5.2

Solution and Evaluation Algorithm

𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃
Refer (𝐼, 𝐾), (𝑆𝑀 , 𝑆𝐻 ), and (𝑆𝑀
, 𝑆𝐻
) as the policy parameters in a TIP, a SFP and a

MSFP, respectively. Let 𝑗 be the index for the three inventory management policies, 𝑗 ∈
{𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃, 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}. We calculate the approximate optimal values for the policy
parameters and the two parties average profit over 𝑇 periods under each inventory policy
using the Sample Average Approximation (SAA) algorithm (Kleywegt et al., 2002). We
use the same parameter values as indicated in Table 3.3.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the implementation of the SAA algorithm. The algorithm
consists of three main steps: optimization, solution evaluation, and bound calculation.
We elaborate on each step as follows.
Optimization
In the optimization step, we solve the optimal parameters for the three inventory
management policies. For a TIP and a SFP, the policy parameters need to satisfy the
following feasibility constraints: 𝐼 > 0, 0 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 1, 𝑠𝐻 ≥ 0, and 𝑠𝑀 ≥ 0, respectively.

60

For a MSFP, the candidate for the policy parameters are limited to two sets of values:
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 )
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 )
(𝑆𝑀
, 𝑆𝐻
= (0,1) and (𝑆𝑀
, 𝑆𝐻
= (𝐴𝐻 , 0), which are the single period

solutions. We first generate one realization of the manufacturer’s random yield rate in
̂ . Next, for policy 𝑗, we compute
each period, and define this sample set of yield rates as 𝑈
the optimal policy parameters that maximize the hospital’s average profit over 𝑇 periods
̂, 𝛱
̂𝑖𝑗 = 1 ∑𝑇𝑡=1 𝛱
̂𝑖𝑡𝑗 , where 𝛱
̂𝑖𝑡𝑗 is the hospital’s profit in period 𝑡 with
with the sample set 𝑈
𝑇
̂ ) for a TIP, (𝑆̂𝑀 , 𝑆̂𝐻 ) for a SFP,
sample 𝑢̂𝑡 . We record the optimal policy parameters, (𝐼̂, 𝐾

1. Optimization
For 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, generate a realization of the manufacturer’s yield rate, 𝑢̂𝑡 , from
i.i.d. uniform distribution 𝑈𝑡 (𝑎, 𝑏), and define the set of these samples of yield rates
̂.
as 𝑈
a. Compute the optimal policy parameters that maximize the hospital’s average
𝑗
̂, 𝛱
̂𝐻𝑗 = 1 ∑𝑇𝑡=1 𝛱
̂𝐻𝑡
profit over 𝑇 periods with the sample set 𝑈
,𝑗∈
𝑇
𝑗
̂𝐻𝑡 is the hospital’s profit in period 𝑡 with sample
{𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃, 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}, where 𝛱
𝑢̂𝑡 .
b. Record the following optimal values:
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 ̂ 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃
̂ ), (𝑆̂𝑀 , 𝑆̂𝐻 ), and (𝑆̂𝑀
I. The optimal policy parameters: (𝐼̂, 𝐾
, 𝑆𝐻
).
II. The manufacturer’s average initial inventory under the optimal policy
1
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
parameters, 𝑧̂𝑀 = 𝑇 ∑𝑇𝑡=1 𝑧̂𝑀𝑡 , 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃, 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}, where 𝑧̂𝑀𝑡 is the
manufacturer’s initial inventory in period 𝑡 with sample 𝑢̂𝑡 .
2. Evaluation
For 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, generate another realization of the manufacturer’s yield rate, 𝑢̌𝑡 ,
̌.
from i.i.d. uniform distribution 𝑈𝑡 (𝑎, 𝑏), and define the set of these samples as 𝑈
̂
̂
̂
̂
a. Fix (𝐼, 𝐾) = (𝐼 , 𝐾 ) for a TIP, (𝑆𝑀 , 𝑆𝐻 ) = (𝑆𝑀 , 𝑆𝐻 ) for a SFP, and
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 ̂ 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃
(𝑆̂𝑀
, 𝑆𝐻
) for a MSFP, respectively.
b. Compute and record the hospital and the manufacturer’s average profit over 𝑇
̌ in the following two scenarios:
periods with the sample set 𝑈
̌𝑖𝑗 .
Scenario 1: The hospital knows 𝑧̌𝑀𝑡 . Compute and record 𝛱
𝑗
Scenario 2: The hospital does not know 𝑧̌𝑀𝑡 , and she uses 𝑧̂𝑀 as her
̌𝑖𝑗′ , 𝑖 ∈
belief in each period. Compute and record 𝛱
{𝐻, 𝑀} and 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃, 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}.
3. Computation of the lower and upper bounds
a. Lower bound: compute the hospital and manufacturer’s average profit over 𝑇
̌𝑖𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 .
periods under a MSPF, 𝛱
̅𝑖 in which case the manufacturer has a perfect yield
b. Upper bound: compute 𝛱
rate, 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝑀}.
Figure 3.8: Implementation of SAA
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𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 ̂ 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃
and (𝑆̂𝑀
, 𝑆𝐻
) for a MSFP, respectively.

We also record the manufacturer’s average initial inventory under the optimal
𝑗

1

𝑗

𝑗

policy parameters, 𝑧̂𝑀 = 𝑇 ∑𝑇𝑡=1 𝑧̂𝑀𝑡 , where 𝑧̂𝑀𝑡 is the manufacturer’s initial inventory in
period 𝑡 with sample 𝑢̂𝑡 .
Solution Evaluation
In the evaluation step, we evaluate the optimal policy parameters obtained in the
optimization step. We first generate another realization of the manufacturer’s yield rate
̌ . We fix the policy parameters at
in each period, and define the set of these samples as 𝑈
̂ ) in a TIP,
the optimal values obtained from the optimization step, i.e., fix (𝐼, 𝐾) = (𝐼̂, 𝐾
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 )
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 ̂ 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃
(𝑆𝑀 , 𝑆𝐻 ) = (𝑆̂𝑀 , 𝑆̂𝐻 ) in a SFP, and (𝑆𝑀
, 𝑆𝐻
= (𝑆̂𝑀
, 𝑆𝐻
) in a MSFP. Next,

we compute and record the hospital and the manufacturer’s average profit over 𝑇 periods
̌ and the optimal policy parameters. In reality, the hospital may not
with the sample set 𝑈
know the manufacturer’s actual initial inventory in each period. Therefore, we consider
two scenarios with different assumptions regarding the hospital’s knowledge about the
manufacturer’s initial inventory in each period. In Scenario 1, the hospital knows the
manufacturer’s initial inventory in period 𝑡, 𝑧̌𝑀𝑡 . We compute and record the two parties’
𝑗

̌𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝑀} and 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃, 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}. In Scenario 2, the hospital does
average profit 𝛱
𝑗

not know 𝑧̌𝑀𝑡 , and she uses 𝑧̂𝑀 (the manufacturer’s average initial inventory solved in the
optimization step) as her belief in each period. We compute and record the two parties’
̌𝑖𝑗′ . Scenario 2 corresponds to the situation in which the
average profit in this scenario, 𝛱
hospital estimates the manufacturer’s average inventory level using analytical approaches
and uses the result to guide her future actions.
Bound Calculation
To evaluate the hospital’s performance under a TIP and a SFP, we define two
benchmark values for the worst case and the best case, respectively.
Lower bound:
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As discussed previously, in the worst-case scenario, the hospital applies a myopic
policy by using the optimal solutions in the single-period model. We consider the profits
in this scenario as the lower bound for the hospital’s average expected profit. Let 𝛱𝑖
̌𝑖𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 , 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝑀}
denote the lower bound on the profit of player 𝑖, 𝛱𝑖 = 𝛱
Upper Bound:
̅𝑖 be the
In the best-case scenario, the manufacturer has a perfect yield rate. Let 𝛱
average profit of player 𝑖 over 𝑇 periods in the best-case scenario, which is considered as
an upper bound on the optimal profit of player 𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝑀}

3.5.3

Performance Evaluation
𝑗

𝑗

̂𝑖 /𝛱
̅𝑖 be the relative performance of player 𝑖 under inventory management
Let 𝑅𝑖 = 𝛱
policy 𝑗 compared with the best-case scenario, 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝑀, } and 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃, 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}.
𝑗

We present the relative performance 𝑅𝑖 when the yield rate changes in three ways. First,
we fix the upper limit of the yield rate, 𝑏, and only change the lower limit, 𝑎 (Figure 3.9
and Figure 3.10). Next, we isolate the effect of the mean and the variance of the yield
rate, by changing the mean with a fixed variance (Figure 3.11 a and b), and changing the
variance with a fixed mean (Figure 3.11 c and d), respectively. We also present the
𝑗

impact of 𝑐𝑅 on the relative performance 𝑅𝑖 by considering a low value of 𝑐𝑅 (𝑐𝑅 =
1.1𝑤, Figure 3.10) and a high value of 𝑐𝑅 (𝑐𝑅 = 1.5𝑤, Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.11).
Table 3.4 summarizes the main differences among the parameter values for the figures
Table 3.4: Summary of figures presented in subsection 3.5.3

Figure 3.7 a and b

Mean of
𝒖𝑴𝒕
Changing

Variance of
𝒖𝑴𝒕
Changing

Knowledge
about 𝒛𝑴𝒕
Known

Value of
𝒄𝑹
High

Figure 3.7 c and d

Changing

Changing

Unknown

High

Figure 3.8

Changing

Changing

Known

Low

Figure 3.9 a and b

Changing

Constant

Known

High

Figure 3.9 c and d

Constant

Changing

Known

High

Low 𝑐𝑅 : 𝑐𝑅 = 1.1𝑤. High 𝑐𝑅 : 𝑐𝑅 = 1.5𝑤

𝑧𝑀𝑡 is Known
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(b)

(c)

(d)

𝑧𝑀𝑡 is Unknown

(a)

Figure 3.9: The relative performance of player 𝑖 under inventory management policy 𝑗
𝑗
̂𝑖𝑗 /𝛱
̅𝑖 ) with respect to 𝑎 with fixed 𝑏 =
compared with the best-case scenario (𝑅𝑖 = 𝛱
1, 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝑀}, 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃, 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}. 𝑐𝑅 is high (𝑐𝑅 = 1.5𝑤). (a) and (b): 𝑧𝑀𝑡 is
known to the hospital. (c) and (d): 𝑧𝑀𝑡 is unknown to the hospital.
presented in this section.
Refer to the TIP and the SFP as the long-term inventory management policies as
opposed to the myopic policy (MSFP). We discuss some observations as follows. First,
the graphs when 𝑧𝑀𝑡 is known are very similar to those when 𝑧𝑀𝑡 is unknown (Figure 3.9
a and b vs. c and d), indicating that the hospital’s knowledge of the manufacturer’s initial
inventory does not have a significant impact on the performance of the inventory
management policies. This may be because the manufacturer’s average initial inventory
solved in the optimization step is low. For all combinations of parameters considered in
𝑗

this section, 𝑧̂𝑀 is less than 10% of the total demand. This feature can also be observed
when 𝑐𝑅 is low (the counterpart of Figure 3.8 when 𝑧𝑀𝑡 is unknown), and different
combinations of 𝑎 and 𝑏 (the counterpart of Figure 3.9 when 𝑧𝑀𝑡 is unknown), which
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3.10: The relative performance of player 𝑖 under inventory management policy
𝑗
̂𝑖𝑗 /𝛱
̅𝑖 ) with respect to 𝑎 with fixed 𝑏 =
𝑗 compared with the best-case scenario (𝑅𝑖 = 𝛱
1, 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃, 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}. 𝑐𝑅 is low (𝑐𝑅 = 1.1 𝑤) and 𝑧𝑀𝑡 is known.
graphs are not presented in this paper due to repetitiveness. Therefore, we conclude that
the implementation of the two long-term inventory management policies does not require
the hospital to know the manufacturer’s exact initial inventory in each period, as long as
the hospital could come up with a reasonable estimation of the manufacturer’s average
inventory using analytical approaches. Another consideration is to let the manufacturer
have a certain level of safety stocks, and verify whether this property still holds, which
can be a future extension to this study.
𝑗

Second, 𝑅𝑖 is low if the manufacturer’s yield rate is low (either 𝑎 is low with a
constant 𝑏 as shown in Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10, or the mean is low with a constant
variance as shown in Figure 3.11 a and b), or the yield is highly uncertain (towards the
left of Figure 3.11 c and d where the variance is large with a constant the mean). In other
words, the hospital and the manufacturer’s profits are low if the manufacturer’s yield rate
is low and/or highly uncertain. This result is intuitive, because the lower the reliability of
the manufacturer (i.e., either the average yield rate is low, or the yield is varying in a
wide range which is hard to predict and mitigate the risks), the lower the profits that both
player can receive compared with a perfect yield scenario.
Third, a TIP and a SFP have similar performance for the hospital, and both
policies perform well with different parameters of the yield rate and the hospital’s regular

Different 𝜇, Fixed 𝜎 2
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(b)

(c)

(d)

Different 𝜎 2 , Fixed 𝜇

(a)

Figure 3.11: The relative performance of player 𝑖 under inventory management policy
𝑗
̂𝑖𝑗 /𝛱
̅𝑖 ), 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃, 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}. 𝑐𝑅 is
𝑗 compared with the best-case scenario (𝑅𝑖 = 𝛱
high (𝑐𝑅 = 1.5𝑤), and 𝑧𝑀𝑡 is known to the hospital. (a) and (b): with respect to 𝜎 2
with fixed 𝜇. (c) and (d): with respect to 𝜇 with fixed 𝜎 2 .
production cost. For example, when 𝑐𝑅 is high, the hospital’s relative performance under
𝑗

a TIP or a SFP compared with the best case scenario, 𝑅𝐻 , is close to or greater than 80%
(Figure 3.9 a and c, and Figure 3.11 a and c). When 𝑐𝑅 is low, Figure 3.10 a shows that
𝑗

𝑅𝐻 is greater than 90%. The graphs for a TIP and for SFP are very close to each other in
these figures, indicating a comparable performance of the two policies for the hospital.
In addition, the manufacturer’s relative performance is lower than the hospital’s
𝑗

𝑗

relative performance (𝑅𝑀 < 𝑅𝐻 ) for any given yield rate and inventory management
policy, indicating that the impact of the yield uncertainty on the manufacturer’s relative
performance is larger than that on the hospital’s relative performance. For example,
𝑗

𝑗

Figure 3.9 a and b show that 𝑅𝑀 < 𝑅𝐻 holds in all regions. And when 𝑎 = 0 and 𝑏 = 1,
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the relative performances of the hospital and the manufacturer are approximately 90%
𝑗

𝑗

and 10%, respectively, under both a TIP and a SFP. The relationship that 𝑅𝑀 < 𝑅𝐻 , 𝑗 ∈
{𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃}, can also be observed when 𝑐𝑅 is low (Figure 3.10 a and b), and with
different combinations of parameters for the yield rate (Figure 3.11). This property may
be because the hospital moves first, i.e., the hospital takes into consideration the yield
uncertainty and the manufacturer’s best response function when choosing the policy
parameters which determines her procurement quantities in each period. This property
means the manufacturer may benefit more from improved yield rate and/or lower
variability in his yield rate than the hospital does.
Note that the manufacturer’s relative performance is zero under two
circumstances. First, the hospital chooses a pure in-house production plan and does not
purchase anything from the manufacturer because the benefit of a reliable source
outweighs the benefit of a cheap but unreliable source. This situation is more likely to
𝑗

occur if 𝑐𝑅 is low (for the same parameter regions 𝑎 ∈ [0, 0.2], 𝑅𝑀 > 0 in Figure 3.9 b
𝑗

with a high 𝑐𝑅 , and 𝑅𝑀 = 0 in Figure 3.10 b with a low 𝑐𝑅 ), or the yield rate is highly
𝑗

uncertain. Another situation under which 𝑅𝑀 = 0 is when the mean of the yield rate is
sufficiently low such that the it is not profitable for the manufacturer to make any
production regardless of the order quantity from the hospital. This observation is
consistent with Lemma 3.3 in the single-period setting, because Lemma 3.3 can be
rewritten as: if

𝑎+𝑏
2

𝑐

𝑀
∗
< 𝑤+𝑠
, then 𝑥𝑀
= 0 ∀ 𝑞𝑀 . For example, Figure 3.11 b shows that
𝑀

𝑗

𝑗

𝑅𝑀 = 0 when 𝑎 ≤ 0.36 and 𝑏 ≤ 0.46, and 𝑅𝑀 > 0 when 𝑎 > 0.36 and 𝑏 > 0.46. Thus,
there is a jump in the hospital’s relative performance at 𝑎 = 0.36 and 𝑏 = 0.46 in Figure
3.11 a, which is caused by the change of the manufacturer’s decision on whether to make
production or not.
Moreover, the performance loss caused by a myopic policy compared with either
𝑗

a TIP or a SFP (i.e., 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑖𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 , 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻, 𝑀} and 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃}) depends on several
parameters. The performance loss caused by a myopic policy is big if the yield rate is
highly uncertain (Figure 3.9, Figure 3.10, and Figure 3.11 c and d). The performance loss
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caused by a myopic policy is smaller (bigger) for the hospital (manufacturer) if 𝑐𝑅 is
lower (compare Figure 3.10 with Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.11 c and d). If the yield rate is
less uncertain (with a small and constant variance), then a myopic policy may perform
closely to a TIP and a SFP. This can be observed from Figure 3.11, in which the graphs
for a MSFP are very close to the graphs for a TIP and a SFP.
Comparison of single-period vs. multi-period solutions
The comparison between a MSFP with the two long-term inventory management
policies shows some commonalities and differences between the single-period and the
multi-period solutions. One common feature for both the single-period and multi-period
models is that if 𝑐𝑅 is low, the yield rate is low or is highly uncertain, then the hospital
𝑗

prefers a pure in-house production plan (e.g., Figure 3.10 b, where 𝑅𝑀 = 0, 𝑗 ∈
{𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃, 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}); if 𝑐𝑅 is high, the yield rate is high or is less uncertain, then the
𝑗

hospital prefers a pure-outsourcing plan (e.g., Figure 3.10 b, where 𝑅𝑀 changes smoothly
in the region 𝑎 > 0.4 for 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃, 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}, and the region 𝑎 > 0.6 for 𝑗 = 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃,
respectively).
One major difference is whether the hospital will use a mixed strategy or not.
Under a MSFP, the hospital will only use a pure procurement strategy (either a pure inhouse production or a pure outsourcing strategy). Whereas under either a TIP or SFP, the
hospital may use a pure procurement strategy or a mixed procurement strategy (procuring
from both the manufacturer and the in-house producer). According to the single period
solution, when the benefit of a reliable source (the in-house producer) outweighs the
benefit of the cheaper but unreliable source (the manufacturer) (we characterize this
situation by 𝑐𝑅 < 𝑐̅𝑅 ) , the hospital will only purchase the manufacturer’s initial
inventory which is cheaper and without any yield risk, but she will not order any
additional quantities from the manufacturer. However, if the manufacturer starts a period
without any initial inventory, then the hospital will not purchase anything from the
manufacturer. This does not provide incentives to the manufacturer to make production
when he is also using a myopic policy as assumed. Therefore, the hospital ends up using
a pure in-house production plan. On the other hand, under a long-term inventory

68

management policy, the hospital chooses the policy parameters by considering the
advantages and disadvantages of each source over the long term. If the advantages of one
source significantly outweigh the other, then the hospital will use a pure strategy.
Otherwise, she will use a mixed strategy to balance the advantages and disadvantages of
each source.
One more difference is that the hospital is more likely to procure from the
manufacturer in a long-term inventory management policy than in a myopic policy.
Figure 3.10 b shows that the manufacturer’s profit remains zero for a larger region under
a MSFP than under a TIP or a SFP.
The differences between the long-term policies and the myopic policy have
important implications. For example, in the range 𝑎 ∈ [0.2, 0.4] in Figure 3.10 b, the
hospital’s optimal policy parameters under a TIP or a SFP will result in a mixed
procurement strategy, under which both the hospital and the manufacturer will receive
positive profit and stay in the supply chain for a long term. Whereas the hospital’s
optimal policy parameters under a MSFP will result in a pure in-house production plan,
under which the manufacturer may exit the supply chain eventually due to the lack of
incentives, leaving the hospital’s in-house producer the only source of the drug. This is
not a favorable situation for a resilient drug supply chain to mitigate shortages. As
previously discussed, a MSFP causes performance loss for both the manufacturer and the
hospital. These indicate the importance of implementing an inventory management
policy from a long-term perspective.

Discussion
Drug shortages are a serious problem threatening patients’ safety and adding a significant
financial burden to many health care systems. Several US hospitals created a generic
drug manufacturer to mitigate drug shortages. Our study investigates circumstances
under which the hospitals would benefit from owning an in-house manufacturer, and we
examine the impact on the external pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Our study has theoretical contributions to the existing literature of supply chain
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risk management. We creatively integrate a game-theoretic model with a multi-stage
stochastic programing model to analyze the interactions between a hospital and an
external manufacturer. We analyze the hospital’s optimal ordering decisions from two
sources (the external manufacturer, and an in-house manufacturer) under the presence of
yield uncertainty. We analytically characterize the optimal decisions and profits for the
hospital and the external manufacturer in a single-period model setting. Based on the
insights from the single period solutions, we then propose two long-term inventory
management policies (a Target Inventory Policy and a Scale Factor Policy) and evaluate
the performance of the two inventory management policies in a multi-period setting
using a heuristic.
Our study also provides managerial insights into the hospital’s optimal sourcing
strategies and inventory management policies. We show that the hospital would benefit
from using an in-house manufacturer to make regular production if the in-house
production cost is low, the external manufacturer’s yield rate is low, or the external
manufacturer’s yield is highly uncertain. The hospital can also benefit from making
emergency production at the in-house manufacturer, if the emergency production cost is
lower than the sum of the drug revenue and the shortage cost caused by the unavailability
of the drug. Drug shortages can be mitigated if the hospital operates an in-house
manufacturer as her regular source or contingent source, which confirms the value of the
establishment of Civica Rx on mitigating drug shortages.
The two long-term inventory management policies that we proposed have
comparable and good performance for the hospital, indicating that the hospital can use
either policy for the long-term inventory management practice. The manufacturer’s yield
uncertainty has a larger impact on his own long-term profit than that on the hospital’s
profit, indicating that it is beneficial for the manufacturer to make investment in
improving his reliability.
In addition, this study has important implications for hospitals’ drug procurement
practice. Our analysis indicates that hospitals should trade-off between the procurement
cost and other factors (e.g., shortage cost of the drug, and reliability of different
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suppliers), instead of focusing only on procurement costs to choose the cheapest supplier,
as observed in drug procurement practices in reality. Considering the long-term impact
on the external manufacturers and the drug supply chain, hospitals should also procure
drugs from both the internal and external manufacturers to avoid driving out the external
manufacturers from the market.
Our study has several limitations. First, our study focuses on drugs shortages
caused by manufacturing reasons, which is the major cause of drug shortages. Future
studies can incorporate other causes, such as supply disruptions due to natural disasters
and unavailability of raw material. Another cause is that Pharmaceutical companies may
deliberately create shortages by stopping production or discouraging sales for a cheaper
form to favor a newer and more profitable form sold by themselves or their parent
companies (Palmer, 2014). Future studies may analyze the impact of this business
decision on drug shortages. Second, we assume that there is only one external
manufacturer if the hospital does not operate an in-house producer. A direction to extend
our study is to consider multiple external manufacturers and to analyze the dynamics of
their interactions with the hospital.
In addition, we assume all information is publicly known. However, the hospital
and the manufacturer may hold private information about some parameters such as the
production cost, and the yield rate. Another extension to our study is to incorporate
information asymmetry and to examine the impact on the two parties’ optimal decisions
and profits. Moreover, our model did not capture the fixed production cost, and may
overestimate the benefit of a dual-sourcing strategy. Future studies can capture the fixed
production cost and provide further insights into the value of the establishment of the
hospital’s in-house producer. Furthermore, our model did not capture the impact on other
hospitals that do not own an in-house manufacturing facility. It would be interesting to
analyze the impact of the establishment of a hospital’s in-house producer on other
hospitals’ benefit.
Finally, drug shortages are a complex problem, and the solutions from the
mathematical model should be implemented in the real world with consideration from a
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systematic and long-term perspective. For example, our model suggests that the hospital
prefers a pure in-house production strategy if the in-house production cost is low, or the
external manufacturer’s yield rate is either low or highly uncertain. However, without
any order quantities from the hospital, the external manufacturer may exit the market,
leaving the hospital’s in-house producer as the sole source for the drug. This is not a
favorable situation for mitigating drug shortages. Therefore, future studies can analyze
mechanisms to incentivize the external manufacturer’s long-term production, which can
be an extension to our work.
There are other ways to further extend our study. For example, one could
endogenize drug price as a decision, which applies to the situation where drug prices are
not strictly regulated but could be determined or largely influenced by powerful
pharmaceutical companies. In addition, due to the limited information of Civica Rx at
present, we are not able to estimate the model parameters using real data. As more
information becomes available in the future, one could estimate the model parameters for
specific drugs and perform case studies to validate the results of our model in a more
realistic manner. Moreover, we did not consider hospital’s strategy of holding safety
stocks to mitigate shortages. This is mainly because many hospitals are using a just-intime purchasing strategy due to expiration date of many pharmaceutical products as well
as the pressure of reducing carrying cost by keeping the drug inventories lean (Green,
2015). Future studies may consider a strategy of holding safety stock to examine the
relative benefit of producing drugs at an in-house manufacturing facility compared with
carrying sufficient stocks.
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Chapter 4
4

Essay 3: Subsidies or Public Provision: Optimal
Government Interventions on Mitigating Drug Shortages
Introduction

Drug shortages have gained increasing attention from health care policymakers in recent
years as they are a major challenge faced by many health care systems (MacLeod, 2020;
McGinley, 2019). To mitigate drug shortages, government agencies such as FDA in the
US have taken actions to collaborate with the pharmaceutical industry by sharing
information, searching for alternative manufacturers, and importing critical drugs in
shortage from other overseas manufacturers (Food and Drug Administration, 2018). The
health authorities in Canada can also implement an expedited review process to speed up
patient access to alternative drugs during a shortage, or use special access programs to
provide physicians access to non-marketed drugs for treating life-threatening conditions
if conventional drugs are not available (The Multi-Stakeholder Steering Committee on
Drug Shortages in Canada, 2017).
However, despite government actions, drug shortages are a persistent problem.
Many shortages involve older, hard-to-make generic drugs where there are low-profit
margins and high market concentration (Food and Drug Administration, 2019; McGinley,
2019). Among them, sole-source drugs (drugs that are produced by a single
manufacturer) are particularly vulnerable to shortages caused by manufacturing problems
since the disruption cannot be absorbed by alternative suppliers (Blank, 2018). Due to the
low profit margin, other manufacturers have little incentives to enter the market. Some
experts concern that the sole-sourcing situation is not likely to change without any
interventions (De Weerdt et al., 2015; Dranitsaris et al., 2017; Gagnon, 2012).
Several policymakers argue that more government interventions are required to
protect patient safety against drug shortages (MacLeod, 2020; McGinley, 2019; Milne et
al., 2017). One strategy for government interventions is to provide subsidies. For
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example, in 2018, the FDA appointed a task force to investigate drug shortages, including
whether the US should develop a list of “essential drugs” which may get subsidies from
the government. Another strategy for government intervention is to establish public
manufacturers to produce certain critical drugs. In 2018, Senator Elizabeth Warren,
proposed legislation that would create a new office within the Department of Health and
Human Services to produce certain generic drugs in shortage (McGinley, 2019). Some
Canadian experts also believe that Canada needs a Crown Corporation to manufacture
crucial drugs that are not favored by pharmaceutical manufacturers in the private sector
(MacLeod, 2020; Milne et al., 2017).
This study analyzes government interventions to mitigate drug shortages. We
analyze two mitigating strategies: establishing a government-owned manufacturing
facility, and providing subsidies. We evaluate the government’s payoff under the two
strategies and in the status quo, which captures the monetary health benefit and the
shortage cost of a drug, the cost of public provision, and the cost of subsidies. We
formulate the problem using a supply chain management approach. We focus on the
shortages caused by manufacturing problems (e.g., quality issues, manufacturing delays),
which are a major cause or drug shortages in many counties in recent years (JAVMA
News, 2019; Malacos, 2019). We model drug shortages as a result of yield uncertainties
at the manufacturing facilities.
Pharmaceutical supply chains often have wholesalers (also known as distributors)
and manufacturers as the primary stakeholders who make procurement or production
decisions. These decisions have significant impacts on the supply and availability of
drugs. Wholesalers purchase and distribute a wide variety of pharmaceutical products so
that hospitals and pharmacies do not need to deal with different manufacturers for
different drugs (Fein, 2017; Healthcare Distribution Alliance, 2018). Wholesalers can
increase the efficiency of pharmaceutical supply chains by saving time, effort, and costs
for hospitals and pharmacies on drug procurement (The Multi-Stakeholder Steering
Committee on Drug Shortages, 2017). Our study focuses on the situation where a single
wholesaler is dealing with several hospitals and pharmacies in the jurisdiction of a
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government. Our study also focuses on the most vulnerable pharmaceutical supply chain
in which there is only one manufacturer.
We investigate the following research questions:
•

Whether a government should establish a manufacturing facility to mitigate drug
shortages?

•

Could the government achieve the same performance level by using subsidies?

•

What are the impacts of government intervention on the private sector?

We construct a game-theoretic model to analyze the interactions among three players in a
pharmaceutical supply chain: a wholesaler, a private manufacturer, and a government.
The wholesaler procures a drug from the manufacturer and sells it to the downstream
demand, such as hospitals and pharmacies. The manufacturer’s production is subject to
random yield, which may cause drug shortages. The wholesaler chooses the order
quantity from the manufacturer, and then the manufacturer chooses the planned
production quantity. We formulate three individual models depending on the
government’s actions. The government can either do nothing (basic model/status quo);
create a manufacturing facility (dual sourcing model); or provide subsidies to the
wholesaler (subsidy model).
We assume the government subsidizes the wholesaler for two reasons. First,
pharmaceutical wholesalers’ profit margin is much lower than pharmaceutical
manufacturers’ profit margin. For example, US pharmaceutical manufacturers and
wholesalers’ average profit margin are 50% and 19% for generic drugs, and 76% and 1%
for branded drugs, respectively (Sood et al., 2017). Second, pharmaceutical
manufacturers are mainly facing R&D and sales risks, whereas pharmaceutical
wholesalers are mostly facing inventory risks (Dai and Tayur, 2018; Sood et al., 2017).
Therefore, we assume the government subsidizes the wholesaler to increase the
wholesaler’s profit margin and incentivize an increase of the wholesaler’s order quantity
from the manufacturer.
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We consider two types of subsidies to the wholesaler: a unit subsidy to its
procured quantity, and a unit subsidy to its sales quantity, respectively. These two types
of subsides are studied in previous supply chain literature as incentives provided by
manufacturers or donors to increase retailers’ order quantity under demand uncertainties
(Dreze and Bell, 2003; Taylor and Xiao, 2014). In those studies, retailers can be
considered as intermediaries between manufacturers and consumers. Whereas in our
study, wholesalers can be considered as the intermediary between the manufacturers and
the downstream party (hospitals and pharmacies which represent the demand of the
drug). Therefore, we adopt the same structure of the unit subsidies and analyze whether
they can effectively mitigate supply side uncertainties.
We first analytically characterize the optimal values in each of the three models.
Next, we compare the performance of each mitigating strategy (the dual sourcing strategy
and the subsidy strategy) with the status quo. This comparison provides insights into the
situations in which the government prefers one strategy over the other, or only one
particular strategy is available. We finally compare the three models together and
examine the government’s optimal choice if both strategies are available options.
Our study has several interesting findings. An advantage of both mitigating
strategies is that both a subsidy strategy and a dual sourcing strategy can effectively
reduce the shortage amounts compared with the status quo. A difference between the two
mitigating strategies is their abilities to align the incentives of different parties. A subsidy
strategy can be mutually preferred by the three parties and achieve Pareto improvement,
whereas a dual sourcing strategy can align the incentives of the government and the
wholesaler, but the manufacturer is no better off under a dual sourcing strategy compared
with the status quo. Therefore, under a dual sourcing strategy, the government and/or the
wholesaler may need to consider incentives to the private manufacturer. Otherwise, the
private manufacturer may leave the market in the long term, which is not a favorable
situation in which the public manufacturer became the sole source of the supply chain.
This study also has policy implications regarding governments’ decisions on the
types of shortage mitigating policies under different circumstances. For example, we
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found that if the wholesaler’s profit margin is low and the shortage cost is high, then the
government should implement a subsidy strategy. The subsidy should be paid to the
wholesaler based on its unit procurement cost rather than its unit selling price. If the
wholesaler’s profit margin is intermediate and the shortage cost is high, then the
government should produce drugs at a public manufacturer. If the shortage cost is low
and the wholesaler’s profit margin is either low or high, then the government does not
need to take any actions.

Literature Review
This study is closely related to four streams of literature: (1) supply chain disruptions
with multiple decision-makers; (2) lot sizing and sourcing strategies to mitigate supply
chain disruptions; (3) subsidies to mitigate supply chain uncertainties ; (4) mitigating
strategies for drug shortages from a pharmaceutical supply chain perspective. We
discussed streams 1, 2 and 4 in the literature review (section 3.2) in Essay 2 and will skip
them in this Essay to avoid repetition. We discuss stream 3 and the contribution of this
study as follows.

Subsidy strategies to mitigate supply uncertainties
Xia et al. (2011) studied two contract mechanisms (an option contract and a firm order
contract) to share demand and supply risk between an unreliable supplier and a buyer.
The authors analyzed two operational strategies that can be used by the buyer to mitigate
the supply disruption risk: the use of an alternate reliable supplier and to provide
subsidies to the supplier to improve reliability. The subsidy in their study is a costly
investment to reduce the probability of disruption, which is a different type of subsidy
from our study.
Taylor and Xiao (2014) investigated a donor’s optimal subsidy decision to
improve the availability and affordability of recommended malaria drugs provided by the
private-sector in some developing countries. The authors constructed a game-theoretic
model between a donor and a retailer of a malaria drug subject to demand uncertainties.
This is the only subsidy study on mitigating demand side uncertainties that we include in
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this literature review because of the similarity of their subsidies with our study. Their
study compared two types of subsidies that the donor can provide to the retailer to
increase the availability of the drug: a per-unit purchase subsidy (paid to the retailer’s
purchased quantities), and a per-unit sales subsidy (paid to the retailer’s sales quantity).
The author found that donors should only subsidize retailers’ purchase but not the sales.
Raz and Ovchinnikov (2015) analyzed government rebates and subsidies for
public interest goods with externalities (e.g., electric vehicles and vaccines). The authors
extended the newsvendor framework with price-dependency to account for externalities.
Their study found that rebates to consumers are much better than subsidies to
manufacturers. Cai et al. (2017) studied contracts to coordinate a vendor-managed
inventory (VMI) supply chain with one retailer and one unreliable supplier under the
presence of yield uncertainty. The authors compared two contracts: an option contract,
and a subsidy contract, and they also considered a replenishment tactic. In their subsidy
contract, the retailer will pay the supplier a unit subsidy for unsold products. Guo et al.
(2019) studied government subsidy, optimal recovery and production strategies for the
closed-loop supply chain with supply disruption. The authors constructed a model with a
manufacturing and a remanufacturing system, and assumed that the buyback cost, return
rate and remanufacturing cost are function of quality level of returned item. The study
showed that the government can apply an appropriate subsidy policy to encourage the
recycling of returned items.
Peng and Pang (2019) studied the optimal strategies for an agricultural supply
chain consisting of three players: a risk-averse farmer who is subject to a yield
uncertainty, a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-neutral distributor. The authors consider a
subsidy which can be offered by a government to the farmer in terms of the acreage of
the farm size. Ye et al. (2020) studied a bioenergy supply chain consisting of a
government, a bioenergy producer, and 𝑛 risk-averse farmers who grow the biomass
feedstocks with yield uncertainties. The authors compared two subsides that can be
provided by the government to mitigate supply uncertainties: a farmer subsidy program
(subsidy to the farmers per unit acreage) and a bioenergy producer subsidy program
(subsidy to the bioenergy producer’s per unit of bioenergy produced). They found the
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conditions under which each subsidy can more effectively increase the reliability of
feedstocks supply.

The contribution of this research
In this research of government mitigating strategies for drug shortages, we make the
following contributions:
•

We develop a pharmaceutical supply chain model that incorporates interactions
among three important decision-makers – a manufacturer, a wholesaler, and a
government. We are not aware of any previous studies that captured the interactions
among these three parties in a single model to study supply chain risk management in
either pharmaceutical or non-pharmaceutical settings. Our study incorporates a total
number of five decisions that are sequentially made by the three parties, and we are
able to analytically characterize the optimal solutions.

•

We evaluate two strategies which can be implemented by government agencies:
establishing a public manufacturer, and providing subsides to the wholesaler. We are
not aware of any existing studies comparing these two types of strategies from the
government’s perspective. Our study provides economical foundations for the
advantages and disadvantages of each strategy. It has theoretical contributions to the
existing literature of mitigating supply disruption, and it also has policy implications
for government interventions to mitigate shortages.

Model
We develop a pharmaceutical supply chain consisting of three decision-makers: a
wholesaler (W), a private manufacturer (M, the manufacturer) that is subject to yield
uncertainty, and a government (G). Let 𝑖 be the index for the three decision-makers, 𝑖 ∈
{𝑊, 𝑀, 𝐺}. We consider a single period setting for one drug. We formulate three
individual models depending on the government’s actions. The government can either do
nothing (basic model/status quo); operate a government-owned manufacturer (dual
sourcing model); or provide subsidies to the wholesaler (subsidy model). Figure 4.1
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(a) Basic Model

(b) Dual Sourcing Model

(c) Subsidy Model

Figure 4.1: A schematic illustration of the pharmaceutical supply chain. (a) Basic
Model/Status Quo (b) Dual Sourcing Model. (c) Subsidy Model.
schematically illustrates the three models in the pharmaceutical supply chain. We assume
that all parameters and decisions are publicly known to all parties. We adopt the
convention that 𝐴+ = max{0, 𝐴}, and 𝐸[∙] denotes the expected value. All model notation
is summarized in Table 4.1.

4.3.1

Basic Model

We first describe the basic model (Model B, denoted by superscript B) in which the
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Table 4.1: Summary of notation
Description

Symbol
Decisions
𝑞𝑖
Wholesaler’s order quantity from player 𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {𝑀, 𝐺}
Manufacturer’s planned production quantity
𝑥𝑀
Government’s planned production quantity at the in-house producer
𝑥𝐺
Government’s s subsidy to the wholesaler’s unit procurement cost
𝛾𝑤
Government’s s subsidy to the wholesaler’s unit selling price
𝛾𝑝
Random Variable
𝑢𝑀
Manufacturer’s random yield rate, 𝑢𝑀 ∈ [𝑢, 𝑢̅], with a PDF 𝑓(∙), a
CDF 𝐹(∙), a mean 𝜇, and a variance 𝜎 2
Parameters
𝑖
Index for the three players, 𝑖 ∈ {𝐺, 𝑀, 𝑊}. G: government; M: the
private manufacturer; W: the wholesaler
𝑗
Index for the models, 𝑗 ∈ {𝐵, 𝑆, 𝐷}. 𝐵: basic model; 𝑆: subsidy
model; 𝐷: dual sourcing model
Wholesaler’s deterministic demand for the drug
𝑑
Government’s unit shortage cost
𝑠𝐺
𝑐𝑖
Player 𝑖’s unit production cost, 𝑖 ∈ {𝐺, 𝑀}
𝑤𝑖
The drug price that the wholesalers pays to player 𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {𝐺, 𝑀}
Wholesaler’s unit selling price of the drug
𝑝
𝑚
The wholesaler’s markup parameter, 𝑚 > 1 . 𝑚 − 1 is the markup
percentage of the wholesaler’s unit selling price over 𝑤𝑀 i.e., 𝑝 =
𝑚𝑤𝑀
The monetary health benefit of each unit of the drug
𝑏
Calculated quantities
𝑗
The delivered quantity from player 𝑖 in Model 𝑗. The expected
𝑦𝑖
𝑗
𝑗
delivered quantity for player 𝑖 is 𝑌𝑖 = 𝐸[𝑦𝑖 ]
𝑗
The expected utility function for player 𝑖
𝛱𝑖
𝑗
The shortage amount in model 𝑗. The expected shortage amount is
𝑧
𝑍𝑗 = 𝐸[𝑧 𝑗 ]

government does not take any action to mitigate shortages. We assume that the
wholesaler is facing a deterministic demand 𝑑 for a drug. This is because a sudden
increase in demand is typically not a major cause of drug shortages (Malacos, 2019). This
assumption is also used in other modeling studies on supply uncertainties (e.g., Hou et al.
(2017) and Tucker et al. (2019)), and it allows us to focus on the supply-side
uncertainties. The wholesaler procures the drug from the manufacturer at an exogenous
wholesale price 𝑤𝑀 . Although drug prices may increase after a drug shortage (Alevizakos
et al., 2016), our model applies to the situation in many countries where drug price is
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highly regulated and is not likely to be affected by the manufacturer or change in the
short run (Hou et al., 2017).
The wholesaler sells the drug to the downstream parties in the drug supply chain
at an exogenous price 𝑝. The selling price represents a markup over the drug price, i.e.,
𝑝 = 𝑚𝑤𝑀 , where 𝑚 > 1 is the wholesaler’s markup parameter which is a constant. This
is because the fees from wholesaling and distributing services are generally computed as
a percentage of drugs’ list price (Fein, 2015). The wholesaler’s markup may be affected
by legislations, therapeutic class, generic vs. brand-name drugs, and many other factors.
We assume that the manufacturer faces a stochastically proportional yield rate 𝑢𝑀 . Let
𝑢𝑀 be a continuous random variable distributed on the interval [𝑢, 𝑢̅], 0 ≤ 𝑢 < 𝑢̅ ≤ 1,
according to a probability density function (PDF), 𝑓(∙), and a cumulative distribution
function (CDF), 𝐹(∙), with a mean, 𝜇, and a variance 𝜎 2 .
Taking into consideration the yield uncertainty, the wholesaler chooses the order
quantity from the manufacturer, 𝑞𝑀 . Next, the manufacturer chooses the production
quantity, 𝑥𝑀 , and produces the drug at a unit production cost 𝑐𝑀 ≤ 𝑤𝑀 . The yield
𝐵
uncertainty is realized, and the production is completed. The manufacturer delivers 𝑦𝑀
to
𝐵
the wholesaler, 𝑦𝑀
= min{𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀 , 𝑞𝑀 } (i.e., the manufacturer will deliver the realized

production quantity, 𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀 , up to the wholesaler’s order quantity). The wholesaler then
𝐵
𝐵
𝐵}
distributes a total amount of 𝑦𝑊
to the downstream parties, 𝑦𝑊
= min{𝑑, 𝑦𝑀
(i.e., the

wholesaler will distribute all available inventories up to the demand for the drug).
Each unit of the drug has a benefit 𝑏, which could be considered as the expected
monetary health benefit of consuming one unit of the drug. We assume that the
government cares about the net monetary health benefit, 𝑏 − 𝑝. This is because of the
public nature of the government, i.e., the government cares about the purchasing cost to
achieve the health benefit. This assumption is similar to other modeling studies (e.g.,
Barros (2011) and Mahjoub et al. (2018)).
The drug is subject to shortages due to yield uncertainty and possible double
marginalization (i.e., the manufacturer and the wholesaler have different incentives and
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markups in the supply chain, and this may cause inefficiency of their production
decisions compared with the social optimal level). The shortage amount is the unfulfilled
𝐵
demand, 𝑧 𝐵 = 𝑑 − 𝑦𝑊
. The government incurs a unit shortage cost for the unfulfilled

demand, 𝑠𝐺 ≥ 0. This shortage cost should include patients’ welfare loss, staff time on
searching for alternative drugs, and any other costs that are caused by the unavailability
of the drug and the government cares about. If the drug enables complex procedures (e.g.,
saline solution, painkillers, and anesthetics required for surgeries) or is a lifesaving drug
which has a large impact on patients’ welfare, then 𝑠𝐺 can be very high.
The expected profit for player 𝑖 in the basic model, 𝛱𝑖𝐵 , is calculated as follows.
𝐵 (𝑞 )
𝐵
𝐵
𝛱𝑊
𝑀 = 𝐸[𝑝𝑦𝑊 − 𝑤𝑀 𝑦𝑀 ]

(4.1)

𝐵 (𝑥 )|𝑞
𝐵
𝛱𝑀
𝑀
𝑊𝑀 = 𝐸[𝑤𝑀 𝑦𝑀 − 𝑐𝑀 𝑞𝑀 ]

(4.2)

𝐵
𝐵 )]
𝛱𝐺𝐵 |𝑥𝑀 , 𝑞𝑀 = 𝐸[(𝑏 − 𝑝)𝑦𝑊
− 𝑠𝐺 (𝑑 − 𝑦𝑊

(4.3)

The wholesaler’s expected profit function (Equation 4.1) consists of the revenue
of selling the drug and the procurement cost paid to the manufacturer. The
manufacturer’s expected profit function (Equation 4.2) consists of the payment received
from the wholesaler and the production cost. Although the government is not an active
decision-maker in the basic model, we calculate its expected utility for comparison with
the other strategies. The government’s expected utility (Equation 4.3) captures the total
net monetary benefit of the drug and the total shortage cost, which can be considered as
the patient welfare. The government can be considered as a health authority – it cares
about patient welfare but does not concern the benefit of the companies (i.e., the
wholesaler and the manufacturer).

4.3.2

Dual Sourcing Model

Under a dual sourcing strategy (Model D, denoted by superscript D), the government
operates a government-owned manufacturer to provide additional supplies to the
wholesaler to mitigate shortages. The government makes decisions on behalf of the
government-owned manufacturer, i.e., they are the same decision unit. To differentiate
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the two manufacturer facilities, we refer to the private manufacturer as the manufacturer,
and we refer to the government-owned manufacturer as GM.
GM produces the drug at a unit production cost 𝑐𝐺 > 𝑐𝑀 . We assume that GM is
perfectly reliable, i.e., it has a perfect yield rate. The reason is three-fold. First, some
manufacturers produce drugs using decades-old equipment, which are vulnerable to
manufacturing problems (Woodcock and Wosinska, 2013). The newly established GM
may be more reliable than the manufacturer because of the newer equipment and
advanced technology. Second, the government’s main motivation for operating a
manufacturer is to produce the drug in a more reliable way to mitigate shortages.
Therefore, GM may have better maintenance and quality control than the manufacturer
does. Third, GM may still have random yield, but it keeps on working until the planned
quantity is fully produced, which also explains why its production cost is higher than the
manufacturer. The assumption of a perfect yield rate for the more reliable supplier is also
used in other studies on supply disruptions, such as Tomlin (2006) and Chen et al. (2012).
GM provides the drug to the wholesaler at a wholesale price 𝑤𝐺 > 𝑤𝑀 , i.e., the
more reliable source is more expensive. As in the basic model, 𝑝 still represents a markup
on 𝑤𝑀 , i.e., 𝑝 = 𝑚𝑤𝑀 . Note that we do not make any assumption about the relative
ordering of 𝑤𝐺 and 𝑐𝐺 . This is because the government may be willing to provide the
drug at a price that is lower than its production cost, due to the shortage cost and/or
benefit of the drug.
At the beginning of the period, the wholesaler chooses the order quantities from
the manufacturer and GM, 𝑞𝑀 and 𝑞𝐺 , respectively. Next, the manufacturer and GM
simultaneously choose the production quantities, 𝑥𝑀 and 𝑥𝐺 , respectively. The two
manufacturing facilities produce the drug, and the yield rate 𝑢𝑀 is realized. The
𝐷
manufacturer and GM then deliver 𝑦𝑀
and 𝑦𝐺𝐷 to the wholesaler, respectively.

We assume that the wholesaler may purchase more than the original order
quantity from the two manufacturers if needed. To explain this assumption, we imagine
𝐷
𝐷
𝐷
dividing 𝑦𝑖𝐷 into two rounds of procurement, 𝑦𝑖1
and 𝑦𝑖2
, respectively, i.e., 𝑦𝑖𝐷 = 𝑦𝑖1
+
𝐷
𝑦𝑖2
, 𝑖 ∈ {𝑀, 𝐺}. The first round of procurement is based on the order quantities in the
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original procurement contracts (i.e., 𝑞𝑊𝑀 and 𝑞𝐺 ). In this first round of procurement, the
𝐷
manufacturer and GM deliver up to the original order quantities, 𝑦𝑀1
= min{𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀 , 𝑞𝑀 }
𝐷
and 𝑦𝐺1
= min{𝑥𝐺 , 𝑞𝐺 }.

If there is still a shortage after the first round of procurement, then the wholesaler
can procure the leftover stocks from the two manufacturing facilities in the second round,
which allows the wholesaler to purchase more than the order quantities indicated in the
original contract. Because 𝑤𝑀 < 𝑤𝐺 , the wholesaler will first exhaust the manufacturer’s
leftover stock before purchasing any additional unit from GM. Therefore, in the second
𝐷
round of procurement, the wholesaler purchases 𝑦𝑀2
unit from the manufacturer, where
𝐷 )+ }
𝐷
𝐷
𝐷
𝑦𝑀2
= min{(𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑞𝑀 )+ , (𝑑 − 𝑦𝑀1
− 𝑦𝐺1
. The first term in 𝑦𝑀2
is the

manufacturer’s leftover stock, and the second term is the quantity still short after the first
𝐷
𝐷
round of procurement. The wholesaler then purchases 𝑦𝐺2
from GM, where 𝑦𝐺2
=
𝐷
𝐷
𝐷
𝐷 )+ }.
min{(𝑥𝐺 − 𝑞𝐺 )+ , (𝑑 − 𝑦𝑀1
− 𝑦𝐺1
− 𝑦𝑀2
The first term in 𝑦𝐺2
is the GM’s leftover

stock, and the second term is the wholesaler’s shortage quantity after exhausting the
manufacturer’s leftover stocks. The wholesaler then uses its available stocks to satisfy the
𝐷
𝐷
demand, and its delivered quantity is 𝑦𝑊
= min{𝑑, 𝑦𝑀
+ 𝑦𝐺𝐷 }. Finally, costs and revenues

are realized.
Player 𝑖’s expected profit in Model D, 𝛱𝑖𝐷 , is calculated as follows.
𝐷
𝐷 (𝑞
𝐷
𝐷
𝛱𝑊
𝑀 , 𝑞𝐺 ) = 𝐸[𝑝𝑦𝑊 − 𝑤𝑀 𝑦𝑀 − 𝑤𝐺 𝑦𝐺 ]

(4.4)

𝐷 (𝑥 )|𝑞
𝐷
𝛱𝑀
𝑀
𝑀 , 𝑞𝐺 = 𝐸[𝑤𝑀 𝑦𝑀 − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀 ]

(4.5)

𝐷
𝐷 )]
𝛱𝐺𝐷 (𝑥𝐺 )|𝑞𝑀 , 𝑞𝐺 = 𝐸[(𝑏 − 𝑝)𝑦𝑊
+ 𝑤𝐺 𝑦𝐺𝐷 − 𝑐𝐺 𝑥𝐺 − 𝑠𝐺 (𝑑 − 𝑦𝑊

(4.6)

The wholesaler’s profit function (Equation 4.4) captures the revenue and the
procurement costs paid to the two manufacturing facilities. The manufacturer’s profit
(Equation 4.5) is the same as in the basic model. The government’s utility (Equation 4.6)
includes the net monetary benefit, revenue received from the wholesaler, production cost,
and shortage cost.
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4.3.3

Subsidy Model

Under a subsidy strategy (Model S, denoted by a superscript S), the government does not
own a manufacturing facility. Instead, it uses subsidies to mitigate shortages. As
discussed in the introduction, we assume that the government provides two types of
subsidies to the wholesaler. The first type is a unit subsidy to the wholesaler’s unit
procurement cost (the procurement cost subsidy), 𝛾𝑤 < 𝑤𝑀 , which brings the
wholesaler’s actual unit procurement cost down to 𝑤𝑀 − 𝛾𝑤 . The second type is a unit
subsidy to the wholesaler’s unit selling price (the selling price subsidy), 𝛾𝑝 , which brings
the wholesaler’s actual unit revenue up to 𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝 .
In the subsidy model, the government chooses the value of the subsidy at the
beginning, and then, the sequence proceeds as described in the basic model. The expected
utility function for Player 𝑖 in Model S, 𝛱𝑖𝑆 , can be expressed as follows.
𝑆
𝑆)
𝑆
𝑆
𝛱𝐺𝑆 (𝛾𝑤 , 𝛾𝑝 ) = 𝐸[(𝑏 − 𝑝)𝑦𝑊
− 𝑠𝐺 (𝑑 − 𝑦𝑊
− 𝛾𝑤 𝑦𝑀
− 𝛾𝑝 𝑦𝑊
]

(4.7)

𝑆 (𝑞 )|𝛾
𝑆
𝑆
𝛱𝑊
𝑀
𝑤 , 𝛾𝑝 = 𝐸[(𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝 )𝑦𝑊 − (𝑤𝑀 − 𝛾𝑤 )𝑦𝑀 ]

(4.8)

𝑆 (𝑥 )|𝑞
𝑆
𝛱𝑀
𝑀
𝑀 , 𝛾𝑤 , 𝛾𝑝 = 𝐸[𝑤𝑀 𝑦𝑀 − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀 ]

(4.9)

𝑆
Where 𝑦𝑀
= min{𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀 , 𝑞𝑀 } and. The government’s utility function (Equation

4.7) includes the net benefit of the drug, the shortage cost, and the subsidy payments. The
wholesaler’s profit function (Equation 4.8) captures the actual revenue from selling the
drug and the actual procurement cost, including the subsides. The manufacturer’s profit
function (Equation 4.9) includes revenue and production costs.
Let 𝑗 be the index for the superscript for each model, 𝑗 ∈ {𝐵, 𝐷, 𝑆}. Figure 4.2
summarizes the sequence of events in each model.

Structural Results
In this section, we derive the closed-form solutions and discuss some structural
properties. In model 𝑗, player 𝑖 makes decision(s) to maximize its expected utility
according to the game sequence. We solve each model using backward induction.
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Figure 4.2: The sequence of events in each model
Throughout the analysis, we assume that 𝑢𝑀 is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, to
simplify the model and obtain closed-form solutions. This is a commonly used
assumption (e.g., Keren, 2009 and Li et al., 2010). The terms “increasing” and
“decreasing” in this section are used in the weak sense (i.e., increasing means nondecreasing, and decreasing means non-increasing.)

4.4.1

Model B

We first solve the manufacturer’s expected profit function and obtain its best response
𝐵
function for the production decision, 𝑥̃𝑀
, which is presented in Lemma 4.1. Details of the

formal proofs are found in the appendix.
Lemma 4.1: The manufacturer’s best response function for the production decision for
any given order quantity from the wholesaler is given by:
𝐵
a. When 𝜇𝑤𝑀 ≤ 𝑐𝑀 , 𝑥̃𝑀
= 0 ∀𝑞𝑀 .

𝑤

𝐵
b. When 𝜇𝑤𝑀 > 𝑐𝑀 , 𝑥̃𝑀
(𝑞𝑀 ) = 𝛼𝑞𝑀 , where 𝛼 = √2𝑐𝑀 > 1.
𝑀

Lemma 4.1.a indicates that when the expected revenue of producing the drug
(𝜇𝑤𝑀 ) is less than the production cost, then the manufacturer will not produce anything
regardless of the wholesaler’s order quantity. Therefore, we assume 𝜇𝑤𝑀 > 𝑐𝑀 (i.e.,
𝑤𝑀 > 2𝑐𝑀 ) throughout the analysis to guarantee the manufacturer’s participation in the

91

game. Lemma 4.1.b indicates that when 𝜇𝑤𝑀 > 𝑐𝑀 , the manufacturer uses a coefficient,
𝛼, to adjust its planned production quantity for any given order quantity from the
wholesaler. Based on the assumption that 𝑤𝑀 > 2𝑐𝑀 , we know 𝛼 > 1 , i.e., the
manufacturer’s planned production quantity is always greater than then wholesaler’s
order quantity. This is an intuitive result due to the existence of the yield uncertainty.
Let ∗ be the superscript for the optimal values. We solve the wholesaler’s
𝐵∗
expected profit function and obtain its optimal ordering decision, 𝑞𝑀
, which is

summarized in Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 4.1: The wholesaler’s optimal ordering quantity is given by:
𝑚
𝐵∗
𝑞𝑀
= 𝜏𝑑, where 𝜏 = √(2𝛼−1
.
)

Proposition 4.1 indicates that the wholesaler uses a coefficient 𝜏 to adjust its order
quantity as a function of the demand. Let 𝑆𝑗∗ be the expected shortage amount under
equilibrium in model 𝑗. We then present the expected shortage amount in Model B, 𝑆 𝐵∗ .
Lemma 4.2: The expected shortage amount under the optimal solution in Model B is
given by
𝑑

𝑆 𝐵∗ = 2𝛼𝜏.
Lemma 4.2 indicates that the expected shortage amount is jointly affected by the
manufacturer and the wholesaler’s adjustment coefficient 𝛼 and 𝜏. We examine some
properties of the optimal solutions and shortage amount in Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.2: The optimal solutions and shortage amount in Model B have the
following properties:
a.

b.

𝐵∗
𝜕𝑞𝑀

𝜕𝑚
𝐵∗
𝜕𝑞𝑀

𝜕𝑤𝑀

> 0;

𝐵∗
𝜕𝑥𝑀

𝜕𝑚

> 0;

𝜕𝑆 𝐵∗
𝜕𝑚

𝜕𝑥 𝐵∗

𝜕𝑆 𝐵∗

𝑀

𝜕𝑤𝑀

< 0; 𝜕𝑤𝑀 > 0;

<0

<0
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c.

𝐵∗
𝜕𝑞𝑀

𝜕𝑐𝑀

> 0;

𝐵∗
𝜕𝑥𝑀

𝜕𝑐𝑀

< 0;

𝜕𝑆 𝐵∗
𝜕𝑐𝑀

>0

Proposition 4.2.a indicates the impact of the wholesaler’s markup (𝑚) on the
optimal values. As 𝑚 increases, the wholesaler will increase its order quantity to pursue a
high profit, and the manufacturer will increase its production quantity. As a result, the
shortage amount will decrease. Proposition 4.2.b indicates that the manufacturer’s selling
price (𝑤𝑀 ) has an opposite impact on the wholesaler and the manufacturer’s optimal
decisions. As 𝑤𝑀 increases, knowing that the manufacturer will increases the adjustment
factor 𝛼 for any order quantity, the wholesaler will decrease its order quantity
accordingly. On the other hand, as 𝑤𝑀 increases, the manufacturer will increase its
production quantity to pursue a higher revenue. As a result, the shortage amount is
decreasing in 𝑤𝑀 . Proposition 4.2.c shows that the manufacturer’s unit production cost
(𝑐𝑀 ) has an opposite impact with 𝑤𝑀 on the manufacturer and the wholesaler’s optimal
decisions as well as the shortage amount. This is because 𝑤𝑀 is the manufacturer’s unit
revenue, whereas 𝑐𝑀 is its unit production cost.

4.4.2

Model D

In Model D, we first solve the manufacturer and the government’s expected utility
𝐷
functions simultaneously to generate their best response functions 𝑥̃𝑀
and 𝑥̃𝐺𝐷 ,

respectively.
Lemma 4.3: The manufacturer and the government’s best response functions for any
given order quantities from the wholesaler are given by:
𝐷
𝑥̃𝑀
(𝑞𝑀 ) = 𝛼𝑞𝑀

𝑥̃𝐺𝐷 (𝑞𝑀 ) = (𝑑 − 𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀 )+
𝑐

Where 𝛼 is as defined in Lemma 4.1 and 𝛽 = 𝑏−𝑝+𝑠𝐺 +𝑤 .
𝐺

𝐺

Lemma 4.3 states the following: the manufacturer’s best response function is the
same as it in the basic model; GM uses an adjustment factor 𝛽 to adjust the
manufacturer’s production quantity, and produces the gap between the adjusted quantity
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(𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀 ) and the demand. Note that GM will not produce anything if the adjusted quantity
𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀 is greater than the demand, i.e., GM only produces to make up an adjusted
expected demand shortfall.
We next solve the wholesaler’s optimal order quantities. Proposition 4.3
summarizes three possible equilibrium states of the optimal procurement and production
plans.
Proposition 4.3: The optimal procurement and production plan of the three players will
be one of the three following cases:
𝐷∗
𝐷∗
a. 𝑞𝑀
= 𝜃𝑑, 𝑞𝐺𝐷∗ = 0, 𝑥𝑀
= 𝑎𝜃𝑑, 𝑥𝐺𝐷∗ = (1 − 𝑎𝜃𝛽)𝑑, and 𝑆 𝐷∗ =

𝛼𝛽2 𝜃𝑑
2

𝐷∗
𝐷∗
b. 𝑞𝑀
= 0, 𝑞𝐺𝐷∗ = 𝑑, 𝑥𝑀
= 0, 𝑥𝐺𝐷∗ = 𝑑, and 𝑆 𝐷∗ = 0
𝑑

𝐷∗
𝐷∗
c. 𝑞𝑀
= 𝜏𝑑, 𝑞𝐺𝐷∗ = 0, 𝑥𝑀
= 𝛼𝜏𝑑, 𝑥𝐺𝐷∗ = 0, and 𝑆 𝐷∗ = 2𝛼𝜏

Where 𝜃 = √𝛼2 𝛽2 (𝑝−𝑤

𝑤𝐺
𝐺 )+𝑤𝑀 (2𝛼−1)

, and 𝜏 > 𝜃.

In plan a, the wholesaler anticipates that GM will produce some backup quantities
even without any order quantity from the wholesaler at the beginning. Therefore, the
wholesaler orders everything from the manufacturer at the beginning and takes advantage
of GM’s produced quantities when the manufacturer’s realized production quantity is
lower than demand. In plan b, the wholesaler orders everything from the government at
the beginning. Because GM has a perfect yield rate, both the wholesaler’s order quantity
and the GM’s production quantity are equal to the demand, whereas the manufacturer
does not produce anything. Plan c is the same as the basic model: GM does not produce
anything in both cases. The wholesaler’s adjustment factor for its order quantity from the
manufacturer in plan c is greater than that in plan a, i.e., 𝜏 > 𝜃, because there are no
backup quantities available at GM in plan c.
In Proposition 4.3 we refer plan a as a mixed procurement plan; plan b as a strict
public procurement plan; and plan c as a strict private procurement plan. We use the
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term “plan” for the three equilibrium states in Model D (i.e., the wholesaler’s
procurement plans in Model D), and we use the term “strategy” for the government’s
interventions (i.e., no intervention, subsidy, and dual sourcing).
𝐷𝑏
𝐷𝑐
Let 𝛱𝐷𝑎
𝑊 , 𝛱𝑊 and 𝛱𝑊 be the wholesaler’s optimal profit in plan a, b and c in

Proposition 4.3, respectively. Proposition 4.4 provides a pairwise comparison of the
wholesalers’ optimal profits in the three plans depending on different parameter values.
Proposition 4.4: The relative values of the wholesaler optimal profits in the three
procurement plans are as follows:
𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑏
a. Comparing 𝛱𝑊
with 𝛱𝑊
:

I.
II.

𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑏
If 𝑐𝐺 ≤ 𝑐𝐺𝑎𝑏 : 𝛱𝑊
> 𝛱𝑊

If 𝑐𝐺 > 𝑐𝐺𝑎𝑏
i.

𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑏
If 𝑠𝐺 ≤ 𝑠𝐺𝑎𝑏 : 𝛱𝑊
≤ 𝛱𝑊

ii.

𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑏
If 𝑠𝐺 > 𝑠𝐺𝑎𝑏 : 𝛱𝑊
> 𝛱𝑊

𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑐
b. Comparing 𝛱𝑊
with 𝛱𝑊
:

I.
II.

𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑐
If 𝑐𝐺 ≤ 𝑐𝐺𝑎𝑐 : 𝛱𝑊
> 𝛱𝑊

If 𝑐𝐺 > 𝑐𝐺𝑎𝑐
i.

𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑐
If 𝑠𝐺 ≤ 𝑠𝐺𝑎𝑐 : 𝛱𝑊
≤ 𝛱𝑊

ii.

𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑐
If 𝑠𝐺 > 𝑠𝐺𝑎𝑐 : 𝛱𝑊
> 𝛱𝑊

𝐷𝑏
𝐷𝑐
c. Comparing 𝛱𝑊
with 𝛱𝑊
𝑝

i.

𝐷𝑏
𝐷𝑐
If 𝑤𝐺 ≤ 𝑎𝜏: 𝛱𝑊
≥ 𝛱𝑊

ii.

𝐷𝑏
𝐷𝑐
If 𝑤𝐺 > 𝑎𝜏: 𝛱𝑊
< 𝛱𝑊

𝑝
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where 𝑐𝑎𝑏
𝐺 =
𝑏−𝑝+𝑤𝐺
𝑎

𝑏−𝑝+𝑤𝐺
𝑎

(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀

√

𝑤𝐺

𝑎2 𝑤𝐺 −(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀

√

𝑝−𝑤𝐺

, 𝑠𝑎𝑏
𝐺 = 𝑎𝑐𝐺 √ 2
𝑎 𝑤
𝑤𝐺

, and 𝑠𝑎𝑐
𝐺 = 𝛼𝑐𝐺 √

(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀

𝑝−𝑤𝐺
𝐺 −(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀

+ 𝑝 − 𝑏 − 𝑤𝐺 , 𝑐𝑎𝑐
𝐺 =

+ 𝑝 − 𝑏 − 𝑤𝐺 .

Proposition 4.4.a summarizes the wholesaler’s preference between a mixed
procurement plan and a public procurement plan. If GM’s selling price is sufficiently
low, then the wholesaler always prefers a public strategy to a mixed procurement plan.
This is because the benefit of a reliable source can justify GM’s higher selling price.
Otherwise, the wholesaler’s preference between the two procurement plans depends on
𝑐𝐺 and 𝑠𝐺 . If either 𝑐𝐺 is sufficiently low or 𝑠𝐺 is sufficiently high, then GM will be more
willing to produce some backup quantities even without any order quantities, and the
wholesaler prefers a mixed procurement plan. This is because the wholesaler can take
advantage of both the cheaper source and the backup supplier: the wholesaler can first
procure the drug from the manufacturer and then purchase the drug from GM if the
manufacturer’s realized quantity is lower than demand.
Proposition 4.4.b summarizes the wholesaler’s preference between a mixed
procurement plan and a private procurement plan. In this comparison, the wholesaler only
orders from the manufacturer at the beginning, and the difference between the two
procurement plans is whether GM voluntarily produces some backup quantities or not.
Similarly to the logic explained in the previous paragraph, GM’s decision is depending
on 𝑐𝐺 and 𝑠𝐺 : if either 𝑐𝐺 is sufficiently low or 𝑠𝐺 is sufficiently high, then GM will be
more willing to produce some backup quantities even without any order quantities from
the wholesaler.
Proposition 4.4.c states the wholesaler’s preference between a public procurement
plan and a private procurement plan. In this comparison, the wholesaler will procure the
drug only from one source throughout the whole period. The wholesaler’s preference is
based on the trade-offs between the reliability and procurement cost at the two sources. If
the wholesaler’s selling price is low, then there is not enough profit margin for it to
procure the drug from a more expensive source, and it will only procure from the
manufacturer which is cheaper. If the wholesaler’s selling price and profit margin are
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4.3. The wholesaler’s optimal procurement plan in Model D. (a): with respect to
the public manufacturer’s selling price (𝑤𝐺 ) and the government’s unit shortage cost
(𝑠𝐺 ); (b): with respect to the wholesaler’s unit markup (𝑚) and 𝑠𝐺 .
high, then it will procure the drug from GM if 𝑤𝐺 is sufficiently low, and it will procure
from the manufacturer if 𝑤𝐺 is sufficiently high.
Due to the complicated threshold values in Proposition 4.4, it is difficult to
provide a clear analytical comparison of the three procurement plans. Therefore, we
graphically illustrate and discuss the wholesaler’s preference for the three procurement
plans as a function of different parameter values in Figure 4.3. Figure 4.3.a illustrates the
wholesaler’s optimal procurement plan with respect to the government’s selling price
(𝑤𝐺 ) and the government’s unit shortage cost (𝑠𝐺 ); If both 𝑠𝐺 and 𝑤𝐺 are small, then the
wholesaler will choose a public procurement plan. If 𝑠𝐺 is small and 𝑤𝐺 is large, then the
wholesaler prefers a private procurement plan; otherwise, the supply chain will reach a
mixed procurement plan. The logic is as follows. If 𝑠𝐺 is small, then the shortage cost is
not severe enough to incentivize GM to voluntarily produce any backup quantities, and
the supply chain will reach a pure procurement plan (the wholesaler only procures the
drug from one manufacturing facility through the entire period). If both 𝑠𝐺 and 𝑤𝐺 are
small, then GM’s reasonably high price and perfect reliability are more attractive to the
wholesaler than the unreliable manufacturer. Knowing that GM will not produce anything
without any order, the wholesaler will order everything from GM. If 𝑠𝐺 is small and 𝑤𝐺 is
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large, then GM’s selling price is too high for the wholesaler, and the wholesaler will
order everything from the manufacturer.
If 𝑠𝐺 is high, then GM will voluntarily produce some backup quantities even
without any order quantities from the wholesaler at the beginning. Therefore, the
wholesaler will order from the cheaper supplier (the manufacturer) at the beginning, and
it will procure from GM if the manufacturer’s realized production quantity is lower than
the demand. In this scenario, the supply chain is more likely to reach a mixed
procurement plan.
Note that in the region where GM’s selling price is less than GM’s unit
production cost (𝑤𝐺 < 𝑐𝐺 ) in Figure 4.3.a, the government is willing to produce the drug
even if GM’s selling price is less than its production cost. This is because the additional
health benefit and avoided shortage cost from GM’s provision of the drug may justify the
gap between GM’s price and production cost.
Figure 4.3.b illustrates the wholesaler’s optimal procurement plan as a function of
with respect to the wholesaler’s unit markup (𝑚) and the government’s unit shortage cost
(𝑠𝐺 ). We can see that 𝑚 and 𝑤𝐺 have an opposite impact on the wholesaler’s optimal
plan. This is because 𝑚 determines the wholesaler’s revenue whereas 𝑤𝐺 is a cost for the
wholesaler.

4.4.3

Model S

For ease of implementation, we assume that the government will only choose one type of
subsidy. Define Model SW and Model SP as two sub-models in which the government
will only implement a procurement cost subsidy (Model SW) and a selling price subsidy
(Model SP), respectively (i.e., 𝛾𝑝 = 0 in Model SW, and 𝛾𝑤 = 0 in Model SP). We solve
Model SW and Model SP separately.
Because the subsidy is not included in the manufacturer’s profit function, its best
response function for any given order quantity from the wholesaler has the same form as
𝑆 (𝑞 )
the basic model, 𝑥̃𝑀
𝑀 = 𝛼𝑞𝑀 , where 𝛼 is the same as defined in Lemma 4.1. We then
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solve the wholesaler’s best response function for any given subsidy in Model SW and
Model SP, respectively.
Lemma 4.4: The wholesaler’s best response functions for any given subsidy in Model SW
and Model SP are given by
𝑆𝑊
𝑞̃𝑀
= 𝜏 𝑆𝑊 𝑑
𝑆𝑃
𝑞̃𝑀
= 𝜏 𝑆𝑃 𝑑

𝑝

where 𝜏 𝑆𝑊 = √(2𝛼−1)(𝑤

𝑀 −𝛾𝑤 )

𝑝+𝛾𝑝

and 𝜏 𝑆𝑃 = √(2𝛼−1)𝑤 .
𝑀

The wholesaler’s ordering decision in the basic model and that in the subsidy
model have the same structure. It uses a coefficient to make an adjustment on the demand
for the drug, and the coefficient in the subsidy model incorporates the subsidies from the
government.
Finally, we solve the government’s optimal subsidy and summarize it in
Proposition 4.5.
Proposition 4.5: There exists a unique optimal solution for the government’s subsidy in
each sub-model, which is given by
𝑏+𝑠

a. In Model SW:

𝛾𝑤∗

𝑏+𝑠

𝑤𝑀 − 𝛾̂𝑤 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑚 ≤ 3𝑤 𝐺 (𝑖. 𝑒. , 𝑝 ≤ 3 𝐺)
𝑀
={
𝑏+𝑠𝐺
𝑏+𝑠
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑚 > 3𝑤
(𝑖. 𝑒., 𝑝 > 3 𝐺 )
𝑀

𝛾̂𝑝 − 𝑝, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 ≤ 𝛾̂𝑝
b. In Model SP: 𝛾𝑝∗ = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 > 𝛾̂𝑝
where the expressions of 𝛾̂𝑤 and 𝛾̂𝑝 are defined in the Appendix.
Proposition 4.5.a indicates that if the government is considering whether to
provide a procurement cost subsidy, then it should provide the subsidy only if the
wholesaler’s profit margin (or revenue) is sufficiently low. With this type of subsidy, the
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wholesaler’s effective procurement cost became 𝛾̂𝑤 . Proposition 4.5.b states that there
exists a unique effective price (𝛾̂𝑝 ) that maximizes the government’s utility. When the
government is considering whether to use a selling price subsidy, then it should provide
the subsidy if 𝑝 is sufficiently low, and the subsidy should increase the wholesaler’s
selling price up to the effective price.
Due to the complicated expression of the optimal solutions in Proposition 4.5, we
are not able to analytically compare the performance of the two subsidies. Therefore, we
conduct numerical analysis and test a wide range of parameter values. We summarize an
important observation that holds for all parameter values we tested.
Observation 4.1: 𝛱𝐺𝑆𝑊∗ > 𝛱𝐺𝑆𝑃∗ .
Observation 4.1 indicates that the government always prefers a procurement cost
subsidy to a selling price subsidy. This is because under a selling price subsidy, the
wholesaler will not receive the subsidy if it overstocks (i.e., when the manufacturer’s
delivered quantity is greater than the drug demand). On the other hand, under a
procurement cost subsidy, the wholesaler can receive the subsidy for all procured
quantities, which has a larger effect on incentivizing it to increase the order quantity and
reduce shortages. Because the drug has a positive net health benefit and positive shortage
cost for the government, a procurement cost subsidy can better mitigate shortages and
improve the government’s utility than a selling price subsidy. This result is similar to the
main finding in Taylor and Xiao (2014), which investigated a donor’s optimal subsidy to
improve the availability and affordability of malaria drugs provided by the private-sector
and found that the donor should only subsidize the retailers’ purchases and should not
subsidize their sales. For the rest of the analysis, we only focus on the procurement cost
subsidy as it is more effective than the selling price subsidy.
Proposition 4.6 summarizes some properties of the optimal procurement cost
subsidy.
Proposition 4.6: The optimal procurement cost subsidy has the following properties
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∗
𝜕𝛾𝑤

𝜕𝑚

𝜕𝛾∗

≤ 0, 𝜕𝑤𝑤 ≥ 0,
𝑀

∗
𝜕𝛾𝑤

𝜕𝑏

≥ 0, and

∗
𝜕𝛾𝑤

𝜕𝑠𝐺

≥0

The optimal procurement cost subsidy is decreasing in 𝑚, because the
government does not need to pay a large subsidy if the wholesaler already charges a high
markup. The optimal subsidy increases as the wholesaler’s procurement cost increases.
The optimal subsidy also increases when the government has a higher incentive to
mitigate shortages, such as the health benefit or the shortage cost are high.

Comparisons of Different Strategies
With the optimal values obtained in each model, we are able to analyze the government’s
optimal strategy and examine the impact on the wholesaler and the manufacturer. Based
on Observation 4.1 (the government always prefers a procurement cost subsidy to a
selling price subsidy), we only consider a procurement cost subsidy in Model S for the
rest of the analysis. The government chooses from the three strategies to maximize its
expected utility, i.e., no intervention (Model B), the subsidy strategy (Model S), and the
dual sourcing strategy (Model D). The government prefers a strategy if its utility in the
corresponding model is higher than that in the other two models. We first compare each
mitigating strategy (Model S and Model D, respectively) with Model B. This comparison
provides insights into situations in which the government has a preference for one
strategy over the other, or only one certain type of strategy is available. Next, we
compare the three models together and examine the government’s optimal strategy if both
mitigating strategies are available.

4.5.1

Comparison of Model B with Model S

We first investigate the government’s preference for whether to provide subsidies to the
wholesaler. We first summarize some properties of the optimal values in Proposition 4.7.
Proposition 4.7: The following properties hold when comparing Model B with Model S
𝐵∗
If 𝛱𝑆∗
𝐺 > 𝛱𝐺 , then the following are true:

𝛱𝑆∗
𝑊

𝑆∗
𝐵∗
𝑆∗
𝐵∗
𝑆∗
𝐵∗
𝑆∗
> 𝛱𝐵∗
< 𝑆𝐵∗.
𝑊 , 𝛱𝑀 > 𝛱𝑀 , 𝑌𝑊 > 𝑌𝑊 , 𝑌𝑀 > 𝑌𝑀 , and 𝑆
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Figure 4.4: The government’s preference between Model B (no intervention) and Model
S (subsidy strategy) with respect to the wholesaler’s markup (𝑚) and the government’s
unit shortage cost (𝑠𝐺 ).
Proposition 4.7 indicates that if the government prefers to provide subsidies, then
the two parties in the private sector have the same preferences as the government,
indicating that a subsidy strategy can achieve an “all-win” situation compared with the
basic model in same cases. Because the government decides whether to provide subsidies
or not, it will be better off if it chooses to provide subsidies instead of no intervention.
The subsidy increases the wholesaler’s profit margin and incentivizes it to increase its
order quantity, which in turn increases its profit. As a response to the wholesaler’s
increased order quantity, the manufacturer will increase the production quantity which in
turn increase it profit. As a result, when the government use a subsidy strategy, the
delivered quantity from the manufacturer to the wholesaler increases, and the shortage
amount decreases, compared with the basic model.
Next, we show a two-way graph of the government’s optimal choice between
Model B and Model S with respect to the wholesaler’s markup (𝑚) and the government’s
unit shortage cost (𝑠𝐺 ). Figure 4.4 illustrates that when the wholesaler’s profit margin
(i.e., markup) is low and the shortage cost is high, the government should provide
subsidies; when the wholesaler’s profit margin is high and the shortage cost is low, the
government should not provide subsidies. Note that when replacing 𝑠𝐺 with the unit
monetary health benefit of the drug (𝑏), the two graphs have similar structures. This is
because the government has a higher incentive to reduce shortages when either 𝑏 or 𝑠𝐺
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increases.

4.5.2

Comparison of Model B with Model D

We compare the government’s optimal utilities in Model B and Model D to investigate
the government’s preference on whether to operate GM. Note that, if the government
implements a dual sourcing strategy, then the wholesaler chooses the optimal
procurement plans (a mixed plan, a public plan, and a private plan) to maximize its own
profit. In other words, the optimal procurement plan in Model D is the wholesaler’s
choice. Therefore, the government’s expected utility under the wholesaler’s optimal
procurement plan in Model D may be lower than in Model B.
Proposition 4.8: The following properties hold when comparing Model B with Model D:
𝐵∗
If 𝛱𝐷∗
𝐺 > 𝛱𝐺 , then the following are true:

𝛱𝐷∗
𝑊

𝐷∗
𝐵∗
𝐷∗
𝐵∗
𝐷∗
𝐵∗
𝐷∗
> 𝛱𝐵∗
≤ 𝑆𝐵∗
𝑊 , 𝛱𝑀 ≤ 𝛱𝑀 , 𝑌𝑊 ≥ 𝑌𝑊 , 𝑌𝑀 ≤ 𝑌𝑀 , and 𝑆

Proposition 4.8 indicates that if the government prefers Model D to Model B,
then the wholesaler also has the same preference. This is intuitive, because the wholesaler
has more flexibility on choosing the suppliers in Model D than in Model B, and it is no
worse off in Model D. However, the manufacturer is always no better off if the
government operates GM. This is because the manufacturer faces competitions with GM,
and some or all of its order quantities will be taken by GM in Model D. If the government
prefers model D to Model B, i.e., it operates GM, then the wholesaler’s fulfilled demand
is higher, the manufacturer’s delivered quantity is lower, and the expected shortage is
lower in Model D then in Model B.
Next, we show the government’s choice between Model B and Model D as a
function of 𝑚 and 𝑠𝐺 in Figure 4.5. Note that, in the region labeled with “Model D
Private Plan”, the government prefers a public procurement plan, whereas the wholesaler
prefers not to procure from GM even if GM is available. In contrast, in the region labeled
with “Model B”, the wholesaler prefers to procure from GM if it is available, whereas the
government prefers not to produce the drug at GM.
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Figure 4.5: The government’s preference between Model B (no intervention) and Model
D (dual sourcing strategy) with respect to the wholesaler’s markup (𝑚) and the
government’s unit shortage cost (𝑠𝐺 ).
If the incentive to mitigate shortages is low, then the government prefers Model B
to Model D. This is more likely to occur if the government’s shortage cost is low and the
wholesaler’s profit margin is sufficiently high (the bottom right region labeled with
“Model B” in Figure 4.5), so that the government would rely on the wholesaler’s ordering
decision in a sole-sourcing situation rather than operating a GM to mitigate shortages.
The optimal procurement plan within Model D is the same as discussed in subsection
4.4.2.

4.5.3

Comparison of the Three Models

We finally analyze the government’s optimal strategy when comparing all three models.
Table 4.2 summarizes the optimal values for all possible equilibrium states in the three
models. Depending on the different combinations of parameters, the three players will
follow their respective optimal decisions, and the supply chain will reach one equilibrium
state in Table 4.2.
Figure 4.6 shows a two-way graph of the government’s optimal strategy as a function of
𝑚 and 𝑠𝐺 . Recall that, in the region labeled with “Model D Private Plan”, the wholesaler
prefers not to procure from GM even if GM is available. However, in the region labeled
with “Model B”, the wholesaler prefers to procure from GM if it is available, whereas the
government prefers not to produce the drug at GM.

where 𝜏 =

√

𝑝
;
(
2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀

𝛼=
2𝑐𝑀

√ 𝑤𝑀

; 𝜏 𝑆∗ = 𝜏 𝑆𝑊∗

𝑝
(
∗)
2𝛼−1)(𝑤𝑀 −𝛾𝑤

√

; 𝛾̂𝑤 is as defined in the Appendix;𝛽 =

Table 4.2: Summary of optimal values

√
𝑐𝐺
;and 𝜃 = 𝛼2𝛽2(𝑝−𝑤 𝑤)𝐺+𝑤 (2𝛼−1).
𝑏−𝑝+𝑠𝐺 +𝑤𝐺
𝐺
𝑀
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Figure 4.6: The government’s optimal strategy among the three policies with respect to
the wholesaler’s markup parameter (𝑚) and the government’s unit shortage cost (𝑠𝐺 ).

If the wholesaler’s profit margin is sufficiently low, then the government’s
optimal choice is between Model B and Model S. If the shortage cost is sufficiently low,
then the government does not have enough incentives to implement a subsidy strategy
(the region labeled “Model B” on the bottom left in Figure 4.6). If the shortage cost is
high, then a procurement cost subsidy is an effective strategy to mitigate shortages (the
region labeled “Model S” in Figure 4.6), which also improves the utilities of the three
players in the pharmaceutical supply chain.
If the wholesaler’s profit margin is sufficiently high, then Model D dominates
Model S, and the government’s optimal choice is between Model B and Model D. In this
comparison, if 𝑚 is sufficiently high and 𝑠𝐺 is sufficiently low, then the government
prefers not to intervene (the region labeled “Model B” on the bottom right in Figure 4.6).
Otherwise, the government will use a dual sourcing strategy to mitigate drug shortages.
When the government uses a dual sourcing strategy, the supply chain will reach a mixed
procurement plan if 𝑚 is small and 𝑠𝐺 is large (the region labeled “Model D Mixed Plan”
in Figure 4.6). This is because when 𝑠𝐺 is large, the government will voluntarily produce

106

some backup quantities even without any initial orders from the wholesaler. If the profit
margin is low, then the wholesaler cannot afford sole-sourcing from a more reliable but
more expensive public supplier. Therefore, the wholesaler will place an initial order from
the manufacturer which is cheaper, and the wholesaler will take advantage of GM’s
backup quantities if the manufacturer’s delivered quantity is lower than the demand. If 𝑠𝐺
is small, as the wholesaler’s profit margin increases, the supply chain will reach a private
procurement plan (the region labeled “Model D Private Plan” in Figure 4.6). This is
because the increase of the wholesaler’s profit margin incentivizes a higher order quantity
which reduces the expected shortage amount, whereas the low shortage cost cannot
incentivize GM to produce any back up quantities voluntarily. Because the wholesaler
still cannot afford to procure the drug exclusively from GM in this range of profit margin,
it will only procure from the manufacturer.
If 𝑠𝐺 is small and the wholesaler charges a higher markup, then the wholesaler can
afford to procure from GM exclusively, and the supply chain will reach a public
procurement plan (the region labeled “Model D Public Plan” in Figure 4.6). However, if
𝑚 is sufficiently high and 𝑠𝐺 is sufficiently low, the government prefer to rely on the
wholesaler’s order decision in a sole sourcing situation rather than producing the drug at
GM to mitigate shortages (“Model B” on the bottom right in Figure 4.6).

Discussion
In this essay, we analyze the governments’ optimal strategy to mitigate drug shortages.
We construct a pharmaceutical supply chain model consisting of three decision-makers: a
manufacturer, a wholesaler, and a government. We assume the manufacturing process has
random yield rate to capture the major known cause of drug shortages, which is
manufacturing issues. We consider two mitigating strategies that can be implemented by
the government: providing subsidies to the wholesaler, or establishing a public
manufacturer. We analytically characterize the optimal decisions for each party in each
strategy and analyze the government’s optimal strategy under different circumstances. To
our best knowledge, this paper is the first modeling study that investigates the
interactions among three key decision-makers in a pharmaceutical supply chain while
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comparing a subsidy strategy and a dual sourcing strategy to mitigate supply uncertainties
from a government’s perspective.
This study shows the advantages and disadvantages of each strategy. An
advantage for both mitigating strategies is that the expected shortage amount can be
reduced by either strategy compared with the status quo in which the government does
not take any intervention. An advantage of a subsidy strategy is that, if the government
prefers to use a subsidy strategy, then the wholesaler and the manufacturer’s profits with
subsidies are higher than those without subsidies, indicating a subsidy strategy can
achieve an all-win situation. However, a disadvantage is that the supply chain remains a
sole sourcing situation under a subsidy strategy, which is more vulnerable to disruptions
risks than a supply chain with multiple suppliers.
In contrast, an advantage of a dual sourcing strategy is that it eases the high
market concentration by adding a second source of the drug, which makes the supply
chain more reliable and resilient to supply disruptions. However, a disadvantage is that a
dual sourcing strategy cannot be mutually preferred by all three parties. If the government
chooses to establish a public manufacturer, then the wholesale is no worse off, but the
manufacturer is no better off compared with the status quo. In some circumstances, the
wholesaler may prefer to procure everything from the public manufacturer, and the
manufacturer is not making any profit. In these situations, the government and/or the
wholesaler may need to provide incentives to the manufacturer to keep it in the market in
the long term. This consideration is similar to the discussion in the previous chapter.
This study also provides analysis for the government’s optimal strategy under
different circumstances. We show that governments should always intervene if the
shortage cost is high (i.e., critical and lifesaving drugs without alternatives). For example,
if the wholesaler’s profit margin is low, then governments should provide subsidies for
critical and lifesaving drugs without alternatives to incentivize an increase of the
wholesaler’s order quantity and reduce shortages. If wholesalers already charge a high
markup, then governments should produce critical and lifesaving drugs without
alternatives at public manufacturers to provide additional supplies. The results confirm
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the importance of establishing a list of critical drugs and take more government
interventions to mitigate shortages of the drugs. These analyses along with the
advantages and disadvantages of each strategy have important policy implications for
government interventions on mitigating drug shortages.
This study has several limitations. First, we construct a single-period model with
zero lead time, mainly due to the complexity of our model. Future studies can extend our
model to a multi-period setting while considering a positive lead time in drug production
and distribution. For example, some drugs require a long time for production and
distribution, which require an assumption of positive lead time in the model. Second, we
do not consider fixed cost and cost of switching production and maintaining regulatory
ability to produce drugs, and our results may overestimate the benefit of producing drugs
at public manufacturers. When considering fixed costs, the threshold values may change,
but the qualitative properties of our model should remain the same. Future studies may
consider possible fixed costs and verify the impacts on our main findings.
In addition, we assume all parameters are known by all parties. However, it is
possible that the parameters of cost, revenue, and/or yield rate are private information.
Therefore, one extension to our study is to incorporate information asymmetry and
provide further insights into possible changes in our findings. Moreover, we do not
consider holding costs for the three parties. Our analysis may apply to the situation in
which the drug does not require costly storage conditions, and the holding costs are
negligible compared with other costs and revenue parameters. We also do not consider
shortage costs for the manufacturer and the wholesaler. For example, the failure-tosupply clauses in many contracts are very week, and often suppliers do not incur financial
penalties if they fail to supply the contracted quantity to the buyer (Jia and Zhao, 2017).
Future studies can extend our study to a richer setting by incorporating parameters for
holding costs and/or shortage costs.
There are other directions to extend this study. We consider two types of subsidies
that are paid to the wholesaler. Future studies can consider more types of subsidies, such
as the subsidies to private manufacturers, or subsidies to induce new manufacturers to
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enter the market. Next, we assume all price parameters are exogenous because drug
prices are highly regulated in many countries. Future analysis can include drug prices as
decision variables, e.g., influential parties may have the power to affect drug prices
directly or through discount/rebate. Moreover, we study the most vulnerable supply chain
setting, which consists of only one private manufacturer and one wholesaler. Future
studies can consider duopoly or more competitive settings to provide insights into
different circumstances.
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Chapter 5
5

Conclusion

In this thesis, I investigate several decision-making problems faced by health care
decision-makers to manage drug supply and patient access to drugs in the presence of
various uncertainties. Using a game-theoretic approach, I analyze the dynamics of the key
decision-makers’ optimal decisions and the impact of these interactions on their
performances. In the first essay, I compare the performance of two drug reimbursement
policies between a payer and a pharmaceutical company to mitigate the uncertainties of
new and expensive drugs. Different from previous studies, I incorporate several key
aspects of the decision making challenge, such as the multiple decision-maker aspects,
comparing a volume-based policy with a value-based policy, and capturing the
pharmaceutical company’s strategic decision of its marketing efforts.
Next, using a supply chain management approach, I examine policies to mitigate
drug shortages caused by supply uncertainties from hospitals’ and governments’
perspectives, respectively. In the second essay, I evaluate hospitals’ strategy of
establishing an in-house manufacturer to mitigate drug shortages. I construct a multiperiod supply chain model consisting of a hospital and an external manufacturer that is
subject to supply uncertainty. The hospital owns an in-house manufacturer and can
procure the drug from the two manufacturing facilities. The hospital also has a second
chance to make emergency production at the in-house producer. I capture the hospital’s
procurement and production decisions, and the external manufacturer’s production
decisions. First, I analytically characterize the optimal decisions of each party in a single
period setting. Next, I analyze the hospital’s long-term inventory management policies in
a multi-period setting using a heuristic.
In the third essay, I study mitigating strategies for drug shortages from the
governments’ perspective. This study distinguished from previous work in several
aspects. I construct a pharmaceutical supply chain consisting of three decision-makers: a
manufacturer, a wholesaler, and a government. I consider three strategies that can be
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implemented by the government: 1) no intervention; 2) a dual sourcing strategy, in
which the government operates a public manufacturer; and 3) a subsidy strategy in which
the government provides subsidies based on the wholesaler’s unit procurement cost or
unit selling price. First, I analytically solve the optimal solutions in each model. Next, I
analyze the government’s optimal policy and its impacts on the performance of the
wholesaler and the manufacturer under different circumstances.

Managerial Insights
The results of the first essay provide insights for health payers who are facing decisions
between a volume-based reimbursement policy and a value-based reimbursement policy.
I show that under some circumstances, none of the two policies can align the incentives
of the two parties. This may lead to resistance from the misaligned party during the
implementation and partially explain the lack of consensus between payers and
manufacturers on the preferability of a risk-sharing agreement, which has been observed
in reality (Bastian et al., 2015). Under some other circumstances, in contrast, a properly
selected policy can be mutually preferred by the two parties, which may result in a
smooth implementation. A policy implication is that neither policy is a universal solution
that can be applied in all situations, and payers should carefully consider the trade-offs
between different incentives and costs when making decision, rather than sticking to just
one policy (e.g., to use a volume-based policy for ease of negotiation and
implementation).
In the second essay, I show that the hospital’s optimal decision on whether to
establish an in-house manufacturer should depend on the trade-offs between different
parameters (e.g., the procurement/production costs, the shortage costs, and the reliability
of the external manufacturers), rather than a simple cost consideration for the cheapest
source. I show that the shortage amount can be reduced by the hospital’s in-house
producer, which provides evidence for the value of establishing Civica Rx to mitigate
drug shortages. The results may provide one explanation for the rapid growths of the
company business: from providing 14 drugs to approximately 500 member hospitals in
2018, to providing 40 drugs to over 1200 members hospitals in July 2020 (Civica Rx,
2020). However, the results show that the external manufacturer is no better off under the
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hospital’s dual sourcing practice, and the hospital may need to consider incentives to
keep the external manufacturer from exiting the market. This consideration is in order to
keep the multi-supplier situation for a more reliable pharmaceutical supply chain against
supply uncertainties.
The third essay provides insights into government interventions to mitigate drug
shortages caused by supply uncertainties. I show that both the subsidy policy and the dual
sourcing strategy can reduce the shortage amount compared with the status quo.
However, the two strategies differ in several aspects. One difference is their ability to
align the incentives of different parties. A subsidy strategy can align the incentives of the
government, the wholesaler, and the external manufacturer, whereas a dual sourcing
strategy cannot be mutually preferred by all three parties. Due to the competition with the
public manufacturer, the external manufacturer is no better off under the government’s
dual sourcing strategy compared with the status quo. Another difference between the two
mitigating strategies is their ability to change the supply structure. Under a subsidy
strategy, the supply chain remains a sole supplier situation which is vulnerable to supply
disruptions. In contrast, a dual sourcing strategy adds a supplier, which eases the high
market concentration and increases the reliability and resilience of the supply chain
against supply disruptions. I also provide analysis for the government’s optimal policies
under different circumstances, which has implications for policymakers regarding the
optimal interventions to mitigate supply uncertainties.
The three essays have some common insights regarding the decision-making
challenges in a multi-decision-maker setting. First, the second and third essays show the
importance of the trade-offs between different factors, rather than a simple cost
consideration that favors the cheapest supplier. The two essays show that sourcing from
the cheaper but unreliable supplier may result in inferior performance for the wholesaler
and the government in the expected form (i.e., long-term average) when taking into
consideration the reliability of the suppliers and the shortage cost due to the
unavailability of the drug. Second, all three essays show that each policy candidate’s
ability to align the incentives of different parties may depend on various circumstances.
In the first essay, the payer and the pharmaceutical company may or may not prefer the
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same reimbursement policy depending on the drug price and patient treatment eligibility.
In the second essay, the external manufacturer always prefers a sole-sourcing situation,
whereas the hospital may prefer to establish an in-house producer. In the third essay, a
subsidy strategy is not always preferred by the three parties, since the government may
prefer a dual sourcing strategy or not to intervene, depending on different situations.

Implications for COVID-19
The three essays have important policy implications in the context of the unprecedented
novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. For example, new vaccines and drugs are
being developed to prevent or treat COVID-19. Due to the public crisis nature of this
pandemic, it is very likely that many government agencies and health authorities will
cover the costs of vaccines and/or drugs for patients. My first essay may provide insights
into payers’ decisions on selecting a reimbursement policy for the newly developed
vaccines or drugs. For example, traditional vaccines and drugs require many years to go
through the process of early development, multiple phases of clinical trials to confirm the
efficacy and safety of the products. In contrast, vaccines and drugs for COVID-19 are
expected to be developed within a very short time period. Therefore, the effectiveness of
the drugs and vaccines for COVID-19 may be highly uncertainty. On the other hand, due
to the possible multiple waves of the pandemic, the sales volume of the drugs for
COVID-19 may be highly uncertain. Payers should carefully weigh the risks and benefits
of different products and select a risk-sharing agreement to mitigate uncertainties.
In addition, many pharmaceutical products are undergoing or are expected to
experience shortages, due to supply uncertainties at overseas suppliers during COVID-19
(Blank, 2020; Hahn, 2020; Rees, 2020; Russell, 2020). For example, the FDA has
identified 20 medicines that sole source the finished drug products or the active
pharmaceutical ingredients from oversea manufacturers, which are significantly affected
by this pandemic (Hahn, 2020; Russell, 2020). The pandemic revealed the vulnerability
of the current pharmaceutical supply chains in many countries, and reconstructions of the
existing systems are required. My second and third essays provide insights into the
reconstruction towards more reliable and resilient pharmaceutical supply chains.
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Many policymakers and experts believe that it is important to increase the
diversity of supply sources (in different geographic regions, if possible), as risk
management measures for drug suppliers (Linton and Vakil, 2020). This coincides with
the dual-sourcing concept discussed in the two essays. The two essays show that it is
crucial to trade-off the benefits and risks of cheaper but unreliable sources with more
expensive but more reliable sources. Due to the for-profit nature of many drug
manufacturers, it is difficult to rely on them to manage drug suppliers and mitigate
shortages. The two essays analyze strategies which can be implemented by two types of
key stakeholders in mitigating drug shortages: hospitals and governments, which provide
theoretical foundations for them to design and implement interventions of drug shortages
in reality. It is also crucial for stakeholders to consider the advantages and disadvantages
of the shortage mitigating strategies and take a long-term perspective when moving
towards supply chain reconstructions in a post-COVID-19 world.
We originally initiated essays 2 and 3 to investigate drug shortages. But recent
events during the COVID-19 pandemic also indicated that our results apply to equipment
shortages, such as personal protective equipment (PPE) and lab testing equipment. Many
PPE and lab equipment require higher production costs at domestic manufacturers than
oversea suppliers. But the equipment has a large impact on frontline worker’s safety and
patient welfare, i.e., the shortage cost is high. Therefore, governments and hospitals
should help make additional productions or provide financial supports to mitigate the
equipment shortages and better defeat the pandemic,

Limitations and Future Research
The three studies establish the foundation for several important decision-making
challenges faced by health care decision-makers to manage drug supply and patient
access to drugs. I made several limiting assumptions to make the models tractable, and
there are multiple directions for future extension. In the first essay, I compare two types
of risk-sharing contracts. Future studies can consider other types of contracts that are
implemented in reality. In the second essay and third essay, I focus on drug shortages
caused by supply uncertainties at the manufacturing facilities. Future studies can
incorporate other causes, such as demand uncertainties, manufacturers’ strategic
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decisions on holding inventories, natural disasters, and unavailability of API from upper
stream suppliers. Because low drug price is one important underlying factor for drug
shortages, future studies may also analyze whether pricing agreement can solve the drug
shortage problems (i.e., whether increase drug price may mitigate drug shortages). In the
third essays, I consider a single-period setting, mainly due to the number of decisions and
decision-makers: I capture five decisions made by the three decision-makers. Future
analysis may extend the study to a multi-period setting and analyze the model with
reasonable simplifications, numerical analysis, or heuristics. Another direction to extend
the third essay is to include more government interventions into consideration.
The three essays also share some common assumptions that may be relaxed in
future studies. For example, in all three essays, I assume all parameters are known to all
parties. However, it is possible that one or more parties possess private information
regarding some parameters. Future research can incorporate information asymmetry to
analyze the impact of this change on the model results. Second, drug prices are
considered as exogenous parameters in all three essays. This is mainly because drug
prices are highly regulated in many countries and jurisdictions and cannot be easily
influenced by any party. One possible extension is to model drug price as a decision for
one party or as a result of a negotiating process among multiple parties depending on the
situation.
In addition, it will be insightful to conduct case studies to estimate the parameters
using real-world data and verify the results of the analytical models. This is very
challenging for the first essay due to the confidential nature of the details of many drug
reimbursement schemes. For the second and third essays, as more information becomes
available in the future, one can estimate the model parameters for specific drugs and
verify the model results.
Finally, it will be useful to conduct interviews with policymakers, health care
practitioners, and other key stakeholders to verify the model setting and understand the
key trade-offs in reality – what makes it difficult to make the decision (i.e., choose the
right risk-sharing agreement, and choose the right strategy to mitigate drug shortages).
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The model frameworks in this dissertation can be revised based on the feedback from the
key stakeholders to capture additional factors and their interrelationship, as well as
additional decision makers and their decisions. The results should also be communicated
with the stakeholders to validate the findings of analytical models and help inform the
decision-making in reality.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Essay 1
Derivation of the optimal solutions
With the assumption of uniform distribution, the total sales and total health benefit are
given by 𝑞 = 1 − (𝑦 − 𝑚 + 𝜖) and 𝑏 =

1−(𝑦−𝑚+𝜖)2
2

.

As uniform distribution has boundaries, there are two cases:
_

(1): 𝑦 − 𝑚 − 𝜖 > 0, i.e., the lowest value for the actual treatment eligibility is positive.
_

(2): 𝑦 − 𝑚 − 𝜖 ≤ 0, i.e., the lowest value for the actual treatment eligibility is zero
(actual treatment eligibilities with 𝑦 − 𝑚 + 𝜖 < 0 are out of the defined boundary for 𝜖
and therefore the values for them are zeros).
_

_

Case 1. (𝒚 − 𝒎 − 𝝐 > 𝟎, i.e., 𝒎 < 𝒚 − 𝝐):
The expected totals sales and the expected total health benefit are 𝑄 = 1 + 𝑚 − 𝑦 and
_

1

𝐵 = 6 (3 − 𝜖 2 − 3(𝑦 − 𝑚)2 ).
1 - a. PVA:
With the assumption 𝑥 = 𝑄, the rebate occurs when 𝑝(𝑞 − 𝑥) = −𝑝𝜖 > 0, i.e., when 𝜖 <
0

0.Thus, 𝑆 𝑃𝑉𝐴 = ∫−𝜖_ 𝑝(𝑞 − 𝑥)𝑔(𝜖) ⅆ𝜖 =
𝑃𝑉𝐴
𝑑 2 𝜋𝑀

(

𝑑𝑚2

_

𝑝𝜖
4

. The manufacturer’s payoff is concave

𝑃𝑉𝐴
= −2𝑘 < 0). The first derivative of 𝜋𝑀
with respect to 𝑚 is

2𝑘𝑚 + 𝑐𝑀 .The first order necessary condition for 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ is

𝑃𝑉𝐴
𝑑𝜋𝑀

𝑑𝑚

𝑃𝑉𝐴
𝑑𝜋𝑀

𝑑𝑚

=𝑝−

= 0. With the

condition for case i, the optimal marketing effort is shown in Table A. 1. The two
parties’ optimal payoffs are calculated by plugging in 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ and shown in Table A. 1.
1 - b. CER:
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The rebate occurs when (𝑝 + 𝑐𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃𝐶𝐸𝑅 )𝑞 − 𝜆𝑏 > 0, i.e., when 𝜖 ≤ 𝜖 𝐶𝐸𝑅 =
𝐶𝐸𝑅
2(𝑝+𝑐𝑃 +𝑎𝑃
)

𝜆

− 1 + 𝑚 − 𝑦. We compare 𝜖 𝐶𝐸𝑅 with the boundaries of 𝜖 and obtain three

cases:
_

_

_

_

(a) 𝜖 𝐶𝐸𝑅 < −𝜖 ; (b) −𝜖 ≤ 𝜖 𝐶𝐸𝑅 ≤ 𝜖 ; (c) 𝜖 𝐶𝐸𝑅 > 𝜖 .
_

1 - b - i. 𝝐𝑪𝑬𝑹 < −𝝐
_

The condition for this case is 𝑚 < 1 − 𝜖 + 𝑦 +

𝐶𝐸𝑅
2(𝑝+𝑐𝑃 +𝑎𝑃
)

𝜆

. The rebate never occurs and

thus 𝑆 𝐶𝐸𝑅 = 0. The optimal values are solved with the same manner and shown in Table
A.2.
_

_

1 - b - ii. −𝝐 ≤ 𝝐𝑪𝑬𝑹 ≤ 𝝐
_

The condition for this case is 1 − 𝜖 + 𝑦 +

𝐶𝐸𝑅
2(𝑝+𝑐𝑃 +𝑎𝑃
)

𝜆

_

< 𝑚 < 1+𝜖+𝑦−

𝐶𝐸𝑅
2(𝑝+𝑐𝑃 +𝑎𝑃
)

𝜆

.

𝜖 𝐶𝐸𝑅

The expected rebate is 𝑆

𝐶𝐸𝑅

((𝑝 + 𝑐𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃𝐶𝐸𝑅 )𝑞 − 𝜆𝑏)𝑔(𝜖) ⅆ𝜖 =

=∫_

−𝜖

_

_

𝐶𝐸𝑅
𝐶𝐸𝑅
)−(1−𝑚−𝜖 +𝑦)𝜆)2 ((2+𝑚+𝜖 −𝑦)𝜆−(𝑝+𝑐𝑃 +𝑎𝑃
(2(𝑝+𝑐𝑃 +𝑎𝑃
))
_

12𝜖 𝜆2

. The optimal values are solved with

the same manner and shown in Table A.2.
_

1 - b - iii. 𝝐𝑪𝑬𝑹 > 𝝐
_

The condition for this case is 𝑚 > 1 + 𝜖 + 𝑦 −

𝐶𝐸𝑅
2(𝑝+𝑐𝑃 +𝑎𝑃
)

𝜆

. The rebate is 𝑆 𝐶𝐸𝑅 =

_

𝜖

1

_

∫ _ ((𝑝 + 𝑐𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃𝐶𝐸𝑅 )𝑞 − 𝜆𝑏)𝑔(𝜖) 𝑑𝜖 = (𝑝 + 𝑐𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃𝐶𝐸𝑅 )(1 + 𝑚 − 𝑦) − 6 (3 − 𝜖 2 −
−𝜖

3(𝑦 − 𝑚)2 )𝜆. The optimal values are solved with the same manner and shown in Table
A.2.
_

_

Case 2 (𝒚 − 𝒎 − 𝝐 ≤ 𝟎, i.e., 𝒎 ≥ 𝒚 − 𝝐):
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The expected totals sales and the expected total health benefit are given by 𝑄 = 1 −
_

(𝑦+𝜖 −𝑚)2
_

4𝜖

1

and 𝐵 = 2 −

_

(𝑦+𝜖 −𝑚)3
_

12𝜖

1

when 𝑦 − 𝑚 + 𝜖 > 0, 𝑄 = 1 and 𝐵 = 2 when 𝑦 − 𝑚 +

𝜖 ≤ 0.
2 - a. PVA:
_

The expected rebate is

_

𝒑(𝒎+𝝐−𝒚)(𝒚−𝒎+𝝐)𝟐
_

𝟖𝝐𝟐

_

when 𝒚 − 𝒎 + 𝝐 ≤ 𝟎, and

𝒑(𝒚+𝝐−𝒎)𝟒
_

𝟔𝟒 𝝐𝟑

when 𝒚 −

𝒎 + 𝝐 > 𝟎, and the total expected rebate is the sum of the two quantities. The optimal
values are solved with the same manner and shown in Table A. 1.

2 - b. CER:
With similar procedure in other cases, we solve the optimal values and conditions for this
case which are shown in Table A. 2.
Table A. 1: Optimal solutions for a PVA
Optimal solutions
_ 1
(𝑝 − 𝑐𝑀 )}
2𝑘

𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴1∗ a

min {𝑦 − 𝜖 ,
_

𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴2∗

min{𝑦 + 𝜖 ,
_
_
_
_
_
max{0, 𝑦 − 𝜖 , (−4 32⁄3 𝑐𝑀 𝑝𝜖 2 + 2 32⁄3𝑝2 𝜖 2 + 1632⁄3 𝑘𝑝𝜖 3 − 3𝑝𝜖 (𝜙 𝑃𝑉𝐴 )1⁄3 + 3𝑝𝑦(𝜙 𝑃𝑉𝐴 )1⁄3 − 2 31⁄3 (𝜙 𝑃𝑉𝐴 )2⁄3 )⁄(3𝑝(𝜙 𝑃𝑉𝐴 )1⁄3 )}}

𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑉𝐴1∗

_
1
𝑝𝜖
(3 − 𝜖 2 − 3 (𝑦 − 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗)2 )𝜆 − (𝑝 + 𝑎𝑃 𝑃𝑉𝐴 + 𝑐𝑃 )(1 − 𝑦 + 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗) +
6
4

𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑉𝐴2∗

1 (𝑦 − 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ + 𝜖 )3
(𝑦 − 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ + 𝜖 )2
𝑝(𝑦 − 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ − 3𝜖 )2 (𝑦 − 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ + 𝜖 )2
_
_
_
( −
)𝜆 − (𝑝 + 𝑎𝑃 𝑃𝑉𝐴 + 𝑐𝑃 )(1 −
)+
2
12𝜖
4𝜖
64𝜖 3

_

_

_

_

_

_

𝑃𝑉𝐴1∗
𝜋𝑀

(𝑝 − 𝑐𝑀 )(1 − 𝑦 + 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ ) − 𝑘(𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ )2 −
_

𝑝𝜖
4
_

_

(𝑦 − 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ + 𝜖 )2
𝑝(𝑦 − 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ − 3𝜖 )2 (𝑦 − 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ + 𝜖 )2
_
_
) − 𝑘(𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ )2 −
4𝜖 _
64𝜖 3
_
a
The optimal values with a superscript 1 is for case 1 (when 𝑚 ≤ 𝑦 − 𝜖 ); the optimal values with a superscript 2 is for case 2 (when 𝑚 > 𝑦 − 𝜖 ).
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
1
b
𝜙 𝑃𝑉𝐴 = 9𝑐𝑀 𝑝2𝜖 3 − 9𝑝3𝜖 3 − 18𝑘𝑝2 𝜖 4 + 18𝑘𝑝2𝜖 3 𝑦 + √4(−24𝑐𝑀 𝑝𝜖 2 + 12𝑝2𝜖 2 + 96𝑘𝑝𝜖 3)3 + (432𝑐𝑀 𝑝2𝜖 3 − 432𝑝3𝜖 3 − 864𝑘𝑝2𝜖 4 + 864𝑘𝑝2𝜖 3𝑦)2
𝑃𝑉𝐴2∗
𝜋𝑀

(𝑝 − 𝑐𝑀 )(1 −

48

Table A. 2: Optimal solution for a CEA
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Appendix B: Essay 2
Proof of Lemma 3.1:
The profit of the centralized system in stage 2 is given by:
𝜋𝐶 |𝐿𝐶 = 𝑟 min{𝐷, 𝐿𝐶 + 𝑞𝐸 } − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑐𝐸 𝑞𝐸 − ℎ𝐶 (𝐿𝐶 + 𝑞𝐸 − 𝐷)+
− 𝑠𝐻 (𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶 − 𝑞𝐸 )+
There are two cases: 𝐷 ≤ 𝐿𝐶 + 𝑞𝐸 , and 𝐷 > 𝐿𝐶 + 𝑞𝐸 .
- If 𝐷 ≤ 𝐿𝐶 + 𝑞𝐸 , i.e., 𝑞𝐸 ≥ 𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶 :
𝜋𝐶 |𝐿𝐶 = −(𝑐𝐸 + ℎ𝐶 )𝑞𝐸 + (𝑟 + ℎ𝐶 )𝐷 − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅 − ℎ𝐶 𝐿𝐶
Since the slope of 𝑞𝐸 is −(𝑐𝐸 + ℎ𝐶 ) < 0, 𝜋𝐶 is decreasing in 𝑞𝐸 , and thus 𝑞𝐸 =
(𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶 )+

- If 𝐷 > 𝐿𝐶 + 𝑞𝐸 , i.e., 𝑞𝐸 ≤ 𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶 :
𝜋𝐶 |𝐿𝐶 = (𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 − 𝑐𝐸 )𝑞𝐸 + (𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 )𝐿𝐶 − 𝑠𝐻 𝐷 − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅
The slope of 𝑞𝐸 is 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 − 𝑐𝐸 .
•

If 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 , then the slope of 𝑞𝐸 is positive, and 𝜋𝐶 is increasing in 𝑞𝐸 . Thus 𝑞𝐸 =
(𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶 )+ .

•

If 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 , then the slope of 𝑞𝐸 is negative and 𝜋𝐶 is decreasing in 𝑞𝐸 . Thus 𝑞𝐸 =
0.∎

Proof of Proposition 3.1:
Depending on the value of 𝑞̃𝐸𝐶 , there are two cases: 1. 𝑞̃𝐸𝐶 = 0, if 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 ; 2. 𝑞̃𝐸𝐶 =
(𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶 )+ , if 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 . We solve each case as follows.
1. 𝑞̃𝐸𝐶 = 0, if 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻
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𝜋𝐶 = 𝑟 min{𝐷, 𝑧𝐶 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑢 𝑘𝑀 } − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅 − ℎ𝐶 (𝑧𝐶 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑢 𝑘𝑀 − 𝐷)+
− 𝑠𝐻 (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶 − 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑢 𝑘𝑀 )+
= 𝑟𝐷 − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅 − ℎ𝐶 (𝑧𝐶 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑢 𝑘𝑀 − 𝐷)+ − (𝑟
+ 𝑠𝐻 )(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶 − 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑢 𝑘𝑀 )+
We find the limit of 𝑢 and calculate the expected profit as follows
𝑏

𝛱𝐶 = 𝑟𝐷 − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅 − ℎ𝐶 ∫

𝐷−𝑞𝑅 −𝑧𝐶
𝑥𝑀

− (𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 ) ∫

𝐷−𝑞𝑅 −𝑧𝐶
𝑥𝑀

(𝑧𝐶 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑢 𝑘𝑀 − 𝐷) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢

(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶 − 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑢 𝑘𝑀 ) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢

𝑎

The second order condition (SOC)

𝜕 2 𝛱𝐶 𝜕 2 𝛱𝐶
2 𝜕𝑥 2
𝜕𝑞𝑅
𝑀

𝜕 2 𝛱𝐶

− (𝜕𝑞

𝑅 𝜕𝑥𝑀

2

) = 0, which is non-conclusive.

Therefore, we solve the interior solution and boundary solutions as candidates, and
compare the profit with the candidate solutions to obtain the optimal solutions.
𝜕𝛱

𝜕𝛱

By solving 𝜕𝑞 𝐶 = 0 and 𝜕𝑥 𝐶 = 0 simultaneously, we obtain the interior solutions: 𝑞𝑅 =
𝑅

𝑀

𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶 and 𝑥𝑀 = 0 (which is also a boundary solution at 𝑥𝑀 = 0);
Another boundary solution is 𝑞𝑅 = 0, 𝑥𝑀 =

√ℎ𝐶 +𝑟+𝑠𝐻 (𝐷−𝑧𝐶 )
√−2𝑎𝑐𝑀 +𝑏(2𝑐𝑀 +𝑏ℎ𝐶 )+𝑎2 (𝑟+𝑠𝐻 )

= 𝑥̂𝑀

We then compare the profit with the two candidate solutions: 𝛱𝐶 (𝑞𝑅 = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝑐 , 𝑥𝑀 =
0) ≤ 𝛱𝐶 (𝑞𝑅 = 0, 𝑥𝑀 = 𝑥̂𝑀 ) iff. 𝑐𝑅 <
√ℎ𝐶 +𝑟+𝑠𝐻 √−2𝑎𝑐𝑀 +𝑏(2𝑐𝑀 +𝑏ℎ𝐶 )+𝑎2 (𝑟+𝑠𝐻 )−𝑏ℎ𝐶 −𝑎(𝑟+𝑠𝐻 )

(

𝑏−𝑎

+

) .

2. 𝑞̃𝐸𝐶 = (𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶 )+ , if 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 .
𝜋𝐶 = 𝑟 min{𝐷, 𝐿𝐶 + (𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶 )+ } − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑐𝐸 (𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶 )+
− ℎ𝐶 (𝐿𝐶 + (𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶 )+ − 𝐷)+ − 𝑠𝐻 (𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶 − (𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶 )+ )+
= 𝑟𝐷 − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅 − ℎ𝐶 (𝑧𝐶 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑢 𝑘𝑀 − 𝐷)+
− 𝑐𝐸 (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶 − 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑢 𝑘𝑀 )+
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After the transformation of 𝜋𝐶 , it is easy to verify that we can obtain 𝜋𝐶 in this case from
𝜋𝐶 in case 1 by replacing 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 (the coefficient of the last term) with 𝑐𝐸 . Thus the
optimal solutions could be obtained from case 1 by replacing 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 with 𝑐𝐸 :
𝛱𝐶 (𝑞𝑅 = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝑐 , 𝑥𝑀 = 0) ≤ 𝛱𝐶 (𝑞𝑅 = 0, 𝑥𝑀 =
√ℎ𝐶 +𝑐𝐸 √−2𝑎𝑐𝑀 +𝑏(2𝑐𝑀 +𝑏ℎ𝐶 )+𝑎2 𝑐𝐸 −𝑏ℎ𝐶 −𝑎𝑐𝐸

(

𝑏−𝑎

√ℎ𝐶 +𝑟+𝑠𝐶 (𝐷−𝑧𝐶 )

) iff 𝑐𝑅 <

√−2𝑎𝑐𝑀 +𝑏(2𝑐𝑀 +𝑏ℎ𝐶 )+𝑎2 (𝑟+𝑠𝐶 )

+

) .∎

Proof of Lemma 3.2: Lemma 3.2 can be proved using the same procedure with Lemma
3.1. ∎
Proof of Lemma 3.4 (the proof of Lemma 3.3 is a subcase in Lemma 3.4):
̃𝑴 :
Proof for 𝒙
- If 𝑞𝑀 ≤ 𝑧𝑀 , the manufacturer’s expected profit is strictly decreasing in 𝑥𝑀 , thus 𝑥𝑀 =
0.
- If 𝑞𝑀 > 𝑧𝑀 :
1. If 𝑞𝑀 < 𝑏𝑥𝑀 + 𝑧𝑀 (i.e.,

𝛱𝑀 |𝑧𝑀 = 𝑤 (∫

𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀
𝑘𝑀

𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀
𝑥𝑀

< 𝑏), then

𝑏

(𝑢 𝑥𝑀 + 𝑧𝑀 ) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 + ∫

𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀
𝑥𝑀

𝑎

𝑞𝑀 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢) − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀

𝑏

− ℎ𝑀 ∫

𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀
𝑥𝑀

− 𝑠𝑀 ∫

𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀
𝑥𝑀

(𝑧𝑀 + 𝑢 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑞𝑀 )𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢

(𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀 − 𝑢 𝑥𝑀 ) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢

𝑎

Since

𝑑 2 𝛱𝑀
2
𝑑𝑥𝑀

=−

(𝑤+ℎ𝑀 +𝑠𝑀 )(𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀 )2

order condition (FOC)

3
(𝑏−𝑎)𝑥𝑀

𝑑𝛱𝑀
𝑑𝑥𝑀

=

< 0, 𝛱𝑀 is concave in 𝑥𝑀 .We solve the first

(𝑤+ℎ𝑀 +𝑠𝑀 )(𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀 )2
2
2(𝑏−𝑎)𝑥𝑀

− 𝑐𝑀 −

2𝑏 2 ℎ𝑀 +𝑎2 (𝑠𝑀 +𝑤)

∗
∗
obtain 𝑥𝑀
= 𝐴𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀 ). We substitute 𝑥𝑀
in the condition

2(𝑏−𝑎)
𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀
𝑘𝑀

= 0 to

< 𝑏 to
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1

obtain 𝐴 < 𝑏, which is equivalent to (𝑎 + 𝑏)(𝑠𝑀 + 𝑤) − 2𝑐𝑀 > 0.
𝑀

2. If 𝑞𝑀 ≥ 𝑏𝑥𝑀 + 𝑧𝑀 (i.e.,

𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀
𝑥𝑀

≥ 𝑏), then

𝛱𝑀 |𝑧𝑀 = 𝑤(𝐸[𝑢]𝑥𝑀 + 𝑧𝑀 ) − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑠𝑀 ((𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀 − 𝐸[𝑢]𝑥𝑀 ))
=
•

1
1
𝑥𝑀 ((𝑎 + 𝑏)(𝑠𝑀 + 𝑤) − 2𝑐𝑀 ) + (−2𝑞𝑀 𝑠𝑀 + 2(𝑠𝑀 + 𝑤)𝑧𝑀 )
2
2

If (𝑎 + 𝑏)(𝑠𝑀 + 𝑤) − 2𝑐𝑀 > 0, then 𝑥𝑀 =

𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀
.
𝑏

However, 𝛱𝑀 (𝑥𝑀 =

𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀
)
𝑏

≤

𝛱𝑀 (𝑥𝑀 = 𝐴𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀 ). ), therefore this solution is not optimal.
•

If (𝑎 + 𝑏)(𝑠𝑀 + 𝑤) − 2𝑐𝑀 < 0, 𝛱𝑀 is decreasing in 𝑥𝑀 , thus 𝑥𝑀 = 0, this is also the
proof for Lemma 3.2 and Assumption 3.1. ∎

Proof of Lemma 3.5:
(𝑤 + ℎ𝑀 + 𝑠𝑀 ) − (2(𝑏 − 𝑎)𝑐𝑀 + 𝑠𝑀 𝑎2 + 𝑤𝑎2 + ℎ𝑀 𝑏2 ) = (1 − 𝑏 2 )(𝑤 + ℎ𝑀 + 𝑠𝑀 ) +
(𝑏 − 𝑎)((𝑏 + 𝑎)(𝑠𝑀 + 𝑤) − 2𝑐𝑀 ) > 0 under the assumption that (𝑎 + 𝑏)(𝑠𝑀 + 𝑤) − 2𝑐𝑀 > 0,
thus, 𝐴𝑀 =

√𝑤+ℎ𝑀 +𝑠𝑀
√2(𝑏−𝑎)𝑐𝑀 + 𝑠𝑀 𝑎 2 +𝑤𝑎 2 + ℎ𝑀 𝑏2

> 1. ∎

Proof of Proposition 3.2:
We skip the proof for Proposition 2.A and B, which are straightforward. We show the proof of
Proposition 2.C. Depending on the best response function in step 3 and step 2, there are 4 cases as
follows:

𝑥̃𝑀 = 0 if 𝑞𝑀 ≤ 𝑧𝑀
𝑥̃𝑀 = 𝐴(𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀 )
if 𝑞𝑀 > 𝑧𝑀

̃𝑬 = 𝟎 if 𝒄𝑬 ≥ 𝒓 + 𝒔𝑯
𝒒
Case 1
Case 3

̃𝑬 = (𝑫 − 𝑳)+ if 𝒄𝑬 < 𝒓 + 𝒔𝑯
𝒒
Case 2
Case 4

The superscript is the index for the case number in the following proof.
Case 1. 𝑞̃𝐸 = 0 and 𝑥̃𝑀 = 0 if 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 and 𝑞𝑀 ≤ 𝑧𝑀 . The hospital’s random profit is as
follows.
1
𝜋𝐻
= 𝑟 min{𝐷, 𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 } − 𝑤𝑞𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅 − ℎ𝐻 (𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 − 𝐷)+

− 𝑠𝐻 (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 − 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑞𝑀 )+
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There are two subcases:1.1. 𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 ≤ 𝐷; 1.2. 𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 ≥ 𝐷.
1.1.𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 ≤ 𝐷, or 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 ≤ 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻
11
𝜋𝐻
= 𝑟(𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 ) − 𝑤𝑞𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑠𝐻 (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 − 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑞𝑀 )

= 𝑞𝑅 (𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 − 𝑐𝑅 ) + 𝑞𝑀 (𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 − 𝑤) + (𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 )𝑧𝐻 − 𝑠𝐻 𝐷
11
𝜋𝐻
is increasing in both 𝑞𝑅 and 𝑞𝑀 based on the assumption that 𝑐𝑅 , 𝑤 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 . We

compare the slope of 𝑞𝑅 and 𝑞𝑀 , and obtain the optimal solutions as follows:
𝑞𝑅 = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 and 𝑞𝑀 = 0 if 𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑤; 𝑞𝑅 = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 − 𝑧𝑀 and 𝑞𝑀 = 𝑧𝑀
if 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑤.
1.2.𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 ≥ 𝐷, or 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 ≥ 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻
12
𝜋𝐻
= 𝑟𝐷 − 𝑤𝑞𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅 − ℎ𝐻 (𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 − 𝐷)

= 𝑞𝑅 (−𝑐𝑅 − ℎ𝐻 ) + 𝑞𝑀 (−𝑤 − ℎ𝐻 ) + 𝑟𝐷 + ℎ𝐻 (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 )
𝜋𝐻 is decreasing in both 𝑞𝑅 and 𝑞𝑀 , and by comparing the slope, we know that the
optimal solutions for this case are the same as those in case 1.1.
Case 2. 𝑞̃𝐸 = (𝐷 − 𝐿)+ and 𝑥̃𝑀 = 0 if 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 and 𝑞𝑀 ≤ 𝑧𝑀 .
Following similar steps, this subcase has the same optimal solution with case 1.
Case 3. 𝑞̃𝐸 = 0 and 𝑥̃𝑀 = 𝐴𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀 ) if 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 and 𝑞𝑀 > 𝑧𝑀 . We substitute 𝑥̃𝑀
to obtain 𝑦 = min{𝑞𝑀 , 𝑢𝐴𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀 ) + 𝑧𝑀 }. We then generate 𝜋𝐻 as follows
𝜋𝐻3 = 𝑟 min{𝐷, 𝑄1 , 𝑄2 } − 𝑤𝑦 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑠𝐻 max{0, 𝐷 − 𝑄1 , 𝐷 − 𝑄2 }
− ℎ𝐻 (min{𝑄1 − 𝐷, 𝑄2 − 𝐷})+
= 𝑟𝐷 − 𝑤𝑦 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅 − (𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 ) max{0, 𝐷 − 𝑄1 , 𝐷 − 𝑄2 }
− ℎ𝐻 (min{𝑄1 − 𝐷, 𝑄2 − 𝐷})+
Where 𝑄1 = 𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 and 𝑄2 = 𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑧𝑀 + 𝑢𝐴𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀 ).
There are two subcases: 3.1. 𝑄1 ≥ 𝐷; 3.2. 𝑄1 < 𝐷 .
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3.1. 𝑄1 ≥ 𝐷, i.e., 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 ≥ 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻
𝜋𝐻 = 𝑟𝐷 − 𝑤𝑦 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅 − (𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 ) max{0, 𝐷 − 𝑄2 } − ℎ𝐻 (min{𝑄1 − 𝐷, 𝑄2 − 𝐷})+
We find the limit for 𝑢 and calculate the expected profit as follows.

𝛱𝐻31

= 𝑟 𝐷 − 𝑤 (∫

1
𝐴𝑀

𝑏

(𝑢𝐴𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀 ) + 𝑧𝑀 ) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 + ∫ 𝑞𝑀 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢) − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅

𝑎

𝐴𝑀

− (𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 ) ∫

𝐷−𝑞𝑅 −𝑧𝐻 −𝑧𝑀
𝐴𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀 )

(𝐷 − 𝑄2 ) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢

𝑎

− ℎ𝐻 ((∫

1
𝐴𝑀

𝑏

𝐷−𝑞𝑅 −𝑧𝐻 −𝑧𝑀
𝐴(𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀 )

(𝑄2 − 𝐷) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 + ∫ (𝑄1 − 𝐷) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢))
1
𝐴𝑀

1

Where 𝑓(𝑢) = 𝑏−𝑎 under the assumption that 𝑢~𝑈(𝑎, 𝑏). For the limit of 𝑢 in the above
profit function: it could be easily verified that

𝐷−𝑞𝑅 −𝑧𝐻 −𝑧𝑀
𝐴𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀 )

1

≤ 𝐴 ; we solve for optimal
𝑀

𝑞𝑅 and 𝑞𝑀 , and verify that

𝐷−𝑞𝑅 −𝑧𝐻 −𝑧𝑀
𝐴𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀 )

≥ 𝑎 under the optimal values for 𝑞𝑅 and 𝑞𝑀 ; we

also solve for the case that

𝐷−𝑞𝑅 −𝑧𝐻 −𝑧𝑀
𝐴𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀 )

≤ 𝑎, and verify that this case is not optimal.

Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, SOC = 0 which is non-conclusive. Thus, we solve
for the interior solution and boundary solutions as candidates, and compare the profit to
obtain the optimal solutions.
Solve

32
𝜕𝛱𝐻

𝜕𝑞𝑅

= 0 and

32
𝜕𝛱𝐻

𝜕𝑞𝑀

= 0 simultaneously, we obtain interior solution: 𝑞𝑅 = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 −

𝑧𝑀 and 𝑥𝑀 = 𝑧𝑀 . This solution is not feasible, since 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀 is showing in the
denominator in the limit for u in 𝛱𝐻 . However, we could use the profit function in Case 1
𝛱𝐻1 , which applies to the solution 𝑞𝑀 = 𝑧𝑀 , to generate the profit for this interior
solution, and compare it with other boundary solution.
The only other boundary solution is when 𝑞𝑅 = 0: 𝛱𝐻31 is concave in 𝑞𝑀 and solving
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32
𝜕𝛱𝐻
(𝑞𝑅 =0)

𝜕𝑞𝑀

= 0 gives 𝑞𝑀 = 𝑧𝑀 +

√(𝑟+𝑠𝐻 +ℎ𝐻 )(𝐷−𝑧𝐻 −𝑧𝑀 )

. We compare 𝛱𝐻31 under

√𝐴𝑀 2 𝑎2 (𝑟+𝑠𝐻 −𝑤)+(2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻 +𝑤)

the two candidate solutions and obtain the optimal solution as follows.
𝑞𝑅 = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 − 𝑧𝑀 , 𝑞𝑀 = 𝑧𝑀 , if 𝑐𝑅 = 𝑐𝑅32 ≤
√(ℎ𝐻 +𝑟+𝑠𝐻 )((2𝐴𝑀 𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻 +𝑤)+𝑎2 𝐴𝑀 2 (𝑟+𝑠𝐻 −𝑤)−𝐴𝑀 (𝑏ℎ𝐻 +𝑎(𝑟+𝑠𝐻 ))

; 𝑞𝑅 = 0, 𝑞𝑀 = max {𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 , 𝑧𝑀 +

𝐴𝑀 (𝑏−𝑎)
√(𝑟+𝑠𝐻 +ℎ𝐻 )(𝐷−𝑧𝐻 −𝑧𝑀 )

} otherwise.

√𝐴𝑀 2 𝑎2 (𝑟+𝑠𝐻 −𝑤)+(2𝐴𝑀 𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻 +𝑤)

We also solve the optimal solution in case 3.2, and verify that 𝛱𝐻31∗ ≥ 𝛱𝐻32∗, i.e., case 3.2
is never optimal, since it is dominated by case 3.1.
Case 4. 𝑞̃𝐸 = (𝐷 − 𝐿)+ and 𝑥̃𝑀 = 𝐴𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀 ) if 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 and 𝑞𝑀 > 𝑧𝑀 . After
substituting 𝑞̃𝐸 and 𝑥̃𝑀 , and some manipulation of the min and max functions, we have
𝜋𝐻4 = 𝑟𝐷 − 𝑤𝑦 − 𝑐𝑅 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑐𝐸 max{0, 𝐷 − 𝑄1 , 𝐷 − 𝑄2 }
− ℎ𝐻 (min{𝑄1 − 𝐷, 𝑄2 − 𝐷})+
𝜋𝐻4 could be obtained by replacing 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 in 𝜋𝐻3 with 𝑐𝐸 . Therefore, the optimal solution
in case 4 could be obtained by replacing 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 in the optimal solution in case 3 with
𝑐𝐸 . ∎
Proof of Proposition 3.3.a:
-

If 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 :
𝜕𝑐̅𝑅
𝜕𝑠𝐻

𝜕𝑐̅𝑅
𝜕𝑟

𝜕𝑐̅𝑅
𝜕𝑐𝐸

-

=

=

(𝑎𝐴𝐻 √ℎ𝐻 +𝑟+𝑠𝐻 −√(ℎ𝐻 +𝑟+𝑠𝐻 )((2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻 +𝑤)+𝑎2 𝐴2 (𝑟+𝑠𝐻 −𝑤))2
2𝐴𝐻 (𝑏−𝑎)√ℎ𝐻 +𝑟+𝑠𝐻 √(ℎ𝐻 +𝑟+𝑠𝐻 )((2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻 +𝑤)+𝑎2 𝐴2 (𝑟+𝑠𝐻 −𝑤)
(𝑎𝐴𝐻 √ℎ𝐻 +𝑟+𝑠𝐻 −√(ℎ𝐻 +𝑟+𝑠𝐻 )((2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻 +𝑤)+𝑎2 𝐴2 (𝑟+𝑠𝐻 −𝑤))2
2𝐴𝐻 (𝑏−𝑎)√ℎ𝐻 +𝑟+𝑠𝐻 √(ℎ𝐻 +𝑟+𝑠𝐻 )((2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻 +𝑤)+𝑎2 𝐴2 (𝑟+𝑠𝐻 −𝑤)

=0

If 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 :

≥ 0;

≥ 0;

133

𝜕𝑐̅𝑅
𝜕𝑠𝐻

𝜕𝑐̅

𝜕𝑐̅

= 0; 𝜕𝑟𝑅 = 0;𝜕𝑐𝑅 =
𝐸

(𝑎𝐴𝐻 √ℎ𝐻 +𝑐𝐸 −√(ℎ𝐻 +𝑐𝐸 )((2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻 +𝑤)+𝑎2 𝐴2 (𝑐𝐸 −𝑤))2
2𝐴𝐻 (𝑏−𝑎)√ℎ𝐻 +𝑐𝐸 √(ℎ𝐻 +𝑐𝐸 )((2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻 +𝑤)+𝑎2 𝐴2 (𝑐𝐸 −𝑤)

> 0. ∎

Proof of Lemma 3.6:
By substituting the optimal solutions in 𝛱𝐻∗ , we verify that 𝑠𝐻 is not showing in 𝛱𝐻∗ in
regions A,B and D in Figure 3.3, indicating that there is no shortage in those regions. In
region C, the expected shortage amount could be obtained by computing the integral of
𝐷−𝑞𝑅 −𝑧𝐻 −𝑧𝑀
𝐴𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 −𝑧𝑀 )

the 𝑠𝐻 term:∫𝑎

(𝐷 − 𝑄2 ) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 =

(𝑞𝑅 +𝑧𝐻 +𝑧𝑀 −𝐷+𝑎𝐴(𝑞̂𝑀 −𝑧𝑀 ))2
2𝐴𝑀 (𝑏−𝑎)(𝑞̂𝑀 −𝑧𝑀 )

.∎
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Appendix C: Essay 3
All proofs are based on the assumption that 𝑢𝑀 ~𝑈(0,1), i.e., 𝑓(𝑢𝑀 ) = 1.
Proof of Lemma 4.1:
-

If 𝑥𝑀 ≤ 𝑞𝑀 :

𝑞𝑀
> 1 → 𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀 < 𝑞𝑀 → min{𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀 , 𝑞𝑀 } = 𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀
𝑥𝑀
1

𝑌𝑀𝐵

= ∫ 𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀 𝑓(𝑢𝑀 )ⅆ𝑢𝑀 = 𝑥𝑀 𝐸[𝑢𝑀 ] =
0

𝑥𝑀
2

𝑤𝑀
− 𝑐𝑀 ) 𝑥𝑀
2

𝐵
𝛱𝑀
= 𝑤𝑀 𝑌𝑀𝐵 − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀 = (
𝐵
𝛱𝑀
is linear in 𝑥𝑀 , and the slope of 𝑥𝑀 is

a. If

𝑤𝑀
2

𝑤𝑀
2

− 𝑐𝑀 .

𝐵
− 𝑐𝑀 < 0, i.e., 𝑤𝑀 < 𝑐𝑀 : 𝛱𝑀
is decreasing in 𝑥𝑀 , and 𝑥𝑀 = 0 ∀ 𝑞𝑀 , the

manufacturer does not produce anything regardless of 𝑞𝑀 . Therefore, we assume 𝑤𝑀 >
2𝑐𝑀 for the rest of the analysis.
b. If
-

𝑤𝑀
2

𝐵
− 𝑐𝑀 < 0, 𝑖.e., 𝑤𝑀 < 𝑐𝑀 : 𝛱𝑀
is increasing in 𝑥𝑀 → 𝑥𝑀 = 𝑞𝑀 .

If 𝑥𝑀 > 𝑞𝑀 :

𝑌𝑀𝐵 = ∫

𝑞𝑀
𝑥𝑀

0

𝑞𝑀

1

2 𝑥𝑀
𝑢𝑀
𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀 𝑓(𝑢𝑀 )ⅆ𝑢𝑀 + ∫ 𝑞𝑀 𝑓(𝑢𝑀 )ⅆ𝑢𝑀 = 𝑥𝑀 [ ] + 𝑞𝑀 [𝑢𝑀 ]1𝑞𝑀
𝑞𝑀
2 0
𝑥𝑀
𝑥𝑀

= 𝑞𝑀 −
𝐵
𝛱𝑀

=

2
𝑞𝑀
2𝑥𝑀

𝑤𝑀 𝑌𝑀𝐵

2
𝑞𝑀
− 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀 = 𝑤𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 −
) − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀
2𝑥𝑀

𝐵
The second order condition (SOC) of 𝛱𝑀
is

𝐵
𝑑 2 𝛱𝑀

𝑑

2
𝑥𝑀

𝑑𝛱 𝐵

𝐵
Solve the first order condition (FOC) of 𝛱𝑀
, 𝑑 𝑥𝑀 =
𝑀

𝑞2

𝐵
= −𝑤𝑀 𝑥𝑀
3 < 0: 𝛱𝑀 is concave in 𝑥𝑀 .
𝑀

𝑤𝑀 𝑞𝑀 2
( )
2 𝑥𝑀

𝐵 (𝑞 )
− 𝑐𝑀 = 0 → 𝑥̃𝑀
𝑀 =

𝑤

𝛼𝑞𝑀 , where 𝛼 = √2𝑐𝑀 ∎
𝑀

Proof of Proposition 3.1:
It could be proved that 𝑞𝑀 < 𝑑 is not optimal. Therefore, the following proof is based on
𝑞𝑀 > 𝑑.
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𝐵
𝑦𝑊
= min{𝑑, min {𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀 , 𝑞𝑀 } = min{𝑑, 𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀 }

𝑌𝑊𝐵

=∫

𝑑
𝑥𝑀

1

𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀 𝑓(𝑢𝑀 )ⅆ𝑢𝑀 + ∫ 𝑑𝑓(𝑢𝑀 )ⅆ𝑢𝑀 = 𝑑 −
𝑑
𝑥𝑀

0
𝐵
𝛱𝑊

=

𝑝𝑌𝑊𝐵

−

𝑤𝑀 𝑌𝑀𝐵

𝑑2
2𝑥𝑀

2
𝑑2
𝑞𝑀
= 𝑝 (𝑑 −
) − 𝑤𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 −
)
2𝑥𝑀
2𝑥𝑀

𝐵
Substitute 𝑥̃𝑀
(𝑞𝑀 ) = 𝛼𝑞𝑀 :
𝐵
̃𝑊
𝛱
= 𝑝 (𝑑 −
2̃𝐵

𝑑2
1
) − 𝑤𝑀 𝑞𝑀 (1 − )
2𝛼𝑞𝑀
2𝛼

2

𝑑 𝛱
𝑑 𝑝
𝐵
𝐵
̃𝑊
̃𝑊
SOC of 𝛱
is 𝑑 𝑞2𝑊 = − 𝑎𝑞3 < 0: 𝛱
is concave in 𝑞𝑀
𝑀

𝑀

̃𝐵
𝑑𝛱

𝑝

2

𝑑

1

𝐵
𝐵∗
̃𝑊
Solve the FOC of 𝛱
, 𝑑 𝑞𝑊 = 2𝛼 (𝑞 ) − 𝑤𝑀 (1 − 2𝛼) = 0 → 𝑞𝑀
= 𝜏𝑞𝑀 , where 𝜏 =
𝑀

𝑀

𝑚

√(2𝛼−1)𝑤 . ∎
𝑀

Proof of Lemma 4.2:
𝐵

𝑆 =𝑑−

𝑌𝑊𝐵

𝑑2
𝑑2
= (𝑑 −
)=
2𝑥𝑀
2𝑥𝑀
𝑑2

𝑑

𝐵
𝐵∗
Substitute 𝑥̃𝑀
(𝑞𝑀 ) = 𝛼𝑞𝑀 and 𝑞𝑀
= 𝜏𝑞𝑀 : 𝑆 𝐵∗ = 2𝑎𝜏𝑑 = 2𝛼𝜏. ∎

Proof of Proposition 4.2:
a.

𝐵∗
𝜕𝑞𝑀
𝜕𝑚

= 2𝑚 √2𝛼−1 > 0; 𝜕𝑤𝑀 = 2𝑤

b.

𝐵∗
𝜕𝑥𝑀
𝜕𝑚

=

−
c.

𝑑

𝜕𝑞𝐵∗

𝑚

𝛼𝜏𝑑
𝑀 (1−2𝛼)

𝑀

𝑎𝑑𝜏
2𝑚

𝜕𝑥 𝐵∗

> 0; 𝜕𝑤𝑀 =
𝑀

𝑑

𝐵∗
𝜕𝑞𝑀
𝜕𝑐𝑀

𝑑𝜏(√𝑤𝑀 −√2𝑐𝑀 )(√2𝑤𝑀 −√𝑐𝑀 )
2 𝑎(2𝑎−1)2
4√2𝑐𝑀

√2𝑎𝑑𝜏(√𝑤𝑀 −√2𝑐𝑀 )(√2𝑤𝑀 −√𝑐𝑀 )
2 (2𝑎−1)2
4𝑐𝑀

𝜕𝑆 𝐵∗
𝜕𝑚

< 0;

𝜕𝑆 𝐵∗

= − 4𝑎𝑚𝜏 < 0; 𝜕𝑤 = −
𝑀

= 2𝑐

𝛼𝜏𝑑

𝑀 (2𝛼−1)

> 0;

𝐵∗
𝜕𝑥𝑀
𝜕𝑐𝑀

𝜕𝑆 𝐵∗
𝜕𝑐𝑀

=

>0

=

<0

𝜏𝑑(√𝑤𝑀 −√2𝑐𝑀 )
3
2
4𝑚𝑤𝑀

< 0;

𝜏𝑑(√𝑤𝑀 −√2𝑐𝑀 )
4𝑚𝑐𝑀 √𝑤𝑀

>0∎

Proof of Lemma 4.3:
It can be proved that 𝑞𝑀 + 𝑞𝐺 < 𝑑 is not optimal, therefore, the following proof is based
on 𝑞𝑀 + 𝑞𝐺 ≥ 𝑑.
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According to our assumption of the procurement rule in Model D, 𝑦𝑖𝐷 as a function 𝑢𝑀 is
summarized in Table C. 1.
Table C. 1: 𝑦𝑖𝐷 as a function 𝑢𝑀 , 𝑖 ∈ {𝑀, 𝐺, 𝑊}
𝒖𝑴

∈ [𝟎,

𝒅 − 𝒙𝑮
]
𝒙𝑴

∈(

𝒅 − 𝒙𝑮 𝒅 − 𝒒𝑮
,
]
𝒙𝑴
𝒙𝑴

∈(

𝒅 − 𝒒𝑮 𝒒𝑴
, ]
𝒙𝑴 𝒙𝑴

∈(

𝒒𝑴
, 𝟏]
𝒙𝑴

𝒚𝑫
𝑴

𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀

𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀

𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀

𝑞𝑀

𝒚𝑫
𝑮

𝑥𝐺

𝑑 − 𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀

𝑞𝐺

𝑞𝐺

𝒚𝑫
𝑾

𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀 + 𝑥𝐺

𝑑

𝑑

𝑑

We first obtain 𝑌𝑖𝐵 , 𝑖 ∈ {𝑀, 𝐺, 𝑊}:
𝑌𝑀𝐵

=∫

𝑞𝑀
𝑥𝑀

1

𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀 𝑓(𝑢𝑀 )ⅆ𝑢𝑀 + ∫ 𝑞𝑀 𝑓(𝑢𝑀 )ⅆ𝑢𝑀 = 𝑞𝑀 −
𝑞𝑀
𝑥𝑀

0

𝑌𝐺𝐵

=∫

𝑑−𝑥𝐺
𝑥𝑀

𝑥𝐺 𝑓(𝑢𝑀 )ⅆ𝑢𝑀 + ∫

𝑑−𝑥𝐺
𝑥𝑀

0

=
𝑌𝑊𝐵 = ∫

𝑑−𝑥𝐺
𝑥𝑀

𝑑−𝑞𝐺
𝑥𝑀

2
𝑞𝑀
2𝑥𝑀

1

(𝑑 − 𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀 )𝑓(𝑢𝑀 )ⅆ𝑢𝑀 + ∫

𝑑−𝑞𝐺
𝑥𝑀

𝑞𝐺 𝑓(𝑢𝑀 )ⅆ𝑢𝑀

2𝑑(𝑥𝐺 − 𝑞𝐺 ) − 𝑥𝐺2 + 2𝑥𝑀 𝑞𝐺 + 𝑞𝐺2
2𝑥𝑀
1

(𝑢𝑀 𝑥𝑀 + 𝑥𝐺 )𝑓(𝑢𝑀 )ⅆ𝑢𝑀 + ∫

𝑑−𝑥𝐺
𝑥𝑀

0

𝑑𝑓(𝑢𝑀 )ⅆ𝑢𝑀 =

2𝑑(𝑥𝐺 + 𝑥𝑀 ) − (𝑑 2 + 𝑥𝐺2 )
2𝑥𝑀

We then obtain the manufacturer and the government’s expected utility functions:
𝐷
𝛱𝑀

=

𝑤𝑀 𝑌𝑀𝐷

2
𝑞𝑀
− 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀 = 𝑤𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 −
) − 𝑐𝑀 𝑥𝑀
2𝑥𝑀

𝐷)
𝛱𝐺𝐷 = (𝑏 − 𝑝)𝑌𝑊𝐷 + 𝑤𝐺 𝑦𝐺𝐷 − 𝑐𝐺 𝑥𝐺 − 𝑠𝐺 (𝑑 − 𝑦𝑊

2𝑑(𝑥𝐺 + 𝑥𝑀 ) − (𝑑 2 + 𝑥𝐺2 )
2𝑑(𝑥𝐺 − 𝑞𝐺 ) − 𝑥𝐺2 + 2𝑥𝑀 𝑞𝐺 + 𝑞𝐺2
= (𝑏 − 𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 )
+ 𝑤𝐺
2𝑥𝑀
2𝑥𝑀
− 𝑐𝐺 𝑥𝐺 − 𝑠𝐺 𝑑
𝐷
SOC of 𝛱𝑀
is

SOC of 𝛱𝐺𝐷 is

𝐷
𝑑 2 𝛱𝑀

𝑑

2
𝑥𝑀

𝐷
𝑑 2 𝛱𝐺
2
𝑑 𝑥𝐺

=−
=−

2
𝑞𝑀
𝑤𝑀
3
𝑥𝑀

𝐷
< 0: 𝛱𝑀
is concave in 𝑥𝑀 .

𝑏−𝑝+𝑠𝐺 +𝑤𝐺
𝑥𝑀

< 0: 𝛱𝐺𝐷 is concave in 𝑥𝐺 .
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𝐷
Solve the FOC of 𝛱𝑀
and 𝛱𝐺𝐷 simultaneously,
𝑐𝐺

𝑥̃𝐺𝐷 = (𝑑 − 𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀 )+ , where 𝛽 = 𝑏−𝑝+𝑠

𝐺 +𝑤𝐺

𝐷
𝑑𝛱𝑀

𝑑 𝑥𝑀

𝑑𝛱 𝐷

𝐷
= 0 and 𝑑 𝑥𝐺 = 0: 𝑥̃𝑀
= 𝛼𝑞𝑀 and
𝐺

∎

Proof of Proposition 4.3:
We first obtain the wholesaler’s expected profit function:
𝐷
𝛱𝑊
= 𝑝𝑌𝑊𝐷 − 𝑤𝑀 𝑌𝑀𝐷 − 𝑤𝐺 𝑌𝐺𝐷
2
2𝑑(𝑥𝐺 + 𝑥𝑀 ) − (𝑑 2 + 𝑥𝐺2 )
𝑞𝑀
=𝑝
− 𝑤𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 −
)
2𝑥𝑀
2𝑥𝑀

2𝑑(𝑥𝐺 − 𝑞𝐺 ) − 𝑥𝐺2 + 2𝑥𝑀 𝑞𝐺 + 𝑞𝐺2
− 𝑤𝐺
2𝑥𝑀
Depending on the government’s best response function, there are two cases: 1. 𝑥̃𝐺𝐷 = 0; 2.
𝑥̃𝐺𝐷 = 𝑑 − 𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀 .
𝑑

1. 𝑥̃𝐺𝐷 = 0, if 𝑑 − 𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀 < 0, i.e., 𝑞𝑀 > 𝛽𝛼

In this case 𝑞𝐺 = 0: the wholesaler does not order from the government since it knows
𝐷
that the government will not produce anything. Substituting 𝑥̃𝑀
= 𝛼𝑞𝑀 , 𝑥̃𝐺𝐷 = 0, and

𝑞𝐺 = 0, the wholesaler’s expected profit function became
𝐷
̃𝑊
𝛱
=𝑝
𝐷
̃𝑊
The SOC of 𝛱
is

𝐷
̃𝑊
𝜕2𝛱
2
𝜕𝑞𝑀

2𝛼𝑞𝑀 − 𝑑 2
𝑞𝑀
− 𝑤𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 − )
2𝛼𝑞𝑀
2𝛼

𝑑2 𝑝

𝐷
̃𝑊
= 𝑎𝑞3 < 0: 𝛱
is concave in 𝑞𝑀 .
𝑀

𝐷
𝐵∗
̃𝑊
Solve the FOC of 𝛱
: 𝑞𝑀
= 𝜏𝑞𝑀 , where 𝜏 is the same as defined in Proposition 1.

𝑑

2. 𝑥̃𝐺𝐷 = 𝑑 − 𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀 (if 𝑑 − 𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀 > 0, i.e., 𝑞𝑀 < 𝛽𝛼)
𝐷
Substituting 𝑥̃𝑀
= 𝛼𝑞𝑀 and 𝑥̃𝐺𝐷 = 𝑑 − 𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀 , the wholesaler’s expected profit function

became
(𝑑 − 𝑞𝐺 )2 1 2
1
𝑞𝑀
𝐷
̃𝑊
𝛱
= 𝑝 (𝑑 − 𝛼𝛽 2 𝑞𝑀 ) − 𝑤𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 − ) − 𝑤𝐺 (𝑞𝐺 +
− 𝛼𝛽 𝑞𝑀 )
2
2𝛼
2𝛼𝑞𝑀
2
𝐷
̃𝑊
We check the SOC of 𝛱
:
𝐷
̃𝑊
(𝑑 − 𝑞𝐺 )2 𝑤𝐺
𝜕 2𝛱
<0
2 =−
3
𝜕𝑞𝑀
𝛼𝑞𝑀
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𝐷
̃𝑊
𝜕 2𝛱
𝑤𝐺
2 = − 𝛼𝑞 < 0
𝜕𝑞𝐺
𝑀
𝐷 2 ̃𝐷
𝐷 2
̃𝑊
̃𝑊
𝜕 2𝛱
𝜕 𝛱𝑊
𝜕 2𝛱
−(
) =0
2
𝜕𝑞𝑀 𝑞𝐺
𝜕𝑞𝑀
𝜕𝑞𝐺2
𝐷
𝐷
̃𝑊
̃𝑊
The SOC of 𝛱
is not conclusive. After examining 𝛱
, we conclude that there are two

candidates of the optimal solutions: the boundary solution with 𝑞𝐺 = 0 and the boundary
solution with 𝑞𝑀 = 0. Therefore, we solve the two candidates, and the candidate which
𝐷
̃𝑊
maximizes 𝛱
is the optimal solution

•

̃𝐷

𝜕𝛱
𝐷
̃𝑊
When 𝑞𝐺 = 0, 𝛱
is concave in 𝑞𝑀 , solve the 𝜕𝑞𝑊 = 0 → 𝑞𝑀 = 𝜃𝑑, where 𝜃 =
𝑀

√𝛼2 𝛽2(𝑝−𝑤
•

𝑤𝐺
.
𝐺 )+𝑤𝑀 (2𝛼−1)
1

When 𝑞𝑀 = 0: 𝑌𝑊𝐷 = 𝑑 − 2 𝛼𝛽 2 𝑞𝑀 = 𝑑, 𝑥̃𝐺𝐷 = 𝑑 − 𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀 = 𝑑, 𝑦𝐺𝐷 =
𝐷
min{𝑞𝑀 , 𝑥𝐺 } = min{𝑞𝑀 , 𝑑}, 𝜋𝑊
= 𝑝𝑑 − 𝑤𝐺 min{𝑞𝑀 , 𝑑} → 𝑞𝑀 = 𝑑.

Next, we prove 𝜃 < 𝜏:

𝑤𝐺
2
2
(𝑝−𝑤
𝛼 𝛽
𝐺 )+𝑤𝑀 (2𝛼−1)

𝑝

< (2𝛼−1)𝑤

𝑀

⇔ 𝑤𝐺 (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 <

𝑝(𝛼 2 𝛽 2 (𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺 ) + 𝑤𝑀 (2𝛼 − 1)) ⇔ −(𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺 )(𝛼 2 𝛽 2 𝑝 + (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 ) < 0. The last
inequality always holds, thus 𝜃 < 𝜏. ∎

Proof of Proposition 4.4:
𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑏
a. Compare 𝛱𝑊
vs. 𝛱𝑊
:
𝐷𝑎
𝛱𝑊

−

𝐷𝑏
𝛱𝑊

𝑑(−𝑤𝐺 + 𝜃(𝑎2 𝛽 2 𝜃(−𝑝 + 𝑤𝐺 ) + 𝜃𝑤𝑀 + 2𝑎(𝑤𝐺 − 𝜃𝑤𝑀 )))
=
2𝛼𝜃

Compare −𝑤𝐺 + 𝜃(𝑎2 𝛽 2 𝜃(−𝑝 + 𝑤𝐺 ) + 𝜃𝑤𝑀 + 2𝑎(𝑤𝐺 − 𝜃𝑤𝑀 )) vs. 0:
Plug in 𝛽, 𝜃 and 𝜏, the above expression became 2𝑤𝐺 (−1 + 𝑎

𝑤𝐺

√

𝑎2 𝑐2
𝐺 (𝑝−𝑤𝐺 )
(𝑏−𝑝+𝑠𝐺 +𝑤𝐺 )

2𝑤𝐺 𝛿2
𝑎2 𝑐𝐺2 (𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺 )
𝛿2 < 0 ⇔ 𝑎 𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 <
(𝑏 − 𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 + 𝑤𝐺 )2
2

We check the sign of 𝑎2 𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 :

2 +(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀

)=
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𝑎2 𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 = 𝑎2 𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝐺 + (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀
= (𝑎 − 1)2 𝑤𝐺 + (2𝛼 − 1)(𝑤𝐺 − 𝑤𝑀 ) > 0

the above equation become:
𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺
𝑏 − 𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 + 𝑤𝐺 < 𝑎𝑐𝐺 √ 2
𝑎 𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀
𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺
⇔ 𝑠𝐺 < 𝑠̅𝐺𝐷1 = 𝑎𝑐𝐺 √ 2
+ 𝑝 − 𝑏 − 𝑤𝐺
𝑎 𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀

If 𝑠𝐺𝑎𝑏 ≤ 0, i.e., 𝑐𝐺 < 𝑐𝐺𝑎𝑏 =

𝑏−𝑝+wG
𝑎

𝑎2 𝑤𝐺 −(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀

√

𝑝−𝑤𝐺

𝐷𝑎
: 𝑠𝐺𝑎𝑏 > 0 always holds: 𝛱𝑊
>

𝐷𝑏
𝛱𝑊

If 𝑐𝐺 > 𝑐𝐺𝑎𝑏
𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑏
𝑠𝐺 < 𝑠𝐺𝑎𝑏 ⇔ 𝛿2 < 0 ⇔ 𝛱𝑊
< 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑏
𝑠𝐺 > 𝑠𝐺𝑎𝑏 ⇔ 𝛿2 > 0 ⇔ 𝛱𝑊
> 𝛱𝑊

𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑐
b. Compare 𝛱𝑊
vs. 𝛱𝑊
:

𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑐
𝛱𝑊
− 𝛱𝑊
=

𝑑(𝑝𝜃(1 − 𝑎2 𝛽 2 𝜏𝜃) + 𝜏(𝑎2 𝛽 2 𝜃 2 − 1)𝑤𝐺 + (2𝑎 − 1)𝜏(𝜏 − 𝜃)𝜃𝑤𝑀 )
2𝑎𝜏𝜃

Compare 𝑝𝜃(1 − 𝑎2 𝛽 2 𝜏𝜃) + 𝜏(𝑎2 𝛽 2 𝜃 2 − 1)𝑤𝐺 + (2𝑎 − 1)𝜏(𝜏 − 𝜃)𝜃𝑤𝑀 vs. 0:
Plug in 𝛽, 𝜃 and 𝜏, the above expression became 2 (𝑝

𝑤𝐺

√

𝑎2 𝑐2
𝐺 (𝑝−𝑤𝐺 )

−

2 +(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
(𝑏−𝑝+𝑠𝐺 +𝑤𝐺 )

𝑝

𝑤𝐺 √(2𝛼−1)𝑤 ) = 2𝛿
𝑀

𝑤

𝐺
𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑐
𝛱𝑊
> 𝛱𝑊
⇔ 𝛿 > 0 ⇔ 𝑠𝐺 > 𝑠𝐺𝑎𝑐 = 𝛼𝑐𝐺 √(2𝛼−1)𝑤
+ 𝑝 − 𝑏 − 𝑤𝐺
𝑀

If 𝑠̅𝐺 < 0 (i.e., 𝑐𝐺 < 𝑐𝐺𝑎𝑐 =
If 𝑠̅𝐺 > 0 (i.e., 𝑐𝐺 > 𝑐𝐺𝑎𝑐 )

𝑏−𝑝+𝑤𝐺
𝑎

(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀

√

𝑤𝐺

𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑐
) ⇔ 𝑠𝐺 > 𝑠𝐺𝑎𝑐 always holds: 𝛱𝑊
> 𝛱𝑊
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𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑐
If 𝑠𝐺 > 𝑠𝐺𝑎𝑐 : 𝛱𝑊
> 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑐
If 𝑠𝐺 < 𝑠𝐺𝑎𝑐 : 𝛱𝑊
< 𝛱𝑊

𝐷𝑏
𝐷𝑐
c. Compare 𝛱𝑊
vs. 𝛱𝑊
:
𝐷𝑏
𝐷𝑐
𝛱𝑊
− 𝛱𝑊
=

𝑑(𝑝 + 𝜏(−2𝑎𝑤𝐺 + (2𝑎 − 1)𝜏𝑤𝑀 ))
2𝑎𝜏

Compare 𝑝 + 𝜏(−2𝑎𝑤𝐺 + (2𝑎 − 1)𝜏𝑤𝑀 ) with 0:
𝑝

Plug in 𝛽, 𝜃 and 𝜏, the above expression became 2 (𝑝 − 𝑎𝑤𝐺 √(2𝑎−1)𝑤 ) = 2𝛿 𝑏𝑐
𝑀

𝛿 𝑏𝑐 < 0 ⇔ 𝑝 − 𝑎𝑤𝐺 √
𝑝

𝑝
𝑝
< 0 ⇔ 𝑤𝐺 >
(2𝑎 − 1)𝑤𝑀
𝑎𝜏

𝑝

If 𝑎𝜏 > 𝑝, i.e., 𝑎𝜏 < 1 then 𝑤𝐺 > 𝑎𝜏 cannot hold. We compare 𝑎𝜏 vs. 1:𝑎𝜏 =
𝑝

𝑎√(2𝑎−1)𝑤 > 1 ⇔ 𝑝 >

(2𝑎−1)𝑤𝑀

𝑀

𝑎2

⇔ 𝑚𝑤𝑀 >

(2𝑎−1)𝑤𝑀

(𝑎 − 1)2 = 𝑎2 − 2𝑎 + 1 > 0 → 𝑎2 > 2𝑎 − 1 →

𝑎2
(2𝑎−1)
𝑎2

⇔𝑚>

(2𝑎−1)
𝑎2

.

< 1 .Thus 𝑚 >

(2𝑎−1)
𝑎2

always

𝑝

hold, and 𝑎𝜏 < 𝑝 always hold. Therefore:
𝑝

𝐷𝑏
𝐷𝑐
If 𝑤𝐺 ≤ 𝑎𝜏: 𝛱𝑊
≥ 𝛱𝑊
𝑝

𝐷𝑏
𝐷𝑐
If 𝑤𝐺 > 𝑎𝜏: 𝛱𝑊
< 𝛱𝑊
.∎

Proof of Lemma 4.4:
𝑝

Since 𝑝 = 𝑚𝑤𝑀 , 𝜏 𝐵 can be rewritten as √(2𝛼−1)𝑤 . 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛, 𝜏 𝑆𝑊 can be obtained from 𝜏 𝐵
𝑀

by replacing the unit procurement cost (𝑤𝑀 ) by 𝑤𝑀 − 𝛾𝑤 . 𝜏 𝑆𝑃 can be obtained from 𝜏 𝐵
by replacing the unit revenue (𝑝) by 𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝 . ∎

Proof of Proposition 4.5:
We first simplify 𝛱𝐺𝑆 as follows:
𝛱𝐺𝑆 = (𝑏 − 𝑝)𝑌𝑊𝑆 − 𝑠𝐺 (𝑑 − 𝑌𝑊𝑆 ) − 𝛾𝑤 𝑌𝑀𝑆 − 𝛾𝑝 𝑌𝑊𝑆
= (𝑏 − 𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 − 𝛾𝑝 )𝑌𝑊𝑆 − 𝛾𝑤 𝑌𝑀𝑆 − 𝑠𝐺 𝑑
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𝑞

𝑑

Similar to the basic model, 𝑌𝑀𝑆 = 𝑞𝑀 (1 − 2𝑥𝑀 ) and 𝑌𝑊𝑆 = 𝑑 (1 − 2𝑥 ). Then, 𝛱𝐺𝑆 can be
𝑀

𝑀

expressed as:
𝛱𝐺𝑆 = (𝑏 − 𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 − 𝛾𝑝 )𝑑 (1 −
•

𝑑
𝑞𝑀
) − 𝛾𝑤 𝑞𝑀 (1 −
) − 𝑠𝐺 𝑑
2𝑥𝑀
2𝑥𝑀

Model SW

𝑆
𝑆𝑊
̃𝐺𝑆𝑊 as a function of 𝛾𝑤
We substitute 𝑥̃𝑀
, 𝑞̃𝑀
, and 𝛾𝑝 = 0 to obtain 𝛱

1

̃𝐺𝑆𝑊 (𝛾𝑤 ) = (𝑏 − 𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 )𝑑 1 −
𝛱

− 𝛾𝑤 𝑑 √

𝑝
(2𝛼 − 1)(𝑤𝑀 − 𝛾𝑤 ))

2𝛼 √

(

𝑝
1
(1 − ) − 𝑠𝐺 𝑑
(2𝛼 − 1)(𝑤𝑀 − 𝛾𝑤 )
2𝑎

2 ̃ 𝑆𝑊

)−3𝑝𝑤𝑀 )
̃𝐺𝑆𝑊 is 𝜕 𝛱𝐺2 = 𝑑((𝑏−2𝑝+𝑠𝐺)(𝑤𝑀 −𝛾3 𝑤𝑆𝑊
The SOC of 𝛱
, which is not conclusive. We
𝜕𝛾
8𝛼(𝑤 −𝛾 ) 𝜏
𝑀

𝑤

𝑤

solve the interior solution and plug it back to the SOC to verify the concavity.
̃𝐺𝑆𝑊 ,
By solving the FOC of 𝛱

𝑆𝑊
̃𝐺
𝜕𝛱

𝜕𝛾𝑤

=

𝑑((𝑏−2𝑝+𝑠𝐺 )(𝑤𝑀 −𝛾𝑤 )−𝑝𝑤𝑀 )
4𝛼(𝑤𝑀 −𝛾𝑤 )2 tausW

𝑏−3𝑝+𝑠

= 0, we obtain the
𝑝𝑤

𝑀
interior solution 𝛾𝑤𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 𝑏−2𝑝+𝑠𝐺 𝑤𝑀 = 𝑤𝑀 − 𝛾̂𝑤 , where 𝛾̂𝑤 = 𝑏−2𝑝+𝑠
.
𝐺

If 𝑏 − 2𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 < 0 (i.e., 𝑝 >
If 𝑏 − 2𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 > 0 (i.e., 𝑝 <

𝑏+𝑠𝐺
2
𝑏+𝑠𝐺
2

𝐺

):

𝑆𝑊
̃𝐺
𝜕𝛱

):

If 𝑏 − 3𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 < 0 (i.e., 𝑝 >
If 𝑏 − 3𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 ≥ 0 (i.e., 𝑝 ≤
abtain

•

𝑆𝑊
̃𝐺
𝜕2𝛱
2
𝜕𝛾𝑤

=−

̃𝐺𝑆𝑊 is decreasing in 𝛾𝑤 , thus 𝛾𝑤∗ = 0.
< 0, i.e., 𝛱

𝜕𝛾𝑤

𝑏+𝑠𝐺
3
𝑏+𝑠𝐺
3

): 𝛾𝑤𝐼𝑁𝑇 < 0, and 𝛾𝑤∗ = 0.
): 𝛾𝑤∗ = 𝛾𝑤𝐼𝑁𝑇 . We substitute 𝛾𝑤𝐼𝑁𝑇 in the SOC to

𝑑(𝑏−2𝑝+𝑠𝐺 )3
2 √ 𝑏−2𝑝+𝑠𝐺
4𝛼𝑝2 𝑤𝑀
(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀

̃𝐺𝑆𝑊 .
< 0 to verify the concavity of 𝛱

Model SP

𝑆
𝑆𝑃
̃𝐺𝑆𝑃 as a function of 𝛾𝑝
We subsititute 𝑥̃𝑀
, 𝑞̃𝑀
, and 𝛾𝑤 = 0 to obtain 𝛱

̃𝐺𝑆𝑃 (𝛾𝑝 ) = (𝑏 − 𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 − 𝛾𝑝 )𝑑 1 −
𝛱
(

1
𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝
2𝛼√
(2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀

− 𝑠𝐺 𝑑
)
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2 ̃ 𝑆𝑃

̃𝐺𝑆𝑃 is 𝜕 𝛱𝐺2 = − 𝑑(3(𝑏+𝑠𝐺
The SOC of 𝛱
𝜕𝛾
𝑆𝑃
̃𝐺
𝜕𝛱

𝜕𝑝

2

8𝑎(𝑝+𝛾𝑝 ) 𝜏𝑆𝑝

𝑝

̃𝐺𝑆𝑃 is
The FOC of 𝛱

)+𝑝+𝛾𝑝 )

=

̃𝐺𝑆𝑃 is concave in 𝛾𝑝 .
< 0: 𝛱

𝑑(𝑏+𝑠𝐺 +(1−4𝛼)𝜏𝑆𝑝 (𝑝+𝛾𝑝 ))
4𝑎(𝑝+𝛾𝑝 )𝜏𝑆𝑝

= 0 ⇔ 𝑏 + 𝑠𝐺 + (1 − 4𝛼𝜏 𝑆𝑝 )(𝑝 +

𝛾𝑝 ) = 0.
The above equation can be transformed to: −16𝛼 2 𝛤𝑝 3 + 𝐴𝛤𝑝 2 + 2𝐴 𝐵𝛤𝑝 + 𝐴𝐵 2 = 0,
where 𝛤𝑝 = 𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝 , 𝐴 = (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 > 0, and 𝐵 = 𝑏 + 𝑠𝐺 > 0. The left-hand side of
the equation is a cubit function of 𝛤𝑝 , with a discriminant ∆= −64𝛼 2 𝐴2 (108𝛼 2 +
𝐴𝐵 3 ) < 0. Thus, the cubic function has a single root for 𝛤𝑝 :
𝛾̂𝑝 =

1
48𝛼2

(𝐴 +

𝐴(𝐴+96𝛼2 𝐵)
𝜑

+ 𝜑)

where 𝜑 = 𝐴3 + 144𝛼 2 𝐴2 𝐵 + 3456𝛼 4 𝐴𝐵 2 + 192√3√𝛼 6 𝐴2 𝐵 3 (𝐴 + 108𝛼 2 𝐵).
Therefore, the interior solution of 𝛾𝑝 is 𝛾𝑝𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 𝛾̂𝑝 − 𝑝. Taking into consideration the nonnegativity constraint of 𝛾𝑝 , the optimal sotluion is
+

𝛾𝑝∗ = (𝛾̂𝑝 − 𝑝) .∎

Proof of Proposition 4.6:
We prove the case that 𝛾𝑤∗ = 𝛾𝑤𝐼𝑁𝑇 , i.e., 𝑝 ≤
𝐼𝑁𝑇
𝜕𝛾𝑤
𝜕𝑚

(𝑏+sG )w2M

= − (𝑏+s

𝑝𝑤𝑀
(𝑏−2𝑝+𝑠𝐺 )2

When 𝑝 >

𝑏+𝑠𝐺
3

G −2𝑚wM )

2

< 0;

𝐼𝑁𝑇
𝜕𝛾𝑤
𝜕𝑤𝑀

𝑏+𝑠𝐺
3

:

𝑏−3𝑝+sG

= 𝑏−2𝑝+sG ≥ 0;

𝐼𝑁𝑇
𝜕𝛾𝑤
𝜕𝑏

𝑝𝑤

𝑀
= (𝑏−2𝑝+𝑠

𝐺)

2

> 0;

𝐼𝑁𝑇
𝜕𝛾𝑤
𝜕𝑠𝐺

=

> 0.

, 𝛾𝑤∗ = 0, and the derivative with respect to any parameter equals zero. ∎

Proof of Proposition 4.7:
If 𝛱𝐺𝑆∗ > 𝛱𝐺𝐵∗ , then 𝛾𝑤∗ > 0. It can be easily verified that 𝜏 𝑆∗ is increasing in 𝛾𝑤 .
1

1

Therefore, 𝑌𝑊𝑆∗ = (1 − 2𝛼𝜏𝑆∗) 𝑑 and 𝑌𝑀𝑆∗ = (1 − 2𝛼) 𝜏 𝑆∗ 𝑑 are increasing in 𝛾𝑤 , and
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𝑑

𝑆∗
𝑆𝑗∗ = 2𝛼𝜏𝑆∗ is decreasing in 𝛾𝑤 . 𝛱𝑀
can be rewritten as follows:

𝑆∗
𝛱𝑀
= 𝑤𝑀 (1 −

1
1
) 𝜏 𝑆∗ 𝑑 − 𝑐𝑀 𝛼𝜏 𝑆∗ 𝑑 = 𝜏 𝑆∗ 𝑑 (𝑤𝑀 (1 − ) − 𝑐𝑀 𝛼)
2𝛼
2𝛼

(2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 − 2𝛼 2 𝑐𝑀
= 𝜏 𝑆∗ 𝑑 (
)
2𝛼
(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀 −𝑤𝑀

𝑤

𝑆∗
Plug in 𝛼 = √2𝑐𝑀 : 𝛱𝑀
= 𝜏 𝑆∗ 𝑑 (
𝑀

(𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
𝛼

2𝛼

(𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀

) = 𝜏 𝑆∗ 𝑑 (

𝛼

). Because 𝛼 > 1,

𝑆∗
> 0 and 𝛱𝑀
is increasing in 𝜏 𝑆∗ .

𝐵∗
If 𝛱𝑆∗
𝑊 < 𝛱𝑊 , then the wholesaler can receive the subsidy from the government, but use its

optimal order quantity in Model B to get a profit 𝛱𝐵∗
𝑊 . Knowing this reaction, the
government will not provide any subsidy if the wholesaler prefers its profit in Model B.
𝐵∗
Therefore, if the government chooses to provide subsidy, then 𝛱𝑆∗
𝑊 ≥ 𝛱𝑊 . ∎

Proof of
Proposition 4.8:
If 𝛱𝐺𝐷∗ > 𝛱𝐺𝐵∗ , (i.e., the government chooses a dual sourcing strategy), then the
wholesaler has the option to procure the drug from either or both manufacturers. The
following proof is based on the on the condition that a public manufacturer has been
established (i.e., Model D is available for the wholesaler)
•

𝑗∗

The wholesaler’s expected profit (𝛱𝑊 )

In Model D, the wholesaler moves first, and it will make the optimal procurement
decisions to maximize its own profit. Since the wholesaler’s optimal profit in Model B is
equal to its optimal profit under a private procurement plan in Model D, the wholesaler
will be no worse off in a Model D than in Model B.
•

The shortage amount (𝑆𝑗 )

We first prove the shortage amount. Let 𝑆 𝐷𝑎 , 𝑆 𝐷𝑏 and 𝑆 𝐷𝑐 be the expected shortage
amount if the wholesaler uses procurement plan a, b and c as indicated in Proposition 4.3,
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respectively. Since 𝑆 𝐷𝑐 > 0 and 𝑆 𝐷𝑏 = 0, we know 𝑆 𝐷𝑐 > 𝑆 𝐷𝑏 . Next, we compare 𝑆 𝐷𝑎
with 𝑆 𝐷𝑐 : 𝑆 𝐷𝑎 < 𝑆 𝐷𝑐 , i.e.,

𝛼 2𝛽2√

𝛼𝛽 2 𝜃𝑑
2

𝑑

< 2𝛼𝜏 ⇔ 𝛼 2 𝛽 2 𝜃𝜏 < 1. Plug in 𝜃 and 𝜏, we have:

𝑝
𝑤𝐺
< 1 ⇔ 𝛼 4 𝛽 4 𝑝 𝑤𝐺
√ 2 2
(2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 𝛼 𝛽 (𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺 ) + (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀
< (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 (𝛼 2 𝛽 2 (𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺 ) + (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 )
⇔ (𝛼 2 𝛽 2 𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 )(𝛼 2 𝛽2 𝑝 + (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 )

Since 𝛼 2 𝛽 2 𝑝 + (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 > 0, we check 𝛼 2 𝛽 2 𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 .
𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑐
In the proof of Proposition 4.4.b, we have 𝛱𝑊
> 𝛱𝑊
iff 𝛿 > 0. We minipulate this

condition as follows: 𝛿 = 𝑝√𝛼2 𝛽2(𝑝−𝑤

𝑤𝐺

𝐺 )+(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀

𝑤𝐺
𝐺 )+(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀

𝑝√𝛼2 𝛽2(𝑝−𝑤

𝑝

𝑝

− 𝑤𝐺 √(2𝛼−1)𝑤 > 0 ⇔
𝑀

𝑤𝐺
𝐺 )+(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀

> 𝑤𝐺 √(2𝛼−1)𝑤 ⇔ 𝑝2 𝛼2 𝛽2(𝑝−𝑤
𝑀

𝑝

> 𝑤𝐺2 (2𝛼−1)𝑤 ⇔
𝑀

𝑝(2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 > 𝑤𝐺 (𝛼 2 𝛽 2 (𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺 ) + (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 ) ⇔ 𝑝(2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 −
𝑤𝐺 (𝛼 2 𝛽 2 (𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺 ) + (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 ) > 0 ⇔ −(𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺 )(𝛼 2 𝛽 2 𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 ) >
𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑐
0 ⇔ 𝛼 2 𝛽 2 𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 < 0. Thus, if 𝛱𝑊
> 𝛱𝑊
, then 𝑆 𝐷𝑎 < 𝑆 𝐷𝑐 .

If the wholesaler chooses a mixed procurement plan (plan a) or a public procurement plan
(plan 𝑏), then the shortage amount in the implemented plan is less than that in a private
procurement plan (plan c, which is the same as Model B). If the wholesaler chooses a
private procurement plan, then the shortage amount is the same as it in Model B.
Therefore, if the government chooses to operate a public manufacturer, then the
wholesaler will choose the optimal procurement plan to maximize its own profit, and the
shortage amount under the wholesaler ‘s optimal procurement plan is less than or equal to
the shortage amount in Model B.
•

𝑗∗

The wholesaler’s expected delivered quantity (𝑌𝑊 )
1

Since 𝑌𝑊𝐷𝑐 = (1 − 2𝛼𝜏) 𝑑 < 𝑌𝑊𝐷𝑏 = 𝑑, we know that if the wholesaler chooses plan a,
then it delivered quantity in plan a is greater than that in plan 𝑐.
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Next, we compare 𝑌𝑊𝐷𝑎 with 𝑌𝑊𝐷𝑐 : 𝑌𝑊𝐷𝑎 − 𝑌𝑊𝐷𝑐 = (1 −
1

(2𝛼𝜏 −

𝛼𝛽 2 𝜃
2

𝛼𝛽 2 𝜃
2

1

) 𝑑 − (1 − 2𝛼𝜏) 𝑑 =

) 𝑑. 𝑌𝑊𝐷𝑎 > 𝑌𝑊𝐷𝑐 iff 𝛼 2 𝛽 2 𝜃𝜏 < 1. As proved for the shortage amount, this

𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑐
condition holds if 𝛱𝑊
> 𝛱𝑊
. Following the similar discussion in the proof for the

shortage amount, we know that the wholesaler’s expected delivered quantity under its
optimal procurement plan is greater than or equal to its expected delivered quantity in
Model B.
𝑗∗

•

The manufacturer’s expected delivered quantity (𝑌𝑊 )
1

𝑌𝑀𝐷𝑐 = (1 − 2𝛼) 𝜏𝑑 > 𝑌𝑀𝐷𝑏 = 0. Next, we compare 𝑌𝑀𝐷𝑎 with 𝑌𝑀𝐷𝑐 : 𝑌𝑀𝐷𝑎 − 𝑌𝑀𝐷𝑐 =
1

1

1

(1 − 2𝛼) 𝜃𝑑 − (1 − 2𝛼) 𝜏𝑑 = (1 − 2𝛼) 𝑑(𝜃 − 𝜏) < 0 (we prove that 𝜃 < 𝜏 in
Proposition 4.3). Thus 𝑌𝑀𝐷𝑎 < 𝑌𝑀𝐷𝑐 always holds. Following the same discussion for the
shortage amount, we know that the manufacturer’s expected delivered quantity under the
wholesaler’s optimal procurement plan is less than or equal to the manufacturer’s
expected delivered quantity in Model B.
•

𝑗∗

The manufacturer’s expected profit (𝛱𝑀 )

𝐷𝑐
𝐷𝑏
𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑐
𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑐
𝛱𝑀
> 𝛱𝑀
= 0. Next, we compare 𝛱𝑀
with 𝛱𝑀
: 𝛱𝑀
− 𝛱𝑀
=

𝑑(𝜃−𝜏)(𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
2𝑎

. Since

𝐷𝑎
𝐷𝑐
𝜃 < 𝜏 and 𝛼 > 1, 𝛱𝑀
< 𝛱𝑀
always holds. Following the same logic with the previous

discussion, we know that the manufacturer’s expected profit under the wholesaler’s
optimal procurement plan is less than or equal to the manufacturer’s expected profit in
Model B. ∎
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